Not exact matches
Readers might recall that back in November, I blogged about a
case in which the
unconscionability doctrine was used to invalidate one lender's entire book of payday and installment loans.
After reading the facts of this
case, I wonder: if the fee agreement isn't unconscionable in this
case, then does per se
unconscionability even exist?
There is always the possibility that the Court of Appeals» opinion shades the facts to justify the reversal but, based on the fact pattern presented, this did not appear to be a close
case on the issue of
unconscionability.
The
case outlined the legal standards for what constitutes procedural and substantive
unconscionability.
As the Court of Appeal in Schwark held that the elements necessary to establish a proprietary estoppel were not made out in that
case, I note that the observation by the court that «to establish
unconscionability», one must meet the five - part test laid out by Fry J. in Willmott v. Barber, supra, is obiter to its decision.
Based on Connecticut
case law, such a provision is enforceable against a claim of innocent misrepresentation, so long as there is no showing of mistake, fraud, or
unconscionability.