The majority report of the PJC concedes the relevance of substantive equality to Australia's obligations under ICERD, and then seeks to explain what
substantive equality requires of States at international law, and how the amended NTA meets this standard.
Not exact matches
The second
requires substantive equality, combining fair
equality of opportunity with limitations on inequality so as to maximize the position of the least well off group.
Like you, I believe that there are strategies the LSUC could pursue which would achieve their
substantive goals, strategies which accurately reflect existing (and unambiguous) legal and ethical obligations and which are consistent with constitutional requirements and principles (as I've noted above, if the current requirement around a Statement of Principle merely
required acknowledgement of our actual existing obligations under the Rules, rather than a general duty to promote
equality, diversity and inclusion which is found nowhere in the Rules, I suspect much opposition would melt away and the LSUC would be on far stronger Charter grounds).
The anticipated focus of these submissions is on the definition of «sexual activity» at s. 273.1 (1) of the Criminal Code, a
substantive equality analysis on the meaning of consent, and observations on the procedure
required by s. 276 of the Criminal Code.
Meaningful access to justice is
required to provide assistance to individual women and to continue to develop family law legal principles which reflect women's legal rights to
substantive equality.
Consequently, the application of the
substantive equality principle to protection of Indigenous rights to property in the present will
require that the history of past discrimination be taken into account.
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (the CERD Committee) has confirmed that in their application to Indigenous peoples, the Convention
requires States to comply with a
substantive equality standard.
It is now also accepted by the Australian Government that
substantive equality is the standard now
required at international law.
The «title to land» characterisation of native title thus satisfies the
substantive equality standard for the protection of the right to enjoy and develop culture in that it legally protects the circumstances
required to maintain Indigenous cultures that are reliant upon their connection to their lands.
Consequently, the «right to land» approach satisfies a
substantive equality standard in relation to property rights, in that it protects the circumstances
required to protect the right, without prescriptively defining the exact content of native title.
Substantive equality on the other hand not only permits the recognition of difference but may
require it where this is necessary to achieve
equality between racial groups.
Substantive equality is
required by international human rights standards [25] and agreed as an appropriate measure by the Commonwealth Parliament [26] and current Australian Government.
In international jurisprudence, particular regimes for the preservation of the characteristics and traditions of minorities are accepted as consistent with, and sometimes
required to achieve factual or
substantive equality.
The protection of the unique, subtle and highly particular nature of native title is a reasonable and proportionate means to achieve
substantive equality [42],
required as a matter of international obligation to safeguard the characteristics of indigenous minorities.
The Commission submits that protection of the unique, subtle and highly particular nature of native title is a reasonable and proportionate means to achieve
substantive equality [75],
required as a matter of international obligation to safeguard the characteristics of indigenous minorities.
[106] Such curtailment is contrary to human rights norms which
require adequate recognition and protection of native title in order to safeguard the distinct identities of indigenous peoples and hence achieve
substantive racial
equality.
In relation to the protection of Indigenous cultures, it is recognised that
substantive equality may
require the protection of rights to lands where the culture is located and which give meaning to the exercise of that culture.
To the extent that the right to negotiate protects Indigenous cultural norms regarding access to their traditional lands, it reflects the
substantive equality standard
required at international law.
[16] This is the principle of «relative» or «
substantive»
equality, [17] which is acknowledged by the Australian government as the international standard
required under ICERD.
This clarification indicates that the government does not in fact accept that a
substantive equality approach is
required in order to meet its obligations under the Convention.
Issue: Does Australia regard the Convention as
requiring formal or
substantive equality.