Sentences with phrase «substantial injustice»

The court will, however, exercise its power if the tribunal has behaved unfairly in a way that has caused substantial injustice.

The claim must then be struck out unless by doing so the claimant would suffer substantial injustice.

In such circumstances, application of a rule of evidence to exclude such material unless it is evidence of general reputation may work substantial injustice.

In considering the application, the court is afforded some discretion in cases where a strike out would cause the claimant to suffer substantial injustice.

«It is the very well - established practice of this court, in a case where the conviction was entirely proper under the law as it stood at the time of trial, to grant leave to appeal against conviction out of time only where substantial injustice would otherwise be done to the defendant.»

(a) The rule is to be «used sparingly, only if a clearly meritorious case is made out and where substantial injustice might otherwise be done, as no doubt it is a rule easily susceptible of abuse and liable, if too freely applied, to serve as an encouragement to carelessness»: Turgeon J.A. in Kowalenko v. Lewis and Lepine, [1921] 2 W.W.R. 504, 35 C.C.C. 224, 59 D.L.R. 333 (Sask.

«To refuse the order, a substantial injustice may occur, wrought by legislation not in force or within the reasonable contemplation of any of the participants in the trial process, but made retrospective by an enactment passed years later,» said the court.

It remains to be seen how the courts might apply the notion of «substantial injustice».

There are some considerable question marks over the definitions of «fundamental dishonesty» and «substantial injustice»; arguably, there are also difficulties with how exactly «personal injury» will be defined and as to how the «related claim» will fit with that definition.

Section 57 places a duty on courts to strike out a personal injury claim, if, on application by the defendant, the court is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the claimant has been fundamentally dishonest, unless by doing so there would be substantial injustice.

«Substantial injustice» is not defined.

The claimant sought to set aside the arbitral award for serious irregularity giving rise to substantial injustice (under section 68 of the Act), claiming that a fair - minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of unconscious bias.

The section gives the court a safety - valve discretion not to deny the claim where it considers that dismissing the claim would work «substantial injustice».

If the appeal is effectively based on a change of law, and nothing else, but the conviction was properly returned at the time, after a fair trial, it is unlikely that a substantial injustice occurred.

Section 57 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 gives the court the power to dismiss a claim for damages where it is satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, the claimant has been «fundamentally dishonest» in relation to the claim, unless the claimant would otherwise suffer «substantial injustice».

If leave is refused on the ground that the substantial injustice requirement is not met, they should submit an application to the CCRC.

The basis of the challenge was that, to avoid tension between the Court of Appeal and the CCRC, the latter is obliged to apply the «substantial injustice» filter referred to by Hughes LJ in Ramzan.

The applications were refused on the ground that the «substantial injustice» requirement was not met.