Not exact matches
thinks, that the Tigris and the Euphrates have not a common source, that the Dead Sea had been in existence long before human beings came to live in Palestine, instead of originating in historical times, and so on... We are able to comprehend this as the naive conception of the men of old, but we can not regard belief in the literal truth of such accounts as an essential of
religious conviction... And every one who perceives the peculiar poetic charm of these old legends must
feel irritated by the barbarian — for there are pious barbarians — who thinks he is putting the true value
upon these narratives only when he treats them as prose and history.
A demand simply for freedom to act
upon subjective
religious feelings is a claim (though not a strong one) that can easily be seen to validate a relativist worldview.
When I reflect on the infinite pains to which the human mind and heart will go in order to protect itself from the full impact of reality, when I recall the mordant analyses of
religious belief which stem from the works of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud and, furthermore, recognize the truth of so much of what these critics of religion have had to say, when I engage in a philosophical critique of the language of theology and am constrained to admit that it is a continual attempt to say what can not properly be said and am thereby led to wonder whether its claim to cognition can possibly be valid — when I ask these questions of myself and others like them (as I can not help asking and, what is more,
feel obliged to ask), is not the conclusion forced
upon me that my faith is a delusion?
-- forgetting that ancient
religious writers, unlike scholarly historians, did not as a rule
feel it incumbent
upon them to give, in a footnote or otherwise, their source for every anecdote or event, or to anticipate the modern reader's constant query, «How can we know that what you say is true, in every detail?»
If the argument here is correct, the two developments result from some of the same causes: The American kind of church - state separation meant no church monopolized
religious symbols; courts were called
upon to articulate ultimate purpose and justice; and judges
felt little ambivalence in doing so.
All that a
Religious Freedom Restoration Act does is initiate a balancing test when a private citizen feels that their religious freedom has been infringed upon by the federal go
Religious Freedom Restoration Act does is initiate a balancing test when a private citizen
feels that their
religious freedom has been infringed upon by the federal go
religious freedom has been infringed
upon by the federal government.
That their campaign to bring America «back to God» will, if successful, mean the imposition of their deeply
felt religious values
upon the nation at large goes without saying.
The former —
religious experience — need not be highly articulated nor even highly conscious of God as God; it may be vague, diffused, and unformed, yet also a deliverance of what it
feels like to be dependent
upon a reality greater than anything human or natural.
Behind the argument lies the uncomfortable
feeling that there is an authoritative teaching which dares to confront what Newman termed the «wild, living intellect of man» as well as acting against «that universal solvent which is so successfully acting
upon religious establishments.»
All it prevents them from doing is imposing the
religious practices of one group
upon others, out of concern they might
feel uncomfortable.
There has always been a tension between
religious freedom and groups who
feel that part of
religious freedom is imposing their religion
upon others.
[176] As we have already discussed in our earlier comments on statutory interpretation, the Court relied
upon the Cohen Committee report on hate propaganda to conclude that individuals subjected to racial or
religious hatred are prone to psychological distress causing loss of self - esteem and
feelings of anger and outrage.