Sentences with phrase «subjective aim of»

These forces seem to correspond to the physical pole, the mental pole, and the subjective aim of an actual occasion.

This way is in correspondence to the two aspects a and ß of the subjective aim of worldly entities mentioned above.

In part the subjective aim of human occasions is conscious.

There he says concerning the subjective aim of a concrescence: «The subjective aim, whereby there is origination of conceptual feeling, is at intensity of feeling (a) in the immediate subject, and (ß) in the relevant future» (Cat.

Among the entities so felt, God will always be by far the most important one and, in some respects, prior to all the others.18 The subjective aim of the new occasion will be some synthesis and adaptation of these aims for it, which it also feels conformally.

About the subjective aim of God's consequent nature Whitehead says: «His primordial nature directs such perspectives of objectification [in his consequent nature] that each novel actuality in the temporal world contributes such elements as it can to a realization in God free from inhibitions of intensity by reason of discordance» (PR 88, italics added).

If we ask how this difference arises, and if we press our question fully, we find that the answer is that in each occasion of human experience there is a decision determining the subjective aim of the occasion which may deviate from the full ideal offered the occasion in its initial phase.

This is because the subjective aim of such an occasion is so nearly limited to repeating the physical patterns which we can detect; in other words, if we pay attention only to the physical characteristics of these enduring objects, we are not missing anything very significant.

But it would be ridiculous to postulate that the subjective aim of the wasp was the survival of the species.

According to Whitehead all life aims at satisfaction, albeit the varying contents of the particular satisfaction are determined by the subjective aim of the unique creative desire of each entity.

This includes the objective form according to which feelings of causal efficacy prehend past actual occasions, the subjective form — how the occasion prehends — and the subjective aim of the present concrescence — how it wants to be a datum for future becomings.

In this interaction some of the factors of the persuasive initial ideal from God are eliminated, becoming the persuasive subjective aim of the occasion which is its final cause (PR 227, 323, 342).

Thus, granted the existence of God, I myself hold that the person is created by God, and I would suggest that this view is what is required by a Whiteheadian theory if we are to take seriously the view that God creates the subjective aim of any actual occasion.

The subjective aim of the new occasion must be formed by some synthesis or adaptation of these aims for which it is itself finally responsible.

Second, it interprets the subjective aim of the actual occasion as arising more impartially out of hybrid feelings of aims (propositional feelings whose subjective form involves appetition) entertained for the new occasion by its predecessors.

We will assume that God's aim for it, a propositional feeling for which the new occasion is the logical subject and some complex eternal object the predicate, will in every case be prehended and play a decisive role in the determination of the subjective aim of the occasion.

This means that God's ideal aim for Jesus was that he be prehended in such a way as to maximize the importance for Jesus» subjective aim of the fact that it was God whom he was prehending, i.e., to maximize God's influence upon Jesus beyond the initial phase of his subjective aim.

This allows, in turn, the composition of the subjective aim of the concrescing occasion at its own self - actualization being determined finally by its own modification or shaping of the various possibilities granted it through the aims at fulfillment for it of all the actual occasions in its past (CNT 96).

The perfection of the subjective aim of an actual occasion is «the absence from it of component feelings which mutually inhibit each other...» (Adventures of Ideas, New York: The Free Press, 1967, 256) One form of inhibition, complete inhibition, is finiteness and does not derogate from perfection.

For according to the category of subjective intensity, the subjective aim of an occasion is directed not merely at intensity of feeling in the present subject, but also in its relevant future.

I do not know why Whiteheadians should object (PS 6:219) to this monistic theme, since they are committed to think in terms of a God who supplies the initial subjective aim of each actual entity, and of the completion of the development of the actual entity by «the final reaction of the self - creative unity of the universe» (PR 75 — italics supplied).

For Whitehead the real object is thereby adumbrated: the intentional object is the real object under the aspect of prehension N in accordance with the subjective aim of the becoming occasion.

Accordingly, what happens during the occasions process of becoming is, in part at least, «merely the outcome of the subjective aim of the subject, determining what it is integrally to be, in its own character of the superject of its own process» (PR 369).

The initial phase of the subjective aim of an occasion Whitehead often calls simply the initial aim.

To slip into Whiteheadian technical terminology, I understand Jesus as a figure the story of whom we objectify with peculiar vividness as a result of his power to grasp the successive subjective aims of generations and generations of men by the sheer massiveness and compelling weight of the ideal vision which he has presented as a lure promising richness and depth of feeling in human satisfactions.

