One thing the Libby case presents a good teaching point for is that the ability of a judge to consider
uncharged conduct or crimes (or for that matter acquitted crimes) in sentencing is one of the main drivers of uncertainty in the Sentencing Guidelines.
With
uncharged conduct, the maxmimum to minimum sentence ratio is about about ten.
Without
uncharged conduct, the maximum to minimum sentence ratio is about two and a half.
Known as acquitted and
uncharged conduct sentencing, the practice is raising a sharp question among legal scholars: Should federal judges dole out tougher sentences based on accusations that jurors rejected or never heard during trial?
In theory, you could take sort of a hybrid approach that allows for judicial fact - finding and reliance on acquitted and
uncharged conduct, but without having those facts determine the applicable guidelines range.
The Jiminez panel indicates, inter alia, that defendants have a burden to dispute the government's prima facie showing on loss, that the potential use of the wrong guideline manual was harmless, and that acquitted conduct can readily be treated exactly the same as
uncharged conduct.
Not exact matches
Reconstitution of AmtB into vesicles shows that AmtB
conducts uncharged NH3.
But my point is simply that there's a middle position between «no consideration of
uncharged / acquitted
conduct» and «use
uncharged / acquitted
conduct to calculate the guidelines range, with all the attendant consequences it entails.»
The guidelines too readily rely on
uncharged (and even acquitted)
conduct to greatly increase offense levels