Sentences with phrase «subjectivist bias»

The subjectivist bias has to do with what shall be the primary data of philosophy.
Whitehead's point in both passages (PR 253 and PR 241) is that Descartes, Locke, and Hume, etc., having adopted the subjectivist bias, inconsistently do what they should not do; namely, continue to interpret the datum in the act of experience using the substance - quality categories.
I think we have clear evidence that the two terms subjectivist principle and subjectivist bias must be clearly distinguished.
In the second place, these two notions must be clearly distinguished because Whitehead makes it abundantly clear that he accepts and affirms one — the subjectivist bias — while he rejects the other — the subjectivist principle.
The subjectivist bias limits the data of philosophy to the experiences of subjects.
In an earlier passage in Process and Reality, prior to his having given Descartes» discovery a name, but clearly having to do with the subjectivist bias, Whitehead said:
This is the famous subjectivist bias which entered into modem philosophy through Descartes....
My contention is supported by the explicit diagnosis of the difficulties of Descartes and his followers in which the term subjectivist bias is used:
When one carefully distinguishes between the subjectivist bias and the subjectivist principle, it becomes apparent that the subjectivist bias is, in and of itself, in no way the cause of modem philosophical difficulties.
I suggest that Whitehead intended to say subjectivist bias in the first statement.
However, he overlooks or ignores those texts which explicitly define the subjective principle and uses the term as if it had the same meaning as the term subjectivist bias, which forty in turn confuses with the reformed subjectivist principle.
After quoting the passage diagnosing Descartes» difficulties (which uses the term subjectivist bias), Rorty adds:
Still in the same context he declares that «Descartes modified traditional philosophy in two opposite ways»; e.g., emphasizing the substance - quality categories and introducing the subjectivist bias (PR 241; italics mine).
Whitehead also makes it explicitly clear in this context that the joint adoption of the subjectivist bias and of the substance - quality categories is inconsistent: «Yet if the enjoyment of experience be the constitutive subjective fact, these categories have lost all claim to any fundamental character in metaphysics» (PR 241; cf. 243).
The subjectivist bias limits the philosopher's data to the experience of subjects.
He says of the subjectivist bias that it is the greatest discovery since Plato and Aristotle (PR 241).
The point that brings Whitehead directly to the concerns of the phenomenological method is his affirmation of the «subjectivist principle»: «The philosophy of organism entirely accepts the subjectivist bias of modern philosophy.
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