Sentences with phrase «traditional problem of evil»

If Griffin has really discovered a flaw in what lam calling the «standard view» of omnipotence, this would have important negative consequences for Christian theology generally and especially for the way in which it has dealt with the traditional problem of evil.

Although Whitehead has successfully avoided the traditional problem of evil by his dipolar doctrine of God, he seems to have presented us with another problem of evil in the sense that God is not only unavoidably implicated in the actions of finite occasions, but to the extent that pleasure is realized by occasions God derives enjoyment in his consequent nature also.

Still, for those of us who have labored in the past to straighten the conceptual kinks in the traditional problem of evil, the emergence of a new theodicy, worked out in something more than only cursory form, is an occasion of special interest.

A study of Griffin's reflections on this topic thus brings the reader face to face with conceptual issues related to this concept that would be worthy of careful philosophical attention even had they no immediate bearing on the traditional problem of evil.

Of course, he is by no means unaware of such difficulties, as is clear from the admission already cited and clearer still from his statement elsewhere, that, as compared with the traditional problem of evil, «there are other difficulties in theism» that he at least finds «more formidable.»

It is incompatible with human freedom and responsibility, and it renders insoluble the traditional problem of evil.

Not exact matches

Process theism, by relinquishing the claim that God could completely control the world in order to overcome the problem of present evil, can not have this traditional assurance about the future.

The authors do not go with the traditional answer to the problem of evil that since God is in control and since God is good, we must call all evil things that happen good, even if they appear bad.

If it is unintelligible (as Griffin and Hartshorne insist that it is), this will not count as a criticism of what Griffin calls «traditional theodicy,» nor will it have any real bearing on the adequacy of various positions taken in the contemporary, philosophical literature on the problem of evil.

(See the Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free - Will Theism by William Hasker; Traditional Free Will Theodicy and Process Theodicy: Hasker's Claim for Parity; «Bitten to Death by Ducks»: A Reply to Griffin; On Hasker's Defense of his Parity Claim by David Ray Griffin (see www.religion-online.org.)

My overall conclusion, accordingly, is that his attempt to show that process and traditional free will theism are on a par with regard to the problem of evil fails in all respects.

However, in more extensive treatments of the problem of evil (the one in Process Theology, which he cites, is only seven pages), I make clear that the issue is that traditional free will theists face a dilemma that process theists do not.

Though a more traditional Resident Evil game by modern standards, Resident Evil 0 does highlight the start of what would become this series» main problem — an inability to keep it simple.