Sentences with phrase «theory of human nature»

An implication of this idea is that a holistic and relativistic approach to human experience not only is a more valid theory of human nature, but has important clinical implications for helping people lead more fulfilling, energized lives.

His theory of human nature: «Never assume that the next guy knows what he is doing.much less why.»

«Rand» by Nathaniel Gold «Every political philosophy has to begin with a theory of human nature,» wrote Harvard evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin in his book Biology as Ideology.

My theory of human nature, «emotional amoral egoism», is closely derived from an understanding of human nature based on findings from neuroscience.

We can thus arrive at a theory of human nature that both explains our inherited aspects in terms of natural selection and leaves sufficient scope for the agency of human beings to develop in relation to their circumstances.

The predispositional aspect of my neurophilosophical theory of human nature is informed by Darwinian selection pressure.

As explained in my neurophilosophical theory of human nature, humans have the potential to be either moral or immoral, depending on their self - interest, and will be influenced in their choices by emotions and socio - cultural contexts.

I'm mostly trying to illustrate a point: Whether we like discussing human nature or not, we are all working with a theory of human nature and that theory of human nature has practical consequences.

But, in addition to descriptive categorization, a philosophical theory of human nature or process also aims to categorize what it means to be distinctively human in the best sense.

A kind of «field» theory of human nature is evidently needed.

Rorty feels that philosophy should not be thought of as a foundation for education or politics; on the contrary, he insists that grounding social and political action on philosophical theories of human nature has done more harm than good.

But that would require some kind of skeptical forward thinking based upon the knowledge of actual displayed human nature beyond the initial «in - the - bubble» short - sighted OREA group - think bureaucratic thinking style based upon wishful thinking Pollyanna fantasy theories of human nature.

Not exact matches

But it is one thing to state that all human beings have some access to God's law within and through human nature, quite another to expect natural law theories based on reason alone to persuade others about contested moral issues in a context where such theories are stripped of their foundations in God as creator, lawgiver, and judge.

Yet, thinkers from Edmund Burke to Russell Kirk have shown the deeply anti-conservative bases of the social contract theory of Lockean (and Hobbesian) origin, one that is premised upon a conception of human beings as naturally «free and independent,» as autonomous individuals who are thought to exist by nature detached from a web of relationships that include family, community, Church, region, and so on.

Yet for us this epistemological dimension of the redemption is not from the supposedly «incurably» dualistic nature of human knowing but from stubbornly dualistic theories of human knowing which over the millennia of their influence have whittled away wonder.

The dominant theory and practice of development treat nature as if it were an inexhaustible resource for human beings.

Whitehead did work out a complex theory of value, but my point here is only to indicate that Whitehead's way of understanding human beings as part of nature both requires that we extend the ethical discussion and gives us clues as to how to do this.

A little knowledge of philosophy is also of help, particularly as Descartes» theories are presented as throwing doubt on the nature of human identity.

These practices were accompanied by theories about the nature of the human beings and the universe quite different from either biblical or secular ones in the West.

Charles W. Morris, in Six Theories of Mind, writes: «Whitehead's course of procedure is to give a comprehensive description of human experience and then to take this description as a key to the nature of reality» (quoted in 1:51).

At the same time, he rejects those theories, «more or less tinged with behaviouristic psychology,» which assume» that human nature has no dynamism of its own and that psychological changes are to be understood in terms of the development of new «habits» as an adaptation to new cultural patterns.»

Stephen Buckle in A Companion to Ethics observes that «the shortcoming of natural law theory is... its typical failure to go beyond the insistence that human nature is rational nature.»

It appears that McGrath has got too sucked into the Popperian insight that human understandings of the world are «theory laden» (p. 61)-- wherein human culture rather than human nature is made not just intrinsic to explanations of observations, but determinative.

Although he initially rejects physicalism because he thinks that a human person is not just an organism and mental changes are not simply physical changes, he concludes «physicalism is the most reasonable theory about the nature of human beings».

Back in the early seventeenth century Francis Bacon, the first modern philosopher of science, recognised that the developmental nature of modern scientific methodology provided a truer vision of how human knowing arrives at formality than the scholastic theory of abstraction.

To put it simply, what has been missing [in economic theory] is an understanding of the nature of human coordination and cooperation.

Niebuhr's antipathy toward any form of inherited sin reflected his fear that it would mitigate responsibility; hence he writes: «the theory of an inherited second nature is as clearly destructive of the idea of responsibility for sin as rationalistic and dualistic theories which attribute human evil to the inertia of nature» (NDM 262).

When evolutionary theory brought human beings into nature, this kind of dualism faded.

