Sentences with phrase «subjective immediacy»

Of course, there are no physical feelings without subjective forms, and no subjective forms without subjective immediacy and subjective aims, and there is no subjective aim without some primitive flash of unconscious mentality.

And (3) isn't perishing of subjective immediacy a categorial necessity for God's efficacy too, in other words, for God's objective immortality?

After the presentation of his categorial scheme, and before he begins the discussion which leads up to, or is explanatory of, the categories of that scheme, he states as one of his preliminary notes: «Actuality in perishing acquires objectivity [i.e., objective immortality], while it loses subjective immediacy» (PR 29).

In the satisfaction of an actual occasion the process of becoming which can be described as the transition from indeterminateness to determinateness comes to an end, and with it the subjective immediacy of the occasion perishes.4 With this satisfaction the objective immortality begins, namely, the functioning in respect to other processes of becoming.

Now, by modus tollens, it is correct to derive from [2]: «If there is no loss of subjective immediacy, then there is no perishing -LRB-- lsi - p).

In accordance with the propositions Whitehead gives, the retention of subjective immediacy does not imply the impossibility of objective immortality!

This view clarifies the fact that God, also with regard to the consequent nature, is continually prehensible and so can be continually efficacious (this, quite unexpectedly, in contradistinction to the societal view), even if God's consequent satisfaction is never complete and hence God's subjective immediacy never perishes.

For this reason, satisfaction is the juncture of immanent causality to transient causality, 5 and hence of subjective immediacy to objective immortality.

For another aspect of the «complete agreement» with Bradley which Whitehead records on the subject of «perishing» resides in his readiness to endorse Bradley's view that there is a final «reality» which contains the subjective immediacy of all feeling - centers without loss or diminution (PR 350f.

As to the resemblance, this comes out manifestly on three points: (a) that God has, according to Christian, a «continuous though changing satisfaction,» which is comparable to my «growing satisfaction» (IWM 409); (b) that God does not lose his subjective immediacy, and that such a perishing is not categorically obliged; and (c) that the finality of God should be seen as telos and not as end.

Because of this incompleteness God's subjective immediacy does not end, despite God's always having a specific satisfaction, and that is why there is, only in God's case, no perishing, With respect to all these points my argumentation rests on the reversal of poles in God (by which an aim is possible for God which is formally independent of any concrete actual world, while Christian does not use God's reversed polar structure but uses God's everlastingness as his main argument.

In its subjective immediacy every agent - event or experience constitutes itself in relation to its holons, objects, or past.

Every occasion aims at intensity of feeling both in its own subjective immediacy and in the relevant occasions beyond itself (PR 41.)

Its value is instrumental to the values of later occasions, but it is those occasions in their subjective immediacy that are the bearers of intrinsic value.

That past is composed of innumerable actual occasions that have had their moment of subjective immediacy (PR 38.

The actual occasion of experience now enjoying «subjective immediacy» (PR 38; AI 227.)

But these occasions exist only momentarily, enjoying a fleeting moment of subjective immediacy before passing into the past.

In that instant subjective immediacy perishes as that actuality becomes objectively immortal.

If the perishing of subjective immediacy can not be the perishing of becoming in being, it must be the perishing of being.

Moreover, since that must be where we enjoy subjective immediacy, it must be durational in order to account for our direct intuition of enduring subjective immediacy.

The first topic, technical in its formulation but at the heart of nearly all the other topics, is whether the subjective immediacy of an occasion's coming - to - be perishes with the attainment of satisfaction.

One is opened up to the character of concrescence as pure unified subjective immediacy rather than referring it to some objective referent in the immediately presented duration.

In Whiteheadian terminology this means that only past actual entities which are devoid of subjective immediacy can be objectified.

The awareness of intuitive realization of the subjective immediacy of concrescence then is the awareness of the energetic force present in all existents and as such serves the same ontological function as consciousness in Aurobindo.

It is the motion of creativity as the subjective immediacy of concrescence that is productive of the universe and is the process which is inherent in every moment of becoming.

God saves evils — with all their negative qualities — as objects, but God is not able to save the subjective immediacy of the evil occasion.

It seems to me that anytime the actual entity qua actual, i.e., qua subjective immediacy, is taken into consideration, the naive realistic discourse, appropriate to cosmogonic or scientific explanation, has to be abandoned and the causally efficacious datum is to be conceived as a component of the percipient subject qua concrescence whereby transition as such is lost sight of and replaced by process.

Is the perishing of subjective immediacy of creativity in an occasion a matter of significance?

Quite ironically, however, in conceiving process in the sense of concrescence as subjective immediacy (PR 29/43) he undermines his own purpose.

Over against Ford and me, Hartshorne and Cobb claim that the subjective immediacy does not perish and is available for being prehended by subsequent occasions.

I prefer many metaphysical advantages which come from distinguishing the genetic from the coordinate, with its consequence that subjective immediacy is the existential heart of each new moment, to the theological advantages of continuity with its vitalistic implications.

The loss, according to Johnson, is the loss of subjective immediacy.

In the former the res vera are capable of philosophical analysis only to the extent that they are objects for thought, whereas the latter demands that the same be capable of analysis qua subjective immediacy.

He defines «vacuous actuality,» «which haunts realistic philosophy,» as «the notion of res vera devoid of subjective immediacy.»

It is the movement of creativity as subjective immediacy that is productive of the universe not only as the individual moment of the actual occasion but of all macrocosmic processes as well.

That is to say, the actual qua subjective immediacy is process but qua entity it is an object.

To claim, as process thinkers do, that the self is the momentary self in its subjective immediacy goes not only contrary to the insights of the inherited tradition and common sense but presents a serious philosophical problem.

Once I would realize that the past was meaningful, that my past selves live on in the present, although certainly not in their subjective immediacy, I could let go, give up my clinging, and be more fully present in my current momentary experience and to the world.

The new occasion then reenacts these eternal objects as now constitutive of its own subjective immediacy.

As such he was one of the formative elements of the world, and not an actuality like the actual occasions enjoying his own subjective immediacy.

The multiplicity of the other occasions entering into the composition of the new occasion is so great that the problem in understanding an actual occasion is not so much how it as an individual enters into social relations but how all the relations that make it up achieve the unity of subjective immediacy and satisfaction.

Fundamentally, the unity of an actual occasion is the unity of its subjective immediacy culminating in its satisfaction.

Given this understanding of Whitehead's philosophy, we can conceive of the soul occupying generally the region of the brain, receiving the causal efficacy of every portion of the brain at once, and experiencing its own synthesis of all these influences in its own unified subjective immediacy.

They interpret Whitehead to mean that «these actual components enjoy their own subjective immediacy within God.

Before we explore this set of problems, we should note that even if one rejects all subjective immediacy for the prehended occasions and has only objective immortality, Whitehead has presented a view of significant immortality for presiding personalities.

Does the presiding personality retain its subjective immediacy and does it continue to expand its routes of occasions?

Some Whiteheadian scholars argue for the reenactment of subjective immediacy of the prehended entity.

«2 The retention of subjective immediacy within the everlastingness of God's nature is seen then as subjective immortality.3 Some argue that subjective immortality is necessary for the religious need of continuity between present hope and future fulfillment, redemption and fulfillment, and the overcoming of evil.4

Lewis Ford and Marjorie Suchocki in a joint article argue for the first meaning (reenactment of subjective immediacy).

Hartshorne also argues for subjective immediacy in the sense of the retention of immediacy.