Sentences with phrase «subjectivist principle»

Both the «principle of relativity» (PR 22) and the «reformed subjectivist principle» (PR 167) indicate that any conception of an actuality apart from its interrelations with other actualities, or apart from its satisfaction of subjective aim, would be high abstraction.

By the reformed subjectivist principle all real togetherness lies within experience.

Moreover, successive acts of transition and concrescence are contrary to the reformed subjectivist principle.

(See Whitehead's critique of «the subjectivist principle» (PR 238 ff.)

Despite his «reformed subjectivist principle,» Whitehead does not, in my opinion, adequately address such high level human experiences as responsibility and our sense of a sustained «being - here» over time.

Here we have to keep in mind the starting point of Whitehead's philosophy, the «reformed subjectivist principle.»

Whitehead tells us that the philosophy of organism embraces what he calls the «reformed subjectivist principle,» which doctrine, in turn, «fully accepts Descartes» discovery that subjective experiencing is the primary metaphysical situation which is presented to metaphysics for analysis» (PR 160 - 243).

Ultimately Whitehead articulates what he calls the revised subjectivist principle: «that apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, bare nothingness» (PR 167).

For purposes of criticism, Whitehead divides this view, normally called «sensationalism,» into two parts, the «subjectivist principle» and the sensationalist principle,» corresponding respectively to the notions that the primary data of perception are universals, and that the reception of the primary data is barren.

It is this dogma, Whitehead believes, rather than an impartial analysis of immediate experience, which leads to the subjectivist principle.

If one who holds the subjectivist principle posits the reality of a world of actual entities spatially and / or temporally beyond the present moment of experience, and the reality of causal interaction among these entities, one does so solely on the basis of inference, not direct knowledge.

Accordingly, on the basis of the empiricist doctrine (which Whitehead accepts) «that nothing is to be received into the philosophical scheme which is not discoverable as an element in subjective experience,» the subjectivist principle entails that the notion of causal influence between actualities must be dismissed (PR 253).

To me it appears not misleading to see, in this ontological egocentricity, a natural first pre-form of that statement of interpretation which Whitehead has brought to a new importance with his «reformed subjectivist principle» on an entirely different, theoretical level — and, therewith, naturally under completely different conditions (PR 160/186).

Thus it was indeed Whitehead's «particular contribution» through his reformed subjectivist principle to make freedom and self - determination a necessary characteristic of all actualities, «from God to the «most trivial puff of existence in empty space (TVF 41, 24; cf. also PR 18 / 28).

The specific sentence quoted indeed begins «The subjectivist principle is that the whole universe (PR 252), but subjectivist principle is clearly not the correct term here.

Whitehead repudiates all three premises of the subjectivist principle.

According to Whitehead, there are two principles whose joint application to the datum in the act of experience leads to modern epistemological difficulties: the subjectivist principle and the «sensationalist principle» (PR 238f.).

Specifically, the attempt to combine the principle that «the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of the experience of subjects» (which Whitehead calls the «subjectivist principle») with the substance - quality framework led straight to the Lockeian paradox (WEP 135)

This statement, together with Whitehead's discussion of the relation of the reformed subjectivist principle to the principles of relativity and of process (PR 252) also makes clear Whitehead's repudiation of dualism and of the notion of «vacuous actuality.»

We must now turn to the reformed subjectivist principle.

Part of Whitehead's cure for the ills of modern philosophy involves the repudiation of aspects of the substance - quality mode of thought that are not immediate premises of the subjectivist principle and are not necessarily connected with the problem of repeatability and unrepeatability.

The subjectivist principle follows from three premises: (i) The acceptance of the «substance - quality» concept as expressing the ultimate ontological principle.

I think we have clear evidence that the two terms subjectivist principle and subjectivist bias must be clearly distinguished.

Indeed when we come to discuss the reformed subjectivist principle connected with Whitehead's proposed solution to the problem of modem philosophy, we shall see that it stands in direct contradiction to both Cartesian dualism and the notion of «vacuous actuality.»

