Sentences with phrase «subsequent return of»

involuntary measures should not be used except as a last resort and, in the event of any compulsory acquisition, strictly on the existing basis of just terms compensation and, preferably, of subsequent return of the affected land to the original owners on a leaseback system basis, as with many national parks.

Capcom really outdid itself with Street Fighter IV, and the subsequent return of fighting games to the spotlight after its release is evidence enough.

President Donald Trump's trade representative racked up a hefty bill on the purchase and subsequent return of a new desk for his office, emails reviewed by ABC News show.

IFRS Accounting standards I believe are skewing some of your numbers with regards to the cost of these acquisitions and the subsequent returns of same.

Not exact matches

In order to test this, the firm isolated returns between 1973 and 1981 and found that returns were positive in each of the subsequent four quarters.

Further, looking across all eight past instances, the BBIT has provided an average return of 6.32 % over the subsequent year, according to the firm.

«Historically, when our indicator has been this low or lower, total returns over the subsequent 12 months have been positive 93 percent of the time, with median 12 - month returns of 19 percent,» according to a BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research report.

Actual results, including with respect to our targets and prospects, could differ materially due to a number of factors, including the risk that we may not obtain sufficient orders to achieve our targeted revenues; price competition in key markets; the risk that we or our channel partners are not able to develop and expand customer bases and accurately anticipate demand from end customers, which can result in increased inventory and reduced orders as we experience wide fluctuations in supply and demand; the risk that our commercial Lighting Products results will continue to suffer if new issues arise regarding issues related to product quality for this business; the risk that we may experience production difficulties that preclude us from shipping sufficient quantities to meet customer orders or that result in higher production costs and lower margins; our ability to lower costs; the risk that our results will suffer if we are unable to balance fluctuations in customer demand and capacity, including bringing on additional capacity on a timely basis to meet customer demand; the risk that longer manufacturing lead times may cause customers to fulfill their orders with a competitor's products instead; the risk that the economic and political uncertainty caused by the proposed tariffs by the United States on Chinese goods, and any corresponding Chinese tariffs in response, may negatively impact demand for our products; product mix; risks associated with the ramp - up of production of our new products, and our entry into new business channels different from those in which we have historically operated; the risk that customers do not maintain their favorable perception of our brand and products, resulting in lower demand for our products; the risk that our products fail to perform or fail to meet customer requirements or expectations, resulting in significant additional costs, including costs associated with warranty returns or the potential recall of our products; ongoing uncertainty in global economic conditions, infrastructure development or customer demand that could negatively affect product demand, collectability of receivables and other related matters as consumers and businesses may defer purchases or payments, or default on payments; risks resulting from the concentration of our business among few customers, including the risk that customers may reduce or cancel orders or fail to honor purchase commitments; the risk that we are not able to enter into acceptable contractual arrangements with the significant customers of the acquired Infineon RF Power business or otherwise not fully realize anticipated benefits of the transaction; the risk that retail customers may alter promotional pricing, increase promotion of a competitor's products over our products or reduce their inventory levels, all of which could negatively affect product demand; the risk that our investments may experience periods of significant stock price volatility causing us to recognize fair value losses on our investment; the risk posed by managing an increasingly complex supply chain that has the ability to supply a sufficient quantity of raw materials, subsystems and finished products with the required specifications and quality; the risk we may be required to record a significant charge to earnings if our goodwill or amortizable assets become impaired; risks relating to confidential information theft or misuse, including through cyber-attacks or cyber intrusion; our ability to complete development and commercialization of products under development, such as our pipeline of Wolfspeed products, improved LED chips, LED components, and LED lighting products risks related to our multi-year warranty periods for LED lighting products; risks associated with acquisitions, divestitures, joint ventures or investments generally; the rapid development of new technology and competing products that may impair demand or render our products obsolete; the potential lack of customer acceptance for our products; risks associated with ongoing litigation; and other factors discussed in our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), including our report on Form 10 - K for the fiscal year ended June 25, 2017, and subsequent reports filed with the SEC.

The report estimates that for each 1 percent of shoppers who return for a subsequent visit, overall revenue will increase by approximately 10 percent.

Normalized P / E - our preferred valuation metric - has explained 80 - 90 % of returns over the subsequent 10 - 11 years.»

Normalized P / E — our preferred valuation metric — has explained 80 - 90 % of returns over the subsequent 10 - 11 years.»

«Valuations have historically explained 60 - 90 % of subsequent returns over a 10 - year horizon.

«We find no relationship between historical five - year returns and subsequent 12 - month returns,» Bank of America Merrill Lynch's Savita Subramanian wrote.

