Sentences with phrase «subjective feelings which»

It all comes down to subjective feelings which can be different between different individuals and societies.

Not exact matches

If so, the initial phase of the subjective aim is also the feeling of a proposition of which the occasion itself is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal object the predicate.

Instead of relying on divine propositional feeling, it seems better to have the nascent occasion simply take over the divine prehending the world, for God is unifying, and evaluating (in terms of his subjective forms) that world in every way which he can.

In this completely social philosophy (conflict, which is not denied, being also a social relation) God is that in the cosmos whereby it is a cosmos; he is the individual case on the cosmic scale of all the ultimate categories (including those of social feeling, «subjective aim,» etc.) thanks to which these categories describe a community of things, and not merely things each enclosed in unutterable privacy, irrelevant to and unordered with respect to anything else.

But the «subjective forms [«of the total objective datum»] are merely contributions to the one fact which is the subjective feeling of the one occasion» (Adventures 254, emphasis added).

In the project of self - creation throughout his life, man must strive to bring these values into aesthetic harmony aiming at intensity of feeling both in its subjective immediacy and in the relevant occasions beyond itself to achieve objective immortality.63 And man realizes that to achieve his individual destiny he must create civilizations which embody truth and beauty.

I am concerned here only with the general structural character of the subjective forms of the physical feelings in which religious experience is grounded.

It is the function of a particular kind of complex integration of physical and conceptual feelings which yields the higher intellectual feelings with the subjective form of consciousness.

Their subjective forms indicate the qualitative ways in which the subject experiences the energy of physical feelings.

The dynamism of the feeling of subjective immediacy is a vectorial tending forward, an appetition toward a «more,» which urges the organism beyond domination by the conformal quality of physical feeling.

Religious experience has an organic structure which can be analyzed in terms of the physical and conceptual feelings correlative to the generality of values perceived, and the subjective forms appropriate to each feeling element.

Therefore, the past relational data which are felt vectorially and conformably exist in contexts which are always «more» than the energies which we are able to include in our own present subjective immediacy.

It corresponds to Whitehead's category of subjective intensity which states that the subject's «anticipatory feeling respecting provision for its grade of intensity» is an element «affecting the immediate complex of feeling» (PR 41).

The combination of communal and adumbrative subjective forms in transmuted physical feelings provides the foundation of the religious feeling of «the value of the objective world which is a community derivative from the interrelations of its component individuals, and also necessary for the existence of each of these individuals» (JIM 59).

The aim, which is what the subject aims, is the precursor of «subjective aim» but is not yet an individual conceptual feeling.

In fact, in spite of his insisting that most actual occasions are unconscious (and that there is much that is unconscious even in that series of actual occasions which constitute our successive mental states), his talk of their experience or feeling of themselves, the influence of their predecessors, and their subjective immediacy seems pointless unless each of them is supposed to feel its own being, in some genuine sense, however dimly, so that there is a truth as to what - it - is - like - being - it.

Rather than, as usual, assign the hybrid prehension of God to the first phase, with the conceptual derivation in the second phase (which would deprive the initial phase of simple physical feeling of any guidance by the subjective aim), we should think of these two terms as referring to the same feeling.

One could point out, quite accurately, that Whitehead talks about God and the world in such a way that it is very clear that while God proffers a subjective aim which, if accepted, would result in the greatest good possible under the circumstances, actual entities sophisticated enough to entertain complex contrasts of feeling also thereby have genuine freedom of choice with the result that they are free to reject the aim proffered by God, free to turn their backs on God's lure toward the best possible tomorrow.

There is secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the primary phase of the mental pole; the determination of identity and diversity depending on the subjective aim at attaining depth of intensity by reason of contrast.

The hybrid physical feeling of God, which is (on the traditional Whiteheadian account) the subjective aim for any particular occasion of the young woman s experience, is also a prehension of the past from which she inherits — it is, after all, a physical feeling.

It is the subject which aims at balance and complexity; the notion of a conceptual feeling of «subjective aim» is yet to come (in T8).

Second, pragmatism, like all interest theories of ethics, has no way of escaping the subjectivism which grounds all value ultimately on subjective feeling, nor is this any less the case because of the objective methods that pragmatism supports for the judgment of whether our actions will in fact produce the values that we think they will.

Such a prehension includes the awareness that others are prehending my actions according to their own subjective forms, which may involve feelings and ideals differing from or enhancing the multiple contrasts I am entertaining.

Such experiences themselves are evidence for the further claim that there are more subjective aesthetic reponses than those which can be called propositional feelings.

«E.g., that the feelings which arise in various phases of a concrescence be compatible for integration; that no element in a concrescence can finally (in the «satisfaction») have two disjoined roles; that no two elements can finally have the same role; that every physical feeling gives rise to a corresponding conceptual feeling: that there is secondary origination of variant conceptual feeling; and that the subjective forms (valuations) of the conceptual feelings are mutually determined by their aptness for being joint elements in the satisfaction aimed at.

