Randall is also open to the idea of more particles, just as normal matter consists of a slew of
subatomic entities, including quarks, electrons and neutrinos.
According to the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics (although «orthodox» seems an odd description for such a radical world view),
subatomic entities such as electrons or photons are either waves or particles — depending on how the physicist chooses to observe them.
She argues that it has been a serious mistake for interpreters of Whitehead «to limit the application of his basic ontological category of existence — his actual entity — to just two kinds of existents:
subatomic entities, such as electrons, protons, photons and the like, and human percipient experience.»
The issue that was posed above was whether the exhaustive analysis of tables into
subatomic entities yields tiny substances with attributes, or instead, events in relation.
Whitehead agrees that it is implausible to suppose that
subatomic entities are conscious or that they think.
The analysis of
the subatomic entities leads to quanta of energy that are much better described as energy - events than as substances.
They could not say whether
the subatomic entities were waves or particles, and since a wave can not be a particle or a particle a wave, they recognized they had no idea of the actual nature of what they studied.
She argues that it has been a serious mistake for interpreters of Whitehead «to limit the application of his basic ontological category of existence — his actual entity — to just two kinds of existents:
subatomic entities, such as electrons, protons, photons...
In itself this would have had minor philosophical consequences if
the subatomic entities could be understood as smaller exemplars of the sorts of entities that physicists had been studying.
The hold of substantialist metaphysics was so strong that, when the substantialist concepts failed to describe
the subatomic entities, most scientists inclined to the view that no conceptual grasp is possible.
The study of
subatomic entities could not be made to fit with the existing scientific worldview.
Not exact matches
Whitehead's ontological principle implies that everything is an actual
entity (in the strictest sense of the word) or combination of actual
entities: both mental experiences and events on the
subatomic level are actual
entities.
20 It has been argued that
subatomic particles require a different logic than the one that applies to macroscopic
entities.
The usual answer is that the structure which Whitehead imputes to his functional feeling is «micrological» in character, i.e., that feeling, as the function of actual
entities, belongs to an impalpable
subatomic realm lying at the basis of things.
Such
entities are not identifiable among
subatomic particles, among human persons, or elsewhere.
How «real» are
entities such as quarks, and to what extent should they be regarded simply as artificial models and analogies to help us try to understand the incomprehensible
subatomic world?