Sentences with phrase «types of entities in»

In the health care arena, she has represented various types of entities in both litigation and regulatory matters.

This, after all, is what we should expect, given that eternal objects and actual entities are the fundamental types of entities in Whitehead's ontology and that «the other types of entities only express how all entities of the two fundamental types are in community with each other, in the actual world» (PR 37).

The other fundamental type of entity in Whitehead's philosophy is called the eternal object.

«Independent paralegals are licensed by law societies or on the way there in four Canadian provinces...» I expect to see a lot more of this type of entity in Canada.

Not exact matches

«Our largest increases were in audits of flow - through entities in fiscal year 2012,» says an IRS spokesperson, adding the jump was reflective of the increased number of these types of businesses.

Rampenthal: In startups, it's asking: «Should I be an entity, and what type of entity should I be?

An investment in these strategies is subject to various risks, such as those market risks common to entities investing in all types of securities, including market volatility.

These competitors often fall into one of the aforementioned categories but in some cases may represent new types of investors, including high net worth individuals, family offices and state - sponsored entities.

Investment in these types of hedge - fund strategies is subject to those market risks common to entities investing in all types of securities, including market volatility.

In examples that appear to be modelled after the ill - fated e-Gold service, FinCEN describes the typical activities of these types of entity as the electronic distribution of digital certificates of ownership of real currencies or precious metals.»

If you are conducting international business, if you are engaging in new types of transactions, if you are doing business with new entities or in new geographic regions, you may receive questions from government entities or your financial institution.

Application for business licenses can be done in the local government office but be aware that depending on the type of business entity you operate, you may have to apply for a license in different government agencies.

The new service channel aims to benefit two types of Canadian companies: high - growth firms in search of unique talent with experience in scaling small and medium sized companies into multi-million dollar entities, and firms in need of highly specialized workers for positions that Canada's current talent pool can not fill.

In addition, we work directly with large corporations, middle market companies, small businesses, municipal governments and many types of institutional entities to provide solutions - based financing alternatives for the acquisition of capital equipment and software.

2017 tax reform is the first major tax overhaul in 30 years, and will affect individuals, all types of businesses, tax - exempt entities, international taxation, and many other areas of tax law...

«Demon», in the English translation, can refer to at least three different types of entities.

It is that, while Laszlo centers upon patterns of structure and relationship which are reiterated throughout the hierarchy of entities of the world, Whitehead focuses on a primordial type of entity, the actual occasion, whose basic processes are found only in its kind and not reiterated in larger arrangements such as nexus and societies.

Whitehead also stated (in the paragraph from which Nobo quoted) that the «mutual immanence of contemporary actual entities is «of the indirect type» (Adventures 259).

For Whitehead has definitely recognized that when the distinction is made into types of entities the problem requires to be faced not merely as to how they are related to each other, but how they are related in respect of «being.»

Furthermore, since even these items that might indeed be susceptible of generalization are realized differently in different types of entities, there is always something peculiarly human about their mode of realization in human occurrences.

That is, what I am maintaining is that the ultimate basis upon which Whitehead has distinguished the different «kinds» or «types» of entities is the different senses in which they «are.»

Whitehead's summary delineation of these types of «entities,» types or kinds of «existence,» is listed in Chapter II, Section 2 of Process and Reality as the «Category of the Ultimate» and the eight «Categories of Existence.»

(3) Nevertheless, it may seem that in process thought there are other types of extended but externally undetectable entities; and this may save the day for the spacy but imperceptible occasions of human consciousness.

Here is what Whitehead said in 1911 about the theory of types: «All the contradictions can be avoided, and yet the use of classes and relations can be preserved as required by mathematics, and indeed by common sense, by a theory which denies to a class — or relation — existence or being in any sense in which the entities composing it — or related by it — exist» (MAT 293).

We shall confine attention in this chapter to the simplest type of abstract entity.

In Whitehead's cosmology, however, some types of derivative abstractions are constituents in every actual entitIn Whitehead's cosmology, however, some types of derivative abstractions are constituents in every actual entitin every actual entity.

Mathematics then, being defined in terms of the infinity of types, is dependent upon the lowest level of individuals interpreted as unspecified entities of the physical world.

She says, «The type of immortality which a process conceptuality suggests is subjective, retaining the living experience of the entity, but it transcends personality... «11 And she adds,»... the boundaries of personality have been left far behind as pertinent solely to finite existence in the temporal world.