Whereupon Lucas concludes: «the inheritance of a common form in a living regnant society consists in the serial coordination of the successive subjective aims of the actual entities (i.e., the complete and peculiar «summation» of the series by each succeeding term) toward a final end or «satisfaction» of the society as a whole» (TVF 44).

Is there any sense in which the subjective aims of entities that exist at one stage of evolutionary history are directed toward some later stage of evolutionary history?

In turn, this reflects the fact that the subjective aims of such entities are confined ordinarily very closely to what Whitehead calls «physical purposes» (PR 280, 406 ff.)

Either way, we can trace the «upward thrust» of evolution to final causation in nature — the subjective aims of actual occasions.

Not exact matches

The proposal, then, is that there is a phase of genetic development beyond the initial one for each modification of the initial, divinely given, subjective aim.

This subjective form is determined by the subjective aim at further integration, so as to obtain the «satisfaction» of the completed subject.

Vagueness can be avoided, of course, if we go to the logical extreme of such a move, which would lie in attributing to the consequent nature all valuations, reserving to the primordial nature only the constitution of metaphysical possibility and the subjective aim toward value realization in general.

Such a view would not be quite so absurd as might at first appear: the divine temporal evaluations would seem to be no more arbitrary than those of the constitution of the primordial nature in Whitehead's view; and the divine subjective aim toward the maximum of value intensity, together with the property of everlastingness and the Categoreal Obligations (constituted by the primordial nature) of Subjective Unity and Subjective Harmony, would seem sufficient to insure the mutual coherence of the growing series of divine temporal evsubjective aim toward the maximum of value intensity, together with the property of everlastingness and the Categoreal Obligations (constituted by the primordial nature) of Subjective Unity and Subjective Harmony, would seem sufficient to insure the mutual coherence of the growing series of divine temporal evSubjective Unity and Subjective Harmony, would seem sufficient to insure the mutual coherence of the growing series of divine temporal evSubjective Harmony, would seem sufficient to insure the mutual coherence of the growing series of divine temporal evaluations.

Whitehead states that in scientific thinking, «change is essentially the importation of the past and of the future into the immediate fact embodied in the durationless present instant» (PNX).8 In process thought, however, the future is not imported into the present but is grounded in the present as a subjective aim.

And he had already asserted that «the initial phase of the «subjective aim»» of an actual occasion «is a direct derivate from God's primordial nature» (PR 104).

The doctrine of the philosophy of organism is that, however far the sphere of efficient causation be pushed in the determination of components of a concrescence — its data, its emotions, its appreciations, its purposes, its phases of subjective aim — beyond the determination of these components there always remains the final reaction of the self - creative unity of the universe.

Indeed it can not differ from it, given that God's subjective aim is supreme and that the primordial nature constitutes the optimal adjustment of possibilities for value.

«The subjective aim at each phase provides the subjective unity of all the data at that phase; subjective unity at every phase means only that the data are compatible for synthesis, not that they are completely integrated.

Each phase is causa sui in itself through its decisive modification of subjective aim; the final phase or satisfaction completes the sui generis creativity of the occasion.

I am less clear on the sense of the last sentence but one, but I believe that Whitehead means that the quantitative emotional intensity of the entity's satisfaction must of course be related to the intensity of its drive toward value as furnished by its subjective aim.

In a passage worth pondering, Whitehead explains that the self - creative contribution of the freedom of each actual entity consists precisely in the subjective emphasis it lays upon the factors which are given it, including its own purposes and subjective aim:

Thus «subjective aim» seems to be absent from earlier strata, up through the summer of 1927.

We can not say that the original initial phase implicitly excluded subjective aim, for at that time the idea of subjective aim was not even anticipated.

Both are prior to the discovery of subjective aim (h) and its being placed in the initial phase (j).

Nobo reconciles many relevant texts by proposing that prior to the phases of concrescence governed by subjective aim there is a distinct phase of transition.

When first proposed, conceptual reversion was absolutely necessary, because Whitehead was then probably attempting to explain the emergence of subjective aim from the occasion itself, and some sort of explanation had to be given for its novelty.

If I am correct about the additional insertions, there is no mention of «subjective aim» in any of the strata before (i).

But this is as far as Whitehead developed the theory of subjective aim, and it may be up to us to see how this trajectory may be completed.

It may or may not have been composed during the summer of 1927, but Whitehead appears to have used neither «objective lure» nor «subjective aim» during his fall lectures on metaphysics at Harvard.

Where Nobo sees two initial phases, one of transition apart from subjective aim, followed by one of concrescence with subjective aim, I see just one initial phase, originally modified to make room for subjective aim.