Sentences with phrase «theories of perception»

The Gruppo Uno, disbanded in 1967, distanced itself from Art Informel, proposing a concept of art that was connected to the theories of perception, and suggested a different role for the artist in society.

A critical feature of the model, and one found in theories of perception more generally, is that it assumes the brain is biased toward inferring causes rather than registering coincidences.

Whitehead's stress on the importance of perceptions of causal efficacy implies that excluding insights generated from women's experience from informing linguistic theory and philosophical theories of perception and knowledge only insures that these theories will be inadequate and oversimplified.

Two reasonably coherent, significantly different theories of perception emerge from these groupings.

The analysis required to produce the four - way connections of FIGURE 1 suggested a relationship between Whitehead's theories of perception and concrescence.

On this analogy, the relation between scientific theories of perception and the experience of the «withness of the body» would be like the relation of scientific psychology and scientific medicine to folk - psychology and folk - medicine.

When Whitehead saw that his theory of perception required a symbolic connection, he may have reworked material from this treatise as the opening two lectures of Symbolism.

This theory offers a definition of straightness independent of measurement that Whitehead could use in his developing theory of perception (IV: 4 - 5, in part).

John H. Kultgen maintains that Whitehead's later theory of perception contains «a reflective phenomenological description of perceiving» (3:129).

1 Specific articles on this subject have been offered by Charles Hartshorne, «Husserl and Whitehead on the Concrete,» FCC 90 - 104; F. David Martin, «Heidegger's Thinking Being and Whitehead's Theory of Perception,» Bucknell Review 17 (May, 1969).

Laszlo seems to forget that the doctrine of prehension emerges out of an analysis of the theory of perception of a great idealist philosopher, George Berkeley.

Since a given actual entity is causally affected by every other actual entity In its past, this theory would tend to support my original «detailed» interpretation of CE in IWTP, according to which Whitehead is committed to a theory of perception in the mode of CE which yields very specific knowledge of causes.

The author has written critiques of Whitehead's theory of perception and here gives new reasons to doubt the cogency and consistency of this theory of Whitehead's.

I have concluded that Whitehead may have conceived of his theory of perception before his completed system, and so he may have intended his theory of perception to be independent of his system, but in fact it is net logically independent of his system.

After Lewis Ford's genetic investigations in The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics, I think there can be little question that Whitehead intended his theory of perception to be independent of his system.3 Ford calls PR II.4.5 - 8 & II.8 the «Original Treatise on Perception» and shows that Symbolism is a revision of it.

I find that Whitehead's exposition is question - begging and seriously misleading.4 The exposition is misleading insofar as it suggests that belief in either a specific or generic causal nexus is adequately justified by a subject's experience of CE alone and not ultimately by systematic considerations, particularly those related to prehension.5 If Whitehead's theory of perception was intended to stand alone without support from the rest of his system, as Ford suggests (EWM 181 - 182), then I claim that it is insufficiently justified insofar as a part of it, the theory of CE, is inadequately justified.

My point is not that this suggests the possibility of positive support for Whitehead's notion of a variety of cosmic epochs (on his own theory of perception, it must be impossible for us to make observations of another epoch); my point is the negative one that generalizations from available astronomical data to uniformity throughout the universe may be precarious.

Others would refuse it the name because they regard as realistic only a theory of perception which asserts that what we perceive exists just as we perceive it independently of its being perceived, whereas I, like Whitehead, think that the object of perception really is what we perceive it to be only as what Whitehead calls an element in an actual situation that includes as other constituents not only the context but also the perceiver.

In the manuscript «Realism and Idealism,» Collingwood states in a no less polemical way that the term «realism» may be retained with regard to the theory of perception, on the condition that it is qualified in Whitehead's way:

The crucial move in Whitehead's theory of perception is to confront this temptation and challenge the exclusive claim of presentational immediacy to provide the sole basis for perceptual knowledge.

10 Given my stress in the previous section on the importance of Whitehead's theory of perception in the mode of causal efficacy, it is revealing to notice that Russell apparently coined both the term and concept, leaving it to Whitehead to make use of it (BR, p. 51).