In the second place, this sentence occurs in a paragraph in which Whitehead is explaining the meaning of the reformed subjectivist principle and its relation to the fourth and ninth of his categories of explanation (the principles of relativity and process respectively).

In the second place, these two notions must be clearly distinguished because Whitehead makes it abundantly clear that he accepts and affirms one — the subjectivist bias — while he rejects the other — the subjectivist principle.

The subjectivist principle is, that the datum in the act of experience can be adequately analysed purely in terms of universals...

When one carefully distinguishes between the subjectivist bias and the subjectivist principle, it becomes apparent that the subjectivist bias is, in and of itself, in no way the cause of modem philosophical difficulties.

Here the subjectivist principle is seen to be inextricably connected to those «categories from another point of view.»

In other words, they interpret the datum according to the subjectivist principle.

However, he overlooks or ignores those texts which explicitly define the subjective principle and uses the term as if it had the same meaning as the term subjectivist bias, which forty in turn confuses with the reformed subjectivist principle.

Having stated his thesis that one must begin with Whitehead's diagnosis, Rorty quotes him as follows: «The difficulties of all schools of modern philosophy lie in the fact that having accepted the subjectivist principle, they continue to use philosophical categories derived from another point of view» (PR 253; WEP 134; italics mine).

It is merely the occasion for the discovery of the difficulties inherent in the substance - quality mode of thought of which the subjectivist principle is but one expression.

In the first place the subjectivist principle denies that the experience of subjects can include any other actualities.

In opposition to the «unreformed» subjectivist principle, which holds that «the datum in the act of experience can be adequately analyzed purely in terms of universals» (PR 157/239), Whitehead insists that we have a direct experience of the causality of the past (PR 169 / 256, 178 / 271).

The sensationalist principle asserts that those data are bare sensa, and the subjectivist principle adequately accounts for those sensa as universals.

It is also clear that, according to Whitehead, adopting the subjectivist principle implies the use of the substance - quality categories.

Now when one turns to Whitehead's formal definition of the subjectivist principle and to his discussion of its derivation one finds him saying:

In other words, part of Whitehead's cure for the ills of modern philosophy involves the repudiation of aspects of the substance - quality mode of thought that are not immediate premises of the subjectivist principle and are not necessarily connected with the problem of repeatability and unrepeatability.

«The reformed subjectivist principle adopted by the philosophy of organism is merely an alternative statement of the principle of relativity....

This feature of Whitehead's epistemology constitutes the reformation involved in his «reformed subjectivist principle.»

In virtue of this it would appear that Santayana rejects what Whitehead calls the subjectivist principle, both in the traditional form Whitehead rejects, and in the revised form he accepts.

Suffice it to note, in this last regard, that the reformed subjectivist principle, on which Whitehead based his metaphysical theory of memory, perception, and knowledge, was for him «merely an alternative statement of the principle of relativity...» (PR 252).

The «First Meditation» is essentially an examination of the phenomena of human consciousness, an examination repeated and refined by all phenomenologists and, as we have seen in section II, by Whitehead with his subjectivist principle.

The point that brings Whitehead directly to the concerns of the phenomenological method is his affirmation of the «subjectivist principle»: «The philosophy of organism entirely accepts the subjectivist bias of modern philosophy.

Now, after having presented his reformed subjectivist principle, Whitehead forthrightly affirms that the final analogy of his philosophy to philosophies of the Hegelian school is not accidental.

In the conclusion of his chapter on the subjectivist principle in Process arid Reality.

The subjectivist principle is that the whole universe Consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of the experiences of subjects.

And Whitehead can summarize his own reformed subjectivist principle as follows: «that apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness.»

I understand the «reformed subjectivist principle» as both naturalizing the human / historical and humanizing the natural — or perhaps better, as seeking an ontological system midway between them and able to account for both.