Sentences with phrase «unusual punishment»

: o (Cruel and unusual punishment I tell ya!

Unfitness proceedings can violate a range of rights, including the right to a fair trial, the right to equal recognition before the law, and the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

That isn't an option for many subscribers, and even if it were, forced bundling of services probably constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

Forcing the Bixby button on us feels like cruel and unusual punishment.

Waking up to the brain - scrambling blast of an audible alarm seems like cruel and unusual punishment after months of being tickled awake by a Fitbit quietly buzzing on our wrist.

The decision said denying prisoners medical care violated the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.

It's not cruel or unusual punishment.

(d) the conditions at Maplehurst among the remanded population were already so onerous that the added effect of the lockdowns amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.

In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court ruled that the execution of persons with mental disabilities constituted «cruel and unusual punishment» under the Eighth Amendment.

We noticed that much of this debate was happening without reference to just how many MMS have already been struck down as unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment by the courts.

It is constitutional to imprison a person for committing a crime, though I suspect that a life sentence for brawling would be held to be cruel and unusual punishment.

The Kansas Supreme Court had found this to be a form of cruel and unusual punishment.

The sentence is the practical equivalent of life without possible parole and violates the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment, said the Second District Court of Appeal in Los Angeles.

If a federal bill reduces a sentence for a crime, can a prisoner get relief at the state level, possibly by stating the original sentence was cruel and unusual punishment?

Accordingly, I find that the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for one year required by s. 5 (3)(a)(i)(D) of the CDSA constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

The Court held that death by hemlock was cruel and unusual punishment and that Socrates had been denied procedural fairness.

Where the law requires a one - year sentence, it violates the guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment in s. 12 and is not justified under s. 1.

The one - year mandatory minimum sentence for a controlled substances offence, while permitting constitutional sentences in a broad array of cases, will sometimes mandate sentences violating the constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.

Most cases do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, but some reasonably foreseeable cases caught by s. 95 (1) they may do so.

This week's summaries concern: Race and mandatory minimum sentences / Cruel and unusual punishment and mandatory minimums:

The issue of sentencing was adjourned to allow the accused to pursue an application challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to s. 12 of the Charter (i.e., the provision respecting cruel and unusual punishment).

Among other things, they argued that this practice constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, violates the life, liberty and security of the person, and discriminates against mentally ill and Indigenous persons.

The trial judge ruled the mandatory minimum sentence required by s. 5 (3)(a)(i)(D) constituted cruel and unusual punishment contrary to s. 12 of the Charter; it was not a reasonable limit within the meaning of s. 1 of the Charter and was declared of no force and effect.

In most cases, including those of Nur and Charles, the mandatory minimum sentences of three and five years respectively do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, but in some reasonably foreseeable cases that are caught by s. 95 (1) they may do so.

The trial judge found that the imposition of such a «one - size - fits - all» sentence in the circumstances would indeed violate Section 12 of the Charter, and that the infringement could not be justified under the Oakes test since it was not proportional and not a minimal impairment of the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment:

The established legal test for «cruel and unusual punishment,» Justice Bellefontaine pointed out, is not merely a harsh or unreasonably excessive punishment, but a punishment «so excessive or grossly disproportionate as to outrage decency.»

The Charter issue was raised on sentencing, and concerned the issue of whether three years» incarceration was «cruel and unusual punishment» given the circumstances of Mr. Smickle's offence.

But back to the real story - if 200 years is not cruel and unusual punishment what is?

Can and should Burress and his legal team raise a head - on due process (or cruel and unusual punishment) constitutional challenge to the statutory mandatory minimum sentence in this case?

The Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and it states that treaties signed by the U.S. are the «supreme Law of the Land» under Article Six.

In my capital punishment class, we read Furman v. Georgia's revelatory holding that the Eighth Amendment now proscribes the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment as another.

The Court found that the imposition of $ 900 in victim surcharges would be cruel and unusual punishment and therefore declared s. 737 of the Code to be of no force or effect.

The cases include some interesting issues, such as the constitutionality of requiring voters to show a photo ID before they may vote; the constitutionality of execution by lethal injection where the procedure poses a risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment ban on «cruel and unusual punishment»; and a Fourth Amendment case involving an unlawful search under state law that Volokh conspirator and Fourth Amendment guru Orin Kerr is interested in.

The Court found, however, that as it could choose to impose nominal fines in addition to jail or probation for Mr. Michael, the victim surcharge did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment in his particular circumstances.

I find, however, that I can not agree with his conclusion that the mandatory victim surcharge in s. 737 is cruel and unusual punishment that is in breach of the Charter.

Testing the law against reasonably foreseeable applications will prevent people from suffering cruel and unusual punishment in the interim until the mandatory minimum is found to be unconstitutional in a particular case.»

The Court ruled that the mandatory minimum sentence violates section 12 of the Charter, which guarantees the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.

In the result, a mandatory minimum sentencing provision may be challenged on the basis that it imposes cruel and unusual punishment (i.e. a grossly disproportionate sentence) on the particular offender before the court, or failing this, on the basis that it is reasonably foreseeable that it will impose cruel and unusual punishment on other persons.»

Writing for the 5 - 2 majority, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin found that the minimum sentences of three years imprisonment for a first offence and five years in the case of a second or subsequent offence under s. 95 (2)(a) of the Criminal Code contravened the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter of Rights.

Third does the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence for second degree murder constitute «cruel and unusual punishment» in this case, so that Mr. Latimer («the appellant») should receive a constitutional exemption from the minimum sentence?»

On the matter of cruel and unusual punishment and a constitutional exemption, the Court stated, «Finally, this sentence is consistent with a number of valid penological goals and sentencing principles.

That's the one barring cruel and unusual punishment.

He figured the Eighth Amendment's bar against cruel and unusual punishment was triggered in cases like Matt's, where a sentence was functionally infinite.

An inmate at the Toronto South Detention Centre said he spent two weeks with untreated broken bones and alleges cruel and unusual punishment by court and jail staff.

The Constitution guarantees a right to a trial by jury in open court, the right to cross-examine witnesses, the right to remain silent (on grounds of self - incrimination), the presumption of innocence, the right to be represented by a lawyer, and the right to be free of cruel or unusual punishment.

The Supreme Court could effectively abolish it by ruling that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment (which also applies to the states via the incorporation doctrine and the Fourteenth Amendment).

Consider the budget - driven approach taken by two local Kentucky lawyers, Public Defender David Barron and state attorney, Jeff Middendorf, who played key roles in Supreme Court case Baze v. Rees, that addresses whether Kentucky's lethal injection drug protocol amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

In the meantime, «in Ottawa, defence lawyers will continue to argue that the victim fine surcharge is unconstitutional based on s. 12 of the Charter, that it is a cruel and unusual punishment,» Brown adds.

«In the alternative, Parliament could provide for judicial discretion to allow for a lesser sentence where the mandatory minimum would be grossly disproportionate and would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.»

The dissenting view argued that the law as drafted was narrow enough, and that it did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.