Sentences with phrase «subsequent returns over»

Moderate interest rates were associated with a whole range of subsequent returns over the following decade, and we know that those outcomes were 90 % correlated with the level of valuations at the beginning of those periods (on reliable measures such as market cap / GDP, price / revenue, Tobin's Q, the margin - adjusted Shiller P / E, and others we've presented over time - see Ockham's Razor and the Market Cycle).

I showed that subsequent returns over the next decade tend to track the current interest rate level very closely.

«Valuations have historically explained 60 - 90 % of subsequent returns over a 10 - year horizon.

Not exact matches

Further, looking across all eight past instances, the BBIT has provided an average return of 6.32 % over the subsequent year, according to the firm.

«Historically, when our indicator has been this low or lower, total returns over the subsequent 12 months have been positive 93 percent of the time, with median 12 - month returns of 19 percent,» according to a BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research report.

Actual results, including with respect to our targets and prospects, could differ materially due to a number of factors, including the risk that we may not obtain sufficient orders to achieve our targeted revenues; price competition in key markets; the risk that we or our channel partners are not able to develop and expand customer bases and accurately anticipate demand from end customers, which can result in increased inventory and reduced orders as we experience wide fluctuations in supply and demand; the risk that our commercial Lighting Products results will continue to suffer if new issues arise regarding issues related to product quality for this business; the risk that we may experience production difficulties that preclude us from shipping sufficient quantities to meet customer orders or that result in higher production costs and lower margins; our ability to lower costs; the risk that our results will suffer if we are unable to balance fluctuations in customer demand and capacity, including bringing on additional capacity on a timely basis to meet customer demand; the risk that longer manufacturing lead times may cause customers to fulfill their orders with a competitor's products instead; the risk that the economic and political uncertainty caused by the proposed tariffs by the United States on Chinese goods, and any corresponding Chinese tariffs in response, may negatively impact demand for our products; product mix; risks associated with the ramp - up of production of our new products, and our entry into new business channels different from those in which we have historically operated; the risk that customers do not maintain their favorable perception of our brand and products, resulting in lower demand for our products; the risk that our products fail to perform or fail to meet customer requirements or expectations, resulting in significant additional costs, including costs associated with warranty returns or the potential recall of our products; ongoing uncertainty in global economic conditions, infrastructure development or customer demand that could negatively affect product demand, collectability of receivables and other related matters as consumers and businesses may defer purchases or payments, or default on payments; risks resulting from the concentration of our business among few customers, including the risk that customers may reduce or cancel orders or fail to honor purchase commitments; the risk that we are not able to enter into acceptable contractual arrangements with the significant customers of the acquired Infineon RF Power business or otherwise not fully realize anticipated benefits of the transaction; the risk that retail customers may alter promotional pricing, increase promotion of a competitor's products over our products or reduce their inventory levels, all of which could negatively affect product demand; the risk that our investments may experience periods of significant stock price volatility causing us to recognize fair value losses on our investment; the risk posed by managing an increasingly complex supply chain that has the ability to supply a sufficient quantity of raw materials, subsystems and finished products with the required specifications and quality; the risk we may be required to record a significant charge to earnings if our goodwill or amortizable assets become impaired; risks relating to confidential information theft or misuse, including through cyber-attacks or cyber intrusion; our ability to complete development and commercialization of products under development, such as our pipeline of Wolfspeed products, improved LED chips, LED components, and LED lighting products risks related to our multi-year warranty periods for LED lighting products; risks associated with acquisitions, divestitures, joint ventures or investments generally; the rapid development of new technology and competing products that may impair demand or render our products obsolete; the potential lack of customer acceptance for our products; risks associated with ongoing litigation; and other factors discussed in our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), including our report on Form 10 - K for the fiscal year ended June 25, 2017, and subsequent reports filed with the SEC.

Normalized P / E - our preferred valuation metric - has explained 80 - 90 % of returns over the subsequent 10 - 11 years.»

