Sentences with phrase «substantive equality law»

Not exact matches

Since then, through its public education, direct advocacy, and law reform initiatives, CAMWL has endeavoured to help shape a legal profession that is responsive to our collective obligation to promote substantive justice and equality.

If Member States are enforcing substantive EU norms through administrative and criminal penalties, the CJEU clearly should be able to oversee uniform application of EU law, especially considering the fact that article 2 TEU states that the «Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities».

Promoting (substantive) equality entails «the promotion of a society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.»

The starting point of an approach to the law that advances substantive equality is to recognize the existence of older adults as a group who may in some respects have different needs and experiences from many younger persons, whether due to the accumulated effects of their life courses, social structures, or marginalization and stereotyping of older persons, and to take those particular needs and circumstances into account when designing laws, policies and programs.

Perhaps if you (and the criticism would apply equally to Omar, since he and I have had this debate here before, as well as numerous other benchers and law society bureaucrats) actually addressed the substantive concerns — perhaps actually cited a source for the purported obligation to promote equality, diversity and inclusion generally — rather than dismissing the critics of this proposal for being inadequately woke, you might win over critics like me (and many of the people I've spoken with).

Meaningful access to justice is required to provide assistance to individual women and to continue to develop family law legal principles which reflect women's legal rights to substantive equality.

It is now also accepted by the Australian Government that substantive equality is the standard now required at international law.

If likening native title to a proprietal interest within a tenurial system provides a vehicle for the enjoyment of the unique Indigenous laws and customs within the protection of the common law then such a translation is justifiable as providing substantive equality to Indigenous people.

The Government's arguments before the CERD Committee conceded that the standard of equality has broadened under international law to include «substantive equality».

As discussed above the international law concept of equality is a substantive one.

An acceptance in the majority PJC report that the standard of equality at international law incorporates substantive equality distinguished the dialogue with the PJC from public debate during the amendments to the NTA in 1998.

Having accepted that substantive equality is an appropriate standard at international law, the PJC was left to grapple with the question of what differences should be treated differently in order to achieve real or substantive equality.

The majority report of the PJC concedes the relevance of substantive equality to Australia's obligations under ICERD, and then seeks to explain what substantive equality requires of States at international law, and how the amended NTA meets this standard.

[55] The international legal approach to equality is one of substantive rather than formal equality: G Triggs, «Australia's Indigenous Peoples and International Law» (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 372 at 379 - 381; also Australian Law Reform Commission, Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, Report No 31 (1986) paras 150, 158.

Even though the High Court had rejected, in the Native Title Act Case, the argument that because native title has different characteristics from other forms of title and derives from a different source, native title holders can be deprived of their property rights, this argument was recouched as part of an international law notion of substantive equality.

The international legal approach to equality is one of substantive rather than formal equality: G Triggs, «Australia's Indigenous Peoples and International Law» (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 372 at 379 - 381; also Australian Law Reform Commission, Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, Report No 31 (1986) paras 150, 158.

Substantive equality on this view is not seen as a fundamental requirement at international law, but as an optional extra.

If by likening native title to a proprietary interest the common law provides the same level of protection and security to the unique relationship that Indigenous people have with their land and sea country as that which is provided to all non-Indigenous proprietary interests, then such a translation is consistent with the principle of substantive equality.

To the extent that the right to negotiate protects Indigenous cultural norms regarding access to their traditional lands, it reflects the substantive equality standard required at international law.

Rather, the right to negotiate is a reflection of traditional law and as such is an inherent property and cultural right protected by the international guarantee of substantive equality.