As we've noted previously, MarketCap / GVA has a correlation of about 92 % with actual subsequent 10 - year S&P 500 total returns, even in recent market cycles.

While this comparison has captured certain periods of extreme overvaluation, it is a useless predictor, in terms of its overall relationship with subsequent market returns.

Moderate interest rates were associated with a whole range of subsequent returns over the following decade, and we know that those outcomes were 90 % correlated with the level of valuations at the beginning of those periods (on reliable measures such as market cap / GDP, price / revenue, Tobin's Q, the margin - adjusted Shiller P / E, and others we've presented over time - see Ockham's Razor and the Market Cycle).

Yet the fact that these 13 years have included three successive approaches (2000, 2007, and today) to valuation peaks - at the very extremes of historical experience - is evidence that investors don't appreciate the link between valuation and subsequent returns.

Along with the steepest equity valuations in U.S. history outside of 1929 and 2000 (on measures that are actually reliably correlated with subsequent market returns), private and public debt burdens have reached the most extreme levels in history.

If one creates as scatter plot of the Shiller P / E versus actual subsequent 10 - year market returns, one gets a nice scatter, but a good deal of noise as well.

When you look back on this moment in history, remember that rich valuations had not only been associated with low subsequent market returns, but also with magnified risk of deep interim price losses over shorter horizons.

For our part, we don't follow the Coppock indicator per se, but the broad range of technical measures we follow include our own variant that is associated with stronger and more reliable subsequent returns (this variant has not even gone to negative levels yet, much less turned favorable).

This adjustment has historically been important, as adjusting for that embedded profit margin significantly improves the relationship between the CAPE and actual subsequent market returns (something we can demonstrate both with algebraic return estimates and regression models — see Margins, Multiples, and the Iron Law of Valuation).

The following chart shows the same data on an inverted log scale (blue line, left), along with the actual subsequent 12 - year nominal average annual total return of the S&P 500 Index (red line, right).

A Ponzi scheme is a fraudulent investment operation that pays returns to its investors from their own money, or the money paid by subsequent investors, instead of from profit earned by the individuals running the business.

Among the valuation measures most tightly correlated across history with actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns, the ratio of market capitalization to corporate gross value added would now have to retreat by nearly 60 % simply to reach its pre-bubble average.

The red line (right scale) is the average annual nominal total return of the S&P 500 over the subsequent 12 - year period.

Last week, the U.S. equity market climbed to the steepest valuation level in history, based on the valuation measures most highly correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 10 - 12 year total returns, across a century of market cycles.

The only alternative to this view is to imagine that the collapses that followed valuation extremes like 1929, 1973, 2000, and 2007 somehow emerged entirely out of the blue, ignoring the fact that valuations accurately projected likely full - cycle losses, and remained tightly correlated with total returns over the subsequent 10 - 12 year horizons.

-LSB-...] table below is from Ben Carlson's A Wealth of Common Sense and it is a summary of the subsequent average, median, high, and low 10 - year returns for the -LSB-...]

Indeed, even Robert Shiller's cyclically - adjusted P / E (CAPE) is much better correlated with actual subsequent market returns, across a century of market cycles, when we account for the profit margin embedded in the 10 - year average of earnings.

So investors might have believed that the extraordinarily depressed market valuations of 1974 and 1982 were «justified» by recession and high interest rates, but that did nothing to prevent the S&P 500 from enjoying remarkably high returns in subsequent years.

It shows someone who retired in the mid-1990s could expect to receive a 10 percent rate of return on their Canada Pension Plan contributions, but late boomers, Gen - Xers and subsequent generations can expect a rate of return closer to 2 percent.

