Sentences with phrase «trial fairness»

The court's authority is preventative — to protect the administration of justice and ensure trial fairness.

The rule that is invoked here (the modified Wray rule) is based primarily on concerns of trial fairness, a matter that is not directly in issue before me.

[50] Regardless of the precise language used, the key point is this: abuse of process refers to Crown conduct that is egregious and seriously compromises trial fairness and / or the integrity of the justice system.

Therefore, being unable to see the witness's face will not impinge on trial fairness.

The accused alleged three separate incidents of state misconduct that, while admittedly not affecting trial fairness, did undermine the integrity of the judicial process (residual category): (1)...

But there is no sugar - coating the bitter taste that is left when a court finds that an amicus curiae is essential to safeguard trial fairness and then pays pennies on the dollar.

Even when a court finds that trial fairness demands an impoverished, unrepresented accused has legal representation or an amicus curiae is needed, defence lawyers are expected to work for a fraction of the cost of Crown prosecutors.

Coincidentally, the Court of Appeal appears to have found the Trial Judge himself ran afoul of the principle behind the rule — the failure to raise the point with defence counsel impacted trial fairness and led the Court of Appeal to order a new trial.

In R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562, 128 D.L.R. (4th) 98, Justice La Forest concluded that this historical concern with trial fairness has now been enshrined in s. 11 (d) of the Charter.

7 and 12 Charter rights, jeopardized the perception of trial fairness and brought the integrity of law enforcement into disrepute.

The violation of privilege compromised trial fairness and could not be remedied other than by a judicial stay.

71 In R. v. Collins, supra, the Supreme Court held that the factors which must be considered in determining whether the admission of the evidence in question could bring the administration of justice into disrepute are the effect of the admission of the evidence on trial fairness; the seriousness of the Charter breach; and the effect on the repute of the administration of justice if the evidence is admitted or excluded.

Conscriptive evidence, on the other hand, adversely affects trial fairness and is generally excluded under s. 24 (2) of the Charter.

The misconduct continued into the trial and, in my view, implicated trial fairness in the broad sense identified by Deschamps J., in her concurring reasons in R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 (S.C.C.), at para. 207, where she wrote that «trial fairness corresponds to courtroom fairness.»

One of those questions would be whether permitting the witness to wear a veil while testifying would create a serious risk to trial fairness.

The Supreme Court majority held that the answer to whether the witness could testify wearing a niqab lay in a just and proportionate balance between freedom of religion and trial fairness, based on the particular case before the Court.

C.A., May 23, 2012)(34881) Mar. 28, 2013 A new trial in this case is required because of the effect of the trial judge's charge on the fairness of the trial

The second question is: would permitting the witness to wear the niqab while testifying create a serious risk to trial fairness?

If both freedom of religion and trial fairness are engaged on the facts, a third question must be answered: is there a way to accommodate both rights and avoid the conflict between them?

Furthermore, the trial judge retains the discretion to exclude evidence where its admission would compromise trial fairness (Hart at para 88).

If wearing the niqab poses no serious risk to trial fairness, a witness who wishes to wear it for sincere religious reasons may do so...

That said, I would venture that trial fairness should operate as the guiding principle in this area, so if the plaintiff has decided that expert evidence from one specialty based on an examination of the plaintiff is relevant to the adjudication of her claim at trial, courts should be loathe to deny the defence a fair opportunity to respond with expert evidence from the same specialty based on an assessment of the plaintiff.

Although this was a well - intentioned effort to expedite matters and to reduce costs to the justice system, the trial judge, as the ultimate guardian of trial fairness, ought to have considered whether such a process could produce a just result in the circumstances.

As to prejudice, trial fairness would be affected should the memory of the defendants» only witness to the accident be impaired.

With respect to trial fairness, the Court of Appeal found the Trial Judge did not raise the issue of whether counsel had cross-examined the complainants on the Appellant's assertion that it was Abdi alone who was involved in the robberies.

Citing R v Schmaltz, 2015 ABCA 4 at para. 13 and R v Werkman, 2007 ABCA 130 at para. 3, the Court of Appeal found both the issue of trial fairness and application of the rule in Browne v Dunn were questions of law reviewable on the correctness standard.

This system is realistically depicted in other recent Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decisions, most notably in R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 (CanLII), where we are told that trial fairness, a most cherished aspect of our principles of fundamental justice, is not in fact in «mutual tension» with trial efficiency; rather they are, «in practice,» in a symbiotic or interdependent relationship.

Hearsay can threaten the integrity of the trial's truth - seeking process and trial fairness, but may be admitted where it meets necessity and threshold reliability.

These cases generally fall into two categories: 1) where state conduct compromises the fairness of an accused's trial (the «main» category); and 2) where state conduct creates no threat to trial fairness but risks undermining the integrity of the judicial process (the «residual» category)(O'Connor, at para. 73).

For example, the disciplinary panel that originally heard Mr. Groia's case suggested in its reasons that regulating lawyer civility is necessary to protect the proper administration of justice, trial fairness, and public confidence in the justice system.