Normalized P / E — our preferred valuation metric — has explained 80 - 90 % of returns over the subsequent 10 - 11 years.»

To the extent that lower Treasury yields are even weakly associated with higher equity valuations, recognize that this effect is also expressed over time as lower subsequent stock market returns.

When you look back on this moment in history, remember that rich valuations had not only been associated with low subsequent market returns, but also with magnified risk of deep interim price losses over shorter horizons.

As we've demonstrated repeatedly, the valuation measures most strongly correlated with actual subsequent returns, particularly over a 7 - 15 year horizon, are those that normalize for profit margin variability in some way.

Depressed interest rates were typically associated with weak market outcomes over the following decade, largely because investors reacted to depressed interest rates with yield - seeking speculation - driving valuations up and driving subsequent prospective returns down.

The red line (right scale) is the average annual nominal total return of the S&P 500 over the subsequent 12 - year period.

At present, the valuation measures we find most strongly correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns suggest zero total returns for the S&P 500 over the coming 10 years, and total returns averaging only about 1 % annually over the coming 12 - year period.

The only alternative to this view is to imagine that the collapses that followed valuation extremes like 1929, 1973, 2000, and 2007 somehow emerged entirely out of the blue, ignoring the fact that valuations accurately projected likely full - cycle losses, and remained tightly correlated with total returns over the subsequent 10 - 12 year horizons.

The red line shows the actual total returns for this portfolio mix over the subsequent 12 - year period.

The mapping between valuations and subsequent returns is typically most reliable over a 10 - 12 year horizon.

In contrast, the relationship between monetary growth and subsequent stock market returns has been only half that strong, explaining just over one - fifth of the total variation in stock market returns.

Valuations in 1949 and 1982 were like paying $ 13.70 for the future $ 100 cash flow, as valuations were consistent with subsequent annual S&P 500 total returns averaging 18 % over the following 12 - year period.

For example, grocers almost always stay in the very low price / revenue deciles because they operate in a low - margin business, yet fluctuations in their price / revenue ratios over time are still very informative about subsequent returns.

1954 and 1992 were like paying $ 25.60, and were followed by 12 % annual S&P 500 total returns over the subsequent 12 - year period.

It turns out that these deviations themselves have been strikingly informative about market returns over the subsequent decade — the greater the deviation, the more the market corrects in the opposite direction.

In fact, one can show that valuations tend to be best correlated with subsequent market returns over periods representing roughly 0.5, 1.5 or 2.5 typical market cycles (see my 2014 Wine Country Conference presentation, A Very Mean Reversion, for details).

We composed a blend of five key valuation metrics — including forward price - to - earnings ratios and price - to - book value — and examined how strong the relationship was between starting valuations — or valuations at the time of purchase — and the variability of subsequent U.S. dollar returns over time.

Based on the valuation measures most strongly correlated with actual subsequent total returns (and those correlations are near or above 90 %), we continue to estimate that the S&P 500 will achieve zero or negative nominal total returns over horizons of 8 years or less, and only about 2 % annually over the coming decade.

Last week, the most historically reliable equity valuation measures we identify (having correlations of over 90 % with actual subsequent 10 - 12 year S&P 500 total returns) advanced to more than double their reliable historical norms.

Indeed, because the level of interest rates at any point in time is highly correlated with the level of nominal economic growth over the preceding decade, the relationship between starting valuations and actual subsequent S&P 500 nominal total returns is nearly independent of interest rates.

According to data from Credit Suisse, when the VIX moves above 20 %, S&P 500 returns over the subsequent 3 months average 6.4 %.

On valuation measures most strongly correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 nominal total returns, we presently expect negative total returns for the S&P 500 on a 10 - year horizon, and total returns averaging only about 1 % annually over the coming 12 - year period (chart).

Technical features were selected by the authors based on the following claims: • Stocks with high (low) returns over periods of three to 12 months continue to have high (low) returns over subsequent three to 12 month periods.