Actual results may vary materially from those expressed or implied by forward - looking statements based on a number of factors, including, without limitation: (1) risks related to the consummation of the Merger, including the risks that (a) the Merger may not be consummated within the anticipated time period, or at all, (b) the parties may fail to obtain shareholder approval of the Merger Agreement, (c) the parties may fail to secure the termination or expiration of any waiting period applicable under the HSR Act, (d) other conditions to the consummation of the Merger under the Merger Agreement may not be satisfied, (e) all or part of Arby's financing may not become available, and (f) the significant limitations on remedies contained in the Merger Agreement may limit or entirely prevent BWW from specifically enforcing Arby's obligations under the Merger Agreement or recovering damages for any breach by Arby's; (2) the effects that any termination of the Merger Agreement may have on BWW or its business, including the risks that (a) BWW's stock price may decline significantly if the Merger is not completed, (b) the Merger Agreement may be terminated in circumstances requiring BWW to pay Arby's a termination fee of $ 74 million, or (c) the circumstances of the termination, including the possible imposition of a 12 - month tail period during which the termination fee could be payable upon certain subsequent transactions, may have a chilling effect on alternatives to the Merger; (3) the effects that the announcement or pendency of the Merger may have on BWW and its business, including the risks that as a result (a) BWW's business, operating results or stock price may suffer, (b) BWW's current plans and operations may be disrupted, (c) BWW's ability to retain or recruit key employees may be adversely affected, (d) BWW's business relationships (including, customers, franchisees and suppliers) may be adversely affected, or (e) BWW's management's or employees» attention may be diverted from other important matters; (4) the effect of limitations that the Merger Agreement places on BWW's ability to operate its business, return capital to shareholders or engage in alternative transactions; (5) the nature, cost and outcome of pending and future litigation and other legal proceedings, including any such proceedings related to the Merger and instituted against BWW and others; (6) the risk that the Merger and related transactions may involve unexpected costs, liabilities or delays; (7) other economic, business, competitive, legal, regulatory, and / or tax factors; and (8) other factors described under the heading «Risk Factors» in Part I, Item 1A of BWW's Annual Report on Form 10 - K for the fiscal year ended December 25, 2016, as updated or supplemented by subsequent reports that BWW has filed or files with the SEC.

The most reliable measures of individual stock valuation we've found are based on formal discounted cash flow considerations, but among publicly - available measures we've evaluated, price / revenue ratios are better correlated with actual subsequent returns than price / earnings ratios (though normalized profit margins and other factors are obviously necessary to make cross-sectional comparisons).

Among these, the ratio of nonfinancial market capitalization to corporate gross value - added has the strongest correlation (about -93 %) with subsequent 12 - year S&P 500 total returns.

Recent cycles provide no evidence of deterioration in the relationship between reliable valuation measures (particularly those that aren't highly sensitive to fluctuations in profit margins) and actual subsequent market returns.

In contrast, the relationship between monetary growth and subsequent stock market returns has been only half that strong, explaining just over one - fifth of the total variation in stock market returns.

Don't criticize historically reliable valuation measures that have maintained the same tight relationship with actual subsequent 10 - 12 year market returns that they've demonstrated across a century of history.

This gives rise to the all - important question: does one's entry level into the market, i.e. the valuation of the market at the time of investing, make a significant difference to subsequent investment returns?

The prevailing overvalued, overbought, and overbullish combination of conditions has historically been associated with subsequent market returns below Treasury bill yields, so while we hold about 1 % of assets in call options as a modest speculative exposure to market fluctuations, a larger exposure closer to 2 % continues to await a short - term pullback sufficient to «clear» that overbought condition.

Our perspective is straightforward: on the basis of measures that have been reliably correlated with actual subsequent market returns in market cycles across a century of data, we estimate that the S&P 500 Index will be no higher a decade from now than it is today.

That's fairly close to our own estimate of about 2.4 % based on a broad range of alternative measures that are highly correlated with actual subsequent market returns.

Among the valuation measures having the strongest correlation with actual subsequent market returns, current levels are actually within 10 % of the March 2000 extreme.

For example, our effort to carefully account for the impact of foreign revenues, and to create an apples - to - apples measure of general equity valuation led us to introduce MarketCap / GVA, which is better correlated with actual subsequent 10 - 12 year market returns than any of scores of measures we've studied.

We composed a blend of five key valuation metrics — including forward price - to - earnings ratios and price - to - book value — and examined how strong the relationship was between starting valuations — or valuations at the time of purchase — and the variability of subsequent U.S. dollar returns over time.

Essentially, Selsick examined the Shiller P / E (the S&P 500 divided by the 10 - year average of inflation - adjusted earnings), and showed that the multiple is even better correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns using 16 - year smoothing and a 16 - year investment horizon.

Selsick estimates the relationship between the Shiller - 16 and subsequent 16 - year total returns in the S&P 500, and arrives at a 16 - year estimate of prospective nominal returns of 4.94 % annually.

On the basis of the most reliable valuation measures we identify (those most tightly correlated with actual subsequent 10 - 12 year S&P 500 total returns), current market valuations stand about 140 - 165 % above historical norms.

It concluded that negative intermeeting stock market returns are a stronger predictor of subsequent target changes in the Fed funds rate than any commonly followed macroeconomic variable.

Regardless of whether an analyst claims that stocks are cheap or expensive, they should be expected to provide some sort of evidence that their methods have a strong relationship with subsequent market returns.