While an event is relative in being internally related to other entities of the same logical type; which it requires by a necessity that is «particular and definite,» a species or genus is relative only in that it requires, by a necessity that is «generic or indefinite,» one or more intentional classes (of individuals or of other more specific kinds), all of which are only contingently nonempty (1970a, l0l f., 103, 109).

If, on the contrary, they are taken strictly, in any one of the senses they have when applied solely to entities within a single logical type, he is equally justified in holding that they are then used in the same sense, and, therefore, are literal, not analogical, even when applicable to God.

In the first place, a civilized society is a secondary type of entity derived exclusively from the social interrelationships of its constituents, and is not, therefore, a concrete one in any sense of the terIn the first place, a civilized society is a secondary type of entity derived exclusively from the social interrelationships of its constituents, and is not, therefore, a concrete one in any sense of the terin any sense of the term.

But, then, there is something else that he very well could say that would render his apparently contradictory statements consistent — namely, that, although such terms as «absolute» and «relative,» or «necessary» and «contingent,» explicate the meaning of more than one logical type, and thus apply to entities within these different types in correspondingly different senses, rather than in simply the same sense, they nevertheless apply to the different entities within any single type whose meaning they in some sense explicate, not in different senses, but rather in the same sense.

Thus the status of a civilized society is equivalent to that of a Society per se in that both types of «entities» are composed of constituents which are ontologically superior to the whole of which each of those constituents is a component.

Thus Hartshorne holds that the term «feeling,» for instance, can be said to be analogical in this sense because, or insofar as, it applies to all entities of the logical type of individuals, including the unique individual God, but does so in suitably different senses to all the different kinds or levels of individuals, with its sense being infinitely different in its application to God (1962, 140).

When Hartshorne says that there is a sense in which analogical terms apply literally to God and, therefore, simply are literal in this application, what he means by «literal» is not that such terms apply to God in the same sense in which they apply to any other entity of the same logical type, this being, as we have seen, what he otherwise takes «literal» to mean.

That is, just as a Society is metaphysically a derivative type of existent inasmuch as its constituent actual entities are ontologically ultimate, so in an equivalent fashion, a civilized society is metaphysically secondary inasmuch as human beings are more real, ontologically speaking, than is the larger civilized society.

That a Society has both essential and accidental qualities thus enables it to be a type of entity which endures throughout change as a «complete existence» with an ongoing historical development of its own: it remains what it is essentially and yet changes accidentally in «reaction to changing circumstances.»

This is not to say that time is an entity in its own right or that it has an independent nature of its own, as if it differed in this way from the nature of movement1 or of some very particular and specific type of movement.

Thus, just as in Whitehead's categoreal system the two first - mentioned elements, absolute concreteness and unique occurrence, are united in the concept of a determinate, fundamental, categoreal existence (the concept of an occasion or actual entity), so the corresponding counter-elements, absolute abstractness and the character of abiding existence [lmmer - Gewesen - Sein], are joined together in another concept of an opposite categoreal type, that of an utterly abstract entity, which always was and always is, which Whitehead calls an eternal object.

But the reality of Spirit is a matter of degrees, depending upon the type of unity achieved in and through a given nexus of actual entities.3

Subjects and objects are not two types of entities, but the same entities considered in different ways.

This is why it is necessary to develop a «one - substance cosmology,» i.e., one in which there is only one type of actual entities (PR 29; cf. 28).

Moreover, would we not be justified in distinguishing ontology, that is, the theory of being as such, from the theory of concreteness, since the system of all the basic types of entity must exhibit some commonality among those types, however formal and empty it may be?

Thus Whitehead posits a type of entity wholly neglected in ordinary reductionistic accounts.

He developed an understanding of another type of entity which combines order and life.22 He did so because he recognized that there is something like social order in the human soul and that this is combined with life and freedom.

Disagreements with the principle of relativity (that it belongs to the nature of every being to be a potential ingredient in the becoming of actual entities), the principle of process (that how an actual entity becomes constitutes what it is), or the ontological principle (that only actual entities can exert influence) would be of this type.

This ideal realization of potentialities in a primordial actual entity constitutes the metaphysical stability whereby the actual process exemplified general principles of metaphysics, and attains the ends proper to specific types of emergent order.

In Locke's phraseology the objectified actual entity is then exerting «power In this type of objectification the eternal objects, relational between object and subject, express the formal constitution of the objectified actual entity.

Whitehead needs to establish the fact that at least one type of objectified entities are actual entities in order to escape the solipsism of the present moment, as he himself notes (PR 81/125, 152/230 -231).

Closures of this type provide a basis for understanding how entities, in interaction with others, can be «divisible but undivided».