Not exact matches
His argument, part
of which appeared in these pages («Leading Children Beyond Good and Evil,» May 2000), is that
moral education as presently conceived almost inevitably ends up by thinning out
moral content, removing the sharp edges
of judgment, avoiding normative
traditions of moral experience, and thus stifling the factors most crucial to the formation
of character.
When
moral rules and selves are abstracted from the normative
traditions that give them substance and the social contexts that makes them concrete, «values» become little more than sentiments,
moral judgments, expressions
of individual preference.
As thinkers in
moral philosophy such as Bernard Williams and Alisdair MacIntyre — upon whom Hauerwas draws extensively — contend, there is no Archimedean point, no
tradition - independent perspective from which value
judgments of the sort implied by Muray's charges
of sexism, racism and anti-Judaism can be made.
And yet that was never enough to shake the confidence
of conservative judges that the appeal to
tradition is valued precisely because it delivers a ground
of judgment safely distant from the need to weigh the
moral justifications for acts
of legislation.