However, if you're only interested in
valuation mean reversion (like a net - net for example) then you're unlikely to care what happens with earnings.
It would put
valuation mean reversion and financial justice on the fast track!
When we explain the intuition behind half - life of
valuation mean reversion in this article, we assume the second effect is significantly stronger.
Not exact matches
Valuations on high - yielding stocks may have become overstretched in the historically low - yield environment, potentially making them vulnerable if the markets experience a
mean reversion shift.
Even technical analysis supports the extent of the washout in
valuations: Just 25 % of the Nikkei 225 Index constituents are above their 50 - day moving averages, which is typically a level that precedes
mean reversion and retracement trades.
The mechanism for the lower returns, in my view, is not going to be some kind of sustained
mean -
reversion to old - school
valuations, as the more bearishly inclined would predict.
The current case for non-US versus US equities supposes an eventual
mean reversion in historically divergent performance and
valuation trends.
As a side - note, we prefer a 12 - year horizon when we discuss
mean -
reversion of
valuations, because that's the point where the «autocorrelation profile» of
valuations hits zero (
meaning that overvaluation or undervaluation most reliably washes out over that horizon).
If my newest are doing well, there may be some
mean -
reversion happening in
valuations.
The common factor of most
mean reversion strategies like the CAPE, the Magic Quadrant and the Acquirer's Multiple is avoiding the effort of
valuation.
The current case for non-US versus US equities supposes an eventual
mean reversion in historically divergent performance and
valuation trends.
This is huge, but only half of what you would expect without including
valuations and