To slip into Whiteheadian technical terminology, I understand Jesus as a figure the story of whom we objectify with peculiar vividness as a result of his power to grasp the successive subjective aims of generations and generations of men by the sheer massiveness and compelling weight of the ideal vision which he has presented as a lure promising richness and depth of feeling in human satisfactions.

The subjective aim, which as Ford clarifies it, is a proposition whose logical subjects indicate the past actual world the novel occasion is to unify, guides the feeling of the nascent subject, the source of which, for Whitehead, is God (DP 292n9).

In this regard, a proposition is indeed «theoretical,» but in the deeper understanding as a lure endeavoring to fix the subjective form which clothes the feeling of the proposition as a datum.

The subjective form of a feeling is the manner in which the subject feels its datum (see PR 23 / 35).

Whitehead claims that a feeling can be analyzed into five factors:» (i) the «subject» which feels; (ii) the «initial data» which are to be felt; (iii) the «elimination» in virtue of negative prehensions; (iv) the «objective datum» which is felt; (v) the «subjective form,» which is how that subject feels that objective datum» (PR 221 / 337f.

But in more sophisticated actual entities, in entities higher up the scale of organic being which inherit positively a richer and more variegated set of data from the past, the responsive, supplemental phase is a process of sorting out the data, modifying and reorganizing it to arrive at a complex unity of subjective feeling.

This follows from the first Categoreal Obligation, The Category of Subjective Unity: «The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in the process of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason of the incompleteness of the phase, are compatible for integration by reason of the unity of their subject» (PR 26 / 39).

Now the subjective form of a feeling receives its characteristic tone from the subject which privately entertains that feeling.

He says, «The «subjective aim,» which controls the becoming of a subject, is that subject feeling a proposition with the subjective form of purpose to realize it in that process of self - creation.»

By subjective immortality I mean that the subjective feeling (which in persons includes consciousness) is retained in God.

(Religion in the Making, Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1960, 115) A clearer statement of the significance of the ordering to God as an actual entity is: «The conceptual feelings, which compose his primordial nature, exemplify in their subjective forms their mutual sensitivity and their subjective unity of subjective aim.

The perfection of the subjective aim of an actual occasion is «the absence from it of component feelings which mutually inhibit each other...» (Adventures of Ideas, New York: The Free Press, 1967, 256) One form of inhibition, complete inhibition, is finiteness and does not derogate from perfection.

This physiological response sets up affective tones or bodily feelings which constitute the subjective forms of the energetic processes transmitted to us from our environment.

We will assume that God's aim for it, a propositional feeling for which the new occasion is the logical subject and some complex eternal object the predicate, will in every case be prehended and play a decisive role in the determination of the subjective aim of the occasion.

The only possible alteration is in the intensity of subjective form with which it is felt.

In the first phase of a moment of experience, the previous feeling is received with a subjective form which conforms to its own subjective form.

This conformal, non-orginative phase of experience, which «merely transforms the objective content into subjective feelings,» is said to be «common to all modes of perception» (PR 179, 250).

[4] It is here termed «God»; because the contemplation of our natures, as enjoying real feelings derived from the timeless source of all order, acquires that «subjective form» of refreshment and companionship at which religions aim.

In regard to his doctrine of ingression, Whitehead distinguished three different ways in which an eternal object can function in the concrescence of an actual entity:» (i) it can be an element in the definiteness of some objectified nexus, or of some single actual entity, which is the datum of a feeling; (ii) it can be an element in the definiteness of the subjective form of some feeling; or (iii) it can be an element in the datum of a conceptual, or propositional, feeling» (PR 290 / 445).

The subjectivity behind that wisdom is the divine subjective aim, which as a conceptual feeling is derived from the primordial nature.17

Wu - yu is the concept of objectless desire, which is the subjective form of feeling associated with instances of wu - chih and wu - wei.

I take the original wording to be «their subjective unity of aim,» where aim is conceived as a common feature by which all feelings are ordered together.15 Note that the unity of aim is quite static, for the divine conceptual actuality is itself static.

This includes the objective form according to which feelings of causal efficacy prehend past actual occasions, the subjective form — how the occasion prehends — and the subjective aim of the present concrescence — how it wants to be a datum for future becomings.

Indeed, a feeling is first and foremost a subjective, concrete experience and not a property or attribute of some inert object, let alone something composed solely of abstract entities, whatever their degree of complexity and organization.7 In brief, then, a concrete percipient event is a feeling experience, which presupposes a body capable of experiencing feelings.

This is especially true with eternal cases of Thirdness, for which all feelings throughout cosmic history will have had to serve as both subjective and then objective poles.