For example, there was no reference to other features of the theory of perception, let alone concrescence.

But it is difficult at times to see how the theory of perception encompassed in Russell's logical atomism adds anything to Hume's position, even as it is often hard to exonerate Russell from the stigma of simpleminded extremism and inconsistent excess — as, for example, in his variant intemperate reactions to the metaphysics of William James.

A «process hermeneutic,» informed by Whitehead's theory of perception, is sympathetic to Bultmann's existentialist interpretation and to the emphasis on imagination in the «new hermeneutic.»

But is «logical force» the right category for the function of propositions in Whitehead's theory of perception?

Thus Whitehead's doctrine acknowledges that we perceive through a medium while denying that this amounts to a representative theory of perception.

Thus, this paper is not an account of Whitehead's theory of perception solely in terms of the categories of the philosophy of organism; rather, it is a critique of the coherence of that theory from a point of view outside it.

Its methodological inclusiveness is protected from the charges of being ad hoc because of its basis in a theory of perception - as - interpretation.

In his theory of perception, Whitehead attempts to do justice to all our various and apparently conflicting perceptive experiences.

It would be more correct to speak of texts as «straightforward descriptions» of an event or state of affairs, to use Kelsey's phrase, if one has in mind this notion, «symbolic reference,» in Whitehead's theory of perception, rather than «propositions,» as Kelsey does.

By reconciling two seemingly incompatible traditional accounts of perception, he hopes to cut through the Gordian knot of problems which have bound the theory of perception since the seventeenth century.

Thus Whitehead's theory of perception is unable to reconcile its opposing tendencies of realism and mediatism.

No ontology or theory of perception that denies these primary facts is credible to me.

(Alternately, rather than as explicit theories, these might be seen as primitive dispositions toward the criteria one chooses to employ in framing or judging a theory of perception.)

To put Whitehead's theory of perception in perspective, let us consider two traditional accounts, each widely held historically and each — separately — commanding considerable intuitive appeal.

Whitehead himself says quite explicitly that he believes both Descartes and Locke attempted to avoid a representational theory of perception.

Bishop Berkeley's chief popular fame is derived from his theory of perception.

A single parenthetical reference to Herbert Spencer has to do only with his theory of perception, not his evolutionist views (EWM 291).

Leclerc comments: «But it is to be noted that in Whitehead's theory the representative theory of perception is avoided.

Buchler's theory of perception and judgment articulates, in a descriptive sense, what is categorically distinctive of human nature, or rather for Buchler, human process.

Our understanding the symbolic process in terms of the bipolar theory of perception avoids the one - sidedness of an exclusively psychological or subjectivist location of religious symbolism.

His theory of perception helps explain why.

In our aesthetic model with its allied bipolar theory of perception, we can find an illuminative value in each mode of discourse, science or religion.

Although Whitehead goes on in later sections of the Enquiry to argue that actually all perceptual objects are delusive (since all perception is belated)(PNK 184), and then to propound an analysis of the transition from appearance to cause which will provide a theory for the connection of delusive perceptual objects with their generating events, it must be emphasized that Whitehead is still in no way advocating a causal theory of perception.

Whether or not feminists recognize it explicitly, a theory of perception and a theory of language are operative in these claims.

Whitehead's theory of perception is also relevant in another way to feminist theory.

This article examines Whitehead's theory of perception to indicate how this theory provides a philosophical reinterpretation for two issues of concern to feminists: criticism of cultural symbols, including language, and the importance of intuition and emotion, usually associated with women, in experience.

Examining these two issues in light of Whitehead's theory of perception suggests the rich possibilities of appropriating this theory for feminist theory.

However, insofar as this widespread opinion accurately reflects a difference in the way many men and women presently experience the world, it is interesting to see how this opinion is reconceived when examined in terms of Whitehead's theory of perception.

Whitehead's broadening of direct experience to include perceptions in the mode of causal efficacy provides an interesting twist to this opinion when it is examined in the philosophical context provided by his theory of perception.