Yet it stands head and shoulders above its nearest rival; its separateness inheres, not in theories of its origin and nature, but in the solid facts of its worth and of its impact upon human society in the way both of rebuke to the low and bestial and of exaltation of an impossible ideal, toward which, nonetheless, it has attracted and impelled.

Schleiermacher, however, built a theory of the solidarity of humankind in sin upon an evolutionary view of human nature.

In a sense, Christ provides the grand unifying theory long sought by physicists, since creation unfolds within the Word's dynamic and personal assumption of human nature, «the microcosmos».

An objectivist view that sees the nature of reality writ large in the universe and waiting to be discovered by the human mind, that claims theories are exact replicas of reality, is typical of naive realism.

Evolutionary theory has deepened my appreciation of both nature in general and of humans as creatures of nature.

In other words, too much of natural law theory, especially that derived from those thinkers from Grotius on who transposed natural law into natural rights (which after the French Revolution usually became known as «human rights»), relies on a concept of nature that is not natural.

It has been a hallmark of genuine natural law theories that through rational reflection on human nature they arrive at the precise place where Scripture reports a firm commandment (against killing the innocent, for example, or violating marriage vows).

In fact, all my anxieties run in the opposite direction: that, in order to affirm the uniqueness of humanity within organic nature, as well as the unique moral obligations it entails, we will reject all evidence of intentionality, reason, or affection in animals as something only apparently purposive, doing so by reference to the most egregiously vapid of philosophical naturalism's mystifications — «instinct» — and thereby opening the way to a mechanistic narrative that, as we have learned from an incessant torrent of biological and bioethical theory in recent decades, can be extended to human behavior as well.

Buchler's theory of perception and judgment articulates, in a descriptive sense, what is categorically distinctive of human nature, or rather for Buchler, human process.

Along with dualistic mythology several developments in scientific thought since the seventeenth century have contributed to the exorcism of mind from nature: first, there is the cosmography of classical (Newtonian) physics picturing our world as composed of inanimate, unconscious bits of «matter» needing only the brute laws of inertia to explain their action; second, the Darwinian theory of evolution with its emphasis on chance, waste and the apparent «impersonality» of natural selection; third, the laws of thermodynamics (and particularly the second law) with the allied cosmological interpretation that our universe is running out of energy available to sustain life, evolution and human consciousness; fourth, the geological and astronomical disclosure of enormous tracts of apparently lifeless space and matter in the universe; fifth, the recent suggestions that life may be reducible to an inanimate chemical basis; and, finally, perhaps most shocking of all, the suspicion that mind may be explained exhaustively in terms of mindless brain chemistry.

12 Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment (1951)[TGT]; Nature and Judgment (1955)[NJ]; The Concept of Method (New York, Columbia University Press, 1961; hereafter, M; The Main of Light: On the Concept of Poetry (1974).

Even in the early works — Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment, Nature and Judgment — the so - called metaphysics of utterance is transcended by more general principles.

They point out that the key assumption behind traditional economic theory is its understanding of the nature of the human person.

In this phase Whitehead proceeds from the fact that, opposed to the «concrete universe,» or to the world which embraces — howsoever — both nature and the «whole round world of human affairs,» there stands a multiplicity of theories of the world, which reciprocally influence each other and the world or are coined in these relations.

This idea depends on developments in general systems theory, which views «all of nature and all of human activity as a hierarchically arranged structure of levels of interlocked subset systems in which the process of any particular subset system affects and is affected by other subset systems at its own level, as well as below or above it.»

Hence it deals with the theory of preaching, of Christian education, of social action and of worship as well as with the theory of divine and human nature, of God's activity and man's behavior.

I use the work of other sciences, evolutionary (developmental systems theory) and anthropological sciences, for baselines about human nature and behavior.

With insights from neuroscience, this theory argues that human nature is characterized by emotionality, amorality, and egoism, and that working for social cohesion and sustainable history requires careful consideration of the dignity needs of human beings.

It also contains, however, an intellectual history of moral philosophy, a theory of virtue, and an account of human nature as being part of a larger framework created by a benevolent deity.

Realism, the central theory in IR, suffered too from this misreading of human nature, adopted from Classical thinkers but disconnected from more recent accounts.

Symbiotic realism is a theory which accounts for the neurobiological substrates of human nature, as well as for the particularities of the world we live in: anarchic, yet characterized by instant connectivity and deep interdependencies.

Although much of the cellular and sub-cellular functions of the human brain remain unknown, the insights we currently have paint a more nuanced understanding of human nature, which in turn helps shape our understanding of politics, IR theory, and global order.