An association that makes common decisions governing all social action does not honor each individual's right to dissent from the moral
validity of any social action unless the association prevents other individuals from violating its governing decisions.
Not exact matches
Accordingly, the remainder
of this essay will proceed as follows: I will first seek to show that the meta - ethical character
of every claim to moral
validity includes a principle
of social action by which a universal community
of rights is constituted, so that no moral theory can be valid if it is inconsistent with these rights.
Indeed, ad hoc engagements in discourse always presuppose this widest possible discourse because any argument about the
validity of social prescriptions is potentially an argument about the most general moral principles and thus about
social action generally.
As a derivation from the meta - ethical character
of every claim to moral
validity, the specific practice
of moral discourse both implies and is implied by — and, in that sense, belongs to — a principle that constitutes
social action universally.