On the basis of valuation measures most tightly related to actual subsequent long - term market returns, we also estimate that the S&P 500 is likely to be lower 12 years from now, compared with current levels, though dividend income may push the total return just over zero on that horizon.

In this segment of the «Look Back» series, we consider inflation and the subsequent real rates of return of holding cash (defined as holding Treasury bills or T - bills) over the past century.

Looking back through history, whenever value stocks have gotten this cheap, subsequent long - term returns have generally been strong.3 From current depressed valuation levels, value stocks have in the past, on average, doubled over the next five years.4 Not that we necessarily expect returns of this magnitude this time around, but based on the data and our six decades of experience investing through various market cycles, we believe the current risk / reward proposition is heavily skewed in favor of long - term value investors.

We find that the positive returns at announcement are not reversed over time, as there is no evidence of a negative abnormal drift during the one - year period subsequent to the announcement.

We composed a blend of five key valuation metrics — including forward price - to - earnings ratios and price - to - book value — and examined how strong the relationship was between starting valuations — or valuations at the time of purchase — and the variability of subsequent U.S. dollar returns over time.

The violet line (left scale) measures the difference in performance between small cap stocks and large cap stocks over the subsequent 5 year period (the line ends in 2000 with the last 5 - year return calculation).

On the measures we find most tightly correlated with actual subsequent market returns across history, the S&P 500 is now between 150 % and 170 % above valuation norms that have been approached or breached over the completion of every market cycle in history, including the most recent one.

Each percentage point of unemployment rate translates into 78 basis points (bps) of stock market excess return compared to cash for each year, on average, of the subsequent two years; in other words, each 1 % jump in unemployment is associated with 1.56 % of incremental stock market return over the two - year period.

For each level of profit margins, the table shows the median P / E of the 500 largest stocks, their median annual return over the subsequent 3 - year period, and their median return over the subsequent 5 - year period.

They have analyzed the power of each measure to explain inflation - adjusted stock returns including reinvested dividends over subsequent multi-year periods, setting their findings out in the following matrix:

He uses Tobin's Q to value a market and compares past valuations with subsequent returns using a hindsight value (the average of the returns over the next 1 to 30 years).

But these don't explain away or eliminate the strong cyclical relationship between the gold / XAU ratio and subsequent returns on the XAU over the following 3 - 4 year periods.

On the contrary, since the 1940's, the ratio of equity market value to GDP has demonstrated a 90 % correlation with subsequent 10 - year total returns on the S&P 500 (see Investment, Speculation, Valuation, and Tinker Bell), and the present level is associated with projected annual total returns on the S&P 500 of just over 3 % annually.

Most academic research has shown short - sellers (represented by measures of short - interest) generate excess returns over the medium to longer - term, and some recent work ferrets out subsequent news flow to posit they [shorts] possess informational advantage (better research?)

John Hussman at Hussman funds is careful to qualify the value of this analysis: «Rich valuation is strongly associated with weak subsequent returns, but only reliably so over periods of 7 - 10 years.

[I] nvestors must recognize that buying stocks at very expensive valuations will necessarily lead to future returns over the subsequent 10 — 20 years that are far below average.

DeBondt and Thaler then calculated the investment return against the equal weighted NYSE Index over the subsequent four years for all of the stocks in each selection period.

Instead, hedge fund targets earn an additional 11.4 % abnormal return during the subsequent year, and other activist targets realize a 17.8 % abnormal return over the year following the activists» interventions.

Still, it is worth noting that, over the past 15 years, the advisers making it onto each year's honor roll on average over the subsequent 12 months went on to make 1.2 percentage points more a year than those who didn't, while nevertheless incurring 25 % less risk, as measured by volatility of returns.

On the second occasion the owner ran out of medication and the dog was not medicated for 48h, Within 24h aggression had returned to the same level it had been at prior to medication, After thyroxine supplementation was resumed aggression was extinguished over the subsequent 2 - 5days.