Sentences with phrase «third appellant»

(i) an order appointing the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee (the «OPGT») as litigation guardian for the third appellant, KW;
The appellants were represented by the third appellant.
Save for the third appellant, the secretary of state accepted that they were killed by members of the British forces.
The Revenue's Special Commissioner later determined that the purchase of the three annuities and the vesting of them in the first to third appellants fell to be treated as a transfer for value for inheritance tax purposes, on the basis, inter alia, that they were associated operations within the meaning of s 263 of the ITA 1984.

Not exact matches

Third, while the appellant had third party funding in place, the Rochon Group litigation plan had stated that on obtaining carriage a funding arrangement would be secThird, while the appellant had third party funding in place, the Rochon Group litigation plan had stated that on obtaining carriage a funding arrangement would be secthird party funding in place, the Rochon Group litigation plan had stated that on obtaining carriage a funding arrangement would be secured.
Summary: The appellant requested court assistance in taking evidence from a third party in an on - going arbitration under Section 26 of the Swedish Arbitration Act.
In their three - count third amended complaint, appellants alleged that appellant Lavetta White was injured in a slip and fall at a Wal - Mart Store.
Third does the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence for second degree murder constitute «cruel and unusual punishment» in this case, so that Mr. Latimer («the appellant») should receive a constitutional exemption from the minimum sentence?»
The Court held that the appellant was entitled to the third party debt order as the respondent was the sole beneficiary of the letters of credit, and identified as such in them, and as it was the sole creditor of the London branch of Crédit Agricole S.A..
To succeed at this third step, the appellant must establish either that there is a) a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had he received effective legal representation [FN2], or b) that his counsel's conduct deprived him of a fair trial.
[26] Since the water licence was not acquired by the appellant, the appellant is directed to provide the necessary written consent for the transfer to the third party as approved by the chambers judge.
The Court further suggests that the onus is on the Appellant to demonstrate that the third party does not have a legitimate interest in the outcome of the lawsuit, and thus an improper motive.
On December 11, 2006, I'm scheduled to argue on behalf of defendants - appellants in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs - prison conditions case from Bucks County, Pennsylvania that resulted in a $ 1.2 million jury award in favor of two pretrial detainees who contracted MRSA during their confinements.
In this instance, the Court found that the motion judge committed an error of principle making it inappropriate for the Court to rely on his factual findings of the Appellants» knowledge of their third party claims as dispositive of the appeal.
In any event, the Judge saw no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the Appellants» third party contractor that he did carry out the rectification works and was paid S$ 150,000 by the Appellants.
Justice McDonald then veered into a third error where he emphasized, at para. 71, that the facts admitted at Scott's sentence hearing, ``... were essentially the same narrative that she testified to at the appellant's trial a year later.»
Acted for the Claimants / Appellants in their challenge to the Lord Chancellor's decision to cut by two - thirds the number of criminal legal aid contracts for duty provider work.
In a previous decision, Goldwater and Others v Sellafield UKEAT / 0178/14 / DXA, the EAT had held that this rule precluded an order for costs where the fee had not been «paid by the appellant» but by a third party.
Third, the Settlement Agreement contained no provision purporting to release the appellants from claims unknown to the respondents at the time the agreement was made.
The appellants defended the action, arguing that 111 was insolvent and indebted to third parties at the time it allegedly assigned the Note, rendering the assignment legally invalid as an attempt to defraud creditors of 111.
At a third pre-trial of the mortgage action, the appellant had retained counsel, but counsel informed the court that his retainer had been terminated.
The appellants were third parties or «strangers» to the matrimonial litigation in which the motion was brought.
[47] The Reimbursement Agreement binds the appellant to make the repayment called for in the Plan, hence, repayment of a portion of any lump sum cash payment made upon or contingent upon resolution of a claim for compensation made against a Third Party.
Third, the effect of delay, in a case where the appeal ultimately failed, was unmeritoriously to prolong the appellant's stay in the UK.
The trial judge accepted that by giving possession to the Respondent, the Appellant implicitly gave the Respondent consent to pass possession of the truck to third parties like Mr. Tessman.
Third, the appellants submitted that the trial judge erred in finding that RCI was not concerned about transferring the purchase order to TM Canada because it knew that Getrag was contractually obliged to indemnify TM Canada for its payment obligations.
In the court's view, where, as here: (1) the Director under the OBCA issues a certificate pursuant to a rectification order; (2) the appellant could reasonably have sought a stay of the rectification order pending appeal; (3) the court is not satisfied that no third party acted, directly or indirectly, in reliance on the certificate issued pursuant to the rectification order and would not be prejudiced by its revocation; and (4) there are no special circumstances which justify exercising the power to cancel the certificate, thereby undermining certainty in a court - approved corporate fundamental change, the principle in Norcan requires the court to decline to exercise its authority to order the revocation of that certificate or otherwise unwind the court - approved corporate fundamental change.
Unfortunately, especially for the appellant, the case's procedural posture forced the Third Court to focus on superseded or «dead» motions and preserving appellate grounds.
In fact, with respect to the third action, the motion judge found that the delay was caused by the appellant's failure to provide timely instructions and the required retainer.
The appellants submitted that the respondent made a negligent misrepresentation when he failed to disclose that under the arrangement with the third party supplier in place at the time the agreement of purchase and sale was entered into, the respondent was financing the supply of pigs by purchasing them when they came to the barn and reselling them to the third party supplier when they left.
The third appeal is from the order of Varpio J. dated March 9, 2017, that dismissed a motion by the appellant for his recusal and for transfer of the proceedings to Toronto.
The respondent was the plaintiff in the underlying action who subsequently entered into two agreements with the defendant, H&M Combustion Services Ltd. («H&M») in 2011 and 2016, to indemnify H&M from any exposure in the litigation in exchange for the assignment of its rights to the plaintiff in pursuing a third party claim that H&M commenced against the appellant.
[25] The appellant's third submission is that a joint custody order was not appropriate because the parties were continually in conflict over how best to raise Jacob and could neither co-operate nor communicate with each other on his upbringing.
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