Sentences with phrase «temporal actuality»

And last but not least, Suchocki expressly states that God's consequent nature is not prehended, while Whitehead not only claims in the last page of Process and Reality that «the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience» (PR 351), but also speaks in more exact language of» [t] he objective immortality of his [God's] consequent nature» (PR 32).

As has been said, Suchocki consistently speaks of «the primordial satisfaction» while Whitehead also refers to God's «specific satisfaction» (PR 88), and he also speaks of the contribution of every new temporal actuality to a realization in God (PR 88, 345).

For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience» (351) 3 Some interpreters refer also to Whitehead's reference to the «superjective nature» of God in Process and Reality: «The «superjective» nature of God is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances» (88).4 In this case, however, the actual warrant lies again on page 351, as it is under the light of that particular passage that the «superjective character» on page 88 is interpreted as a reference to the objectification of the consequent nature.

For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience.

The corresponding element in God's nature is not temporal actuality, but is the transmutation of that temporal actuality into a living, ever - present fact (Process and Reality, An Essay in Cosmology 531).20

Whitehead notes, «The corresponding element in God's nature is not temporal actuality, but is the transmutation of that temporal actuality into a living, ever - present fact.»

So God's consequent nature has an effect on the temporal world,»... each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience.»

Griffin & Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, 350) The difference is that the occasion, as a temporal actuality, fades into the past.

«For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience» (PR 351).

At any rate, the function that does seem relatively clear is that God conditions temporal actuality as a result of his prehension and harmonization of the antecedent world.

Its function, we said, is God's conditioning of temporal actuality as a result of his prehension and harmonization of the antecedent world.

«The perfected actuality [God's satisfaction] passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience» (PR 532).

In fact, we might even find an implicit anticipation of God's knowledge of temporal actuality in the 1922 essay on «Uniformity and Contingency» (ESP 134f).

In more technical terms, this «inclusion as an immediate fact of relevant experience» by each temporal actuality is the feeling by each concrescing occasion of its own initial aim.

Moreover, as eternally ingressed in God's primordial nature, each eternal object is, relative to the temporal actualities, a transcendent capacity for their determination.

For in a sense God can only enjoy what lesser temporal actualities give him to enjoy.

Not exact matches

Granted, therefore, that God's infinite conceptual valuation of pure possibility may justly be termed «free» since it is «limited by no actuality which it presupposes (PR 524), yet the temporal integrative activity of his consequent nature, whereby he loves particular occasions of the actual world, may also be called «free,» though in a somewhat different sense.

What is the lifespan if not a temporal aggregate that is woven by the mind into a seamless thread from the series of discrete momentary actualities.

And, as we have seen, the notion of God arises in «the question whether the process of the temporal world passes into other actualities, bound together in an order in which novelty does not mean loss.

There is still, however, the same threefold character: (i) The «primordial nature» of God is the concrescence of a unity of conceptual feelings... (ii) The «consequent nature» of God is the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe... (iii) The «superjective» nature10 of God is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances.

, the divine consequent nature is everlasting or infinitely temporal, entailing that God has been interacting with the domain of finite actualities for an infinitely past time, and that God will continue to interact with finite actualities infinitely in the future.

Every actual occasion has temporal thickness and every present actual entity is a response to actualities of the settled past.

The philosophy of organism culminates in a new metaphysical theology.12 In Whitehead's view, «The most general formulation of the religious problem is the question whether the process of the temporal world passes into the formation of other actualities, bound together in an order in which novelty does not mean loss» (Process and Reality, An Essay in Cosmology 517)-- as it does in the temporal world.

As before, the question of such survival is left open, but a new note is struck by the reference to the everlasting nature of God, which is his consequent nature as the weaving of his temporal physical feelings of actualities upon his nontemporal conceptualizations of all pure possibilities (PR 524).

This results in a basic and inexplicable dichotomy whereby transmutation and redemption are regarded as nontemporal achievements.17 But if transmutation is a fact, and if God as consequent is a concrete actuality, transmutation must be a temporal affair — even though it has a nontemporal element.

Existence and actuality are related by the same general principles that govern other ultimate contrasts such as necessity and contingency, independence and dependence, everlasting and temporal, and abstract and concrete (to name four of the twenty - one contrasts that Hartshorne lists).

However, though essentially connected to our temporal world, this final realm is a nonworldly actuality, God.

Even «the ultimate evil in the temporal world» concerns how present actualities obstruct past ones (PR 340), not pure possibilities.

It can only if the abstract can make decisions or resolve its own indefiniteness — which Hartshorne would deny.2 It will not change the situation to assert that Hartshorne's theory, though it has no place for the internal development of an actuality, does provide for temporal development by stipulating that each succeeding actuality comes into being as a whole.

Griffin & Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, 88) Whitehead further comments that God's «primordial nature directs such perspectives of objectification that each novel actuality in the temporal world contributes such elements as it can to a realization in God free from inhibitions of intensity by reason of discordance.»

Whitehead says,»... each novel actuality in the temporal world contributes such elements as it can to a realization in God...» (Process and Reality, Corrected Edition, ed.

The discordant multiplicity of free creations of actualities in the temporal world are brought into complete adjustment in the harmony of God's own actualization.

Doubtless such foreknowledge would entail that future actualities exist (if knowledge is agreement with reality); then, of course, they would not be future — and, once more, temporal distinctions would disappear.

He starts with the general principle, «Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception into God's nature.»

To set the stage for considering religion from a cosmological point of view, Whitehead writes, «The most general formulation of the religious problem is the question whether the process of the temporal world passes into the formation of other actualities, bound together in an order in which novelty does not mean loss.»

God prehends every actuality in the temporal world.

«The factor of temporal endurance selected for any one actuality will depend upon its initial «subjective aim»» (PR 128 / 195).

The two sets [«the things which are temporal» and «the things which are eternal»] are mediated by a thing which combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential.

On the divine non-temporal actual entity as ground for the relevance of eternal objects Whitehead contends that «if there be a relevance of what in the temporal world is unrealized, the relevance must express a fact of togetherness in the formal constitution of a non-temporal actuality» (Process 32).

Here, Whitehead writes that the divine element in the world «combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential.»

The two sets are mediated by a thing which combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential.

The ontological principle can be expressed as: All real togetherness is togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality So if there be a relevance of what in the temporal world is unrealized, the relevance must express a fact of togetherness in the formal constitution of a non-temporal actuality.

Therefore, the statement that God «combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential» is incompatible with the concept of God in two natures developed in the last chapter of that book where, as we have seen above, God is temporal in the consequent nature.

the ontological principle can be expressed as: All real togetherness is togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality.6 So if there be a relevance of what in the temporal world is unrealized, the relevance must express a fact of togetherness in the formal constitution of a non-temporal actuality.

This conception is theoretically founded on the affirmation of the priority of actuality over potentiality, which applies, according to Aristotle, explicitly in a temporal sense to the members of species: There must always be an actual member of a species that precedes its potential successors.

The most general formulation of the religious problem is the question whether the process of the temporal world passes into the formation of other actualities, bound together in an order in which novelty does not mean loss.12

Perhaps, it is best understood as that pneumopathology, that infection of the spirit, that inhibits and interrupts and acts on the transition of the modes of being from potentiality to actuality revealed in the mode of «time and temporal existence.»

This weaving together of the actual and the ideal is the consummation of the world in God's experience, 22 but it is also our future, since the Ideals used to bring the actuality experienced by God into harmonious unity thereby also become ideals and lures for actualization in the temporal world.

If temporal meant that actuality and truth were being lost as well as gained, then God is «timeless.»

The concretely actual is temporal and in process, Hence the effort of theologians to affirm the actuality of the timeless and changeless has led to absurdities.