Abstract In a nutshell, the majority of the Court in Meadows v. Minister for Justice held that proportionality would be relevant in determining the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of an administrative decision affecting rights.
Not exact matches
The majority opinion justifies the need to merge reasonableness simpliciter with patent
unreasonableness on now familiar grounds that: (i) the two standards are impossible to distinguish in application, despite good intentions in selecting a «middle ground» standard where pragmatic factors point both for and against judicial deference; and (ii) patent
unreasonableness contemplates judicial endorsement
of an «unreasonable»
administrative decision.
Yes, this looks a lot like the Pushpanathan list
of factors, [14] but the difference is that these factors are being considered not to decide on the standard
of review — correctness, reasonableness and patent
unreasonableness — but rather to determine the extent to which the court should defer to an
administrative decision in the context
of a particular case and a particular question — that is, the range
of options that are legally open to the
decision maker.
In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court set out to do two things: first, to simplify the standards
of judicial review by eliminating the patent
unreasonableness standard, and second, to strike a balance between upholding the rule
of law — that is, ensuring that
administrative decision makers adhere to the law as written by legislatures — and according sufficient deference to the
administrative decision maker to allow them to provide substantive «meat» to the legislative bones.
To deny WCAT's practice
of reconsidering its
decisions for patent
unreasonableness would increase the necessity for court proceedings and would be contrary to the purpose
of the legislation and the principles
of administrative law.
So we've suffered through categorizations into jurisdictional error and non-jurisdictional error, legislative,
administrative, quasi-judicial and judicial
decisions, categories
of correctness, reasonableness and patent
unreasonableness and, now, categories
of correctness and reasonableness.