It therefore seems likely that, at least for now, Charter litigation to advance
substantive equality for the economically marginalized will often depend on provisions other than s. 15.
Based in Vancouver on Unceded Coast Salish Territories and focused on issues in BC, West Coast LEAF promotes
substantive equality for women and girls in the courts, in the legislature and in schools.
The implications of the court's decision were significant for creating
substantive equality for women in the workplace, and were of particular importance to women with disabilities.
Not exact matches
If Member States are enforcing
substantive EU norms through administrative and criminal penalties, the CJEU clearly should be able to oversee uniform application of EU law, especially considering the fact that article 2 TEU states that the «Union is founded on the values of respect
for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect
for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities».
From a broad perspective,
substantive equality is rooted in the fundamental principles of respect
for human dignity and worth.
Perhaps if you (and the criticism would apply equally to Omar, since he and I have had this debate here before, as well as numerous other benchers and law society bureaucrats) actually addressed the
substantive concerns — perhaps actually cited a source
for the purported obligation to promote
equality, diversity and inclusion generally — rather than dismissing the critics of this proposal
for being inadequately woke, you might win over critics like me (and many of the people I've spoken with).
We suspect that the need to tie
substantive equality claims to s. 15 of the Charter was based on the (not unreasonable) expectation that s. 15 would be the primary vehicle
for advancing
substantive equality through litigation.
The «title to land» characterisation of native title thus satisfies the
substantive equality standard
for the protection of the right to enjoy and develop culture in that it legally protects the circumstances required to maintain Indigenous cultures that are reliant upon their connection to their lands.
If likening native title to a proprietal interest within a tenurial system provides a vehicle
for the enjoyment of the unique Indigenous laws and customs within the protection of the common law then such a translation is justifiable as providing
substantive equality to Indigenous people.
Special measures undertaken
for this purpose are essential to achieving
substantive equality, advancing human dignity and eliminating racial discrimination.
Thus, it is accepted that
for justice to be served there must be an element of
substantive equality, and that to rely on formal
equality is to deny justice.18 As Professor Peter Bailey has pointed out, «adopting the principle of
substantive equality leads to difficult value judgements and distinctions, but in the interests of justice and human rights, there is no escape from this course.»
In international jurisprudence, particular regimes
for the preservation of the characteristics and traditions of minorities are accepted as consistent with, and sometimes required to achieve factual or
substantive equality.
Note: In its submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Native Title the Attorney - General's Department stated that it is
for «the Parliament to decide whether
substantive equality was to be provided and, if it was, what that encompassed»: Quoted in Parliamentary Joint Committee on Native Title, CERD and the Native Title Amendment Act 1998, op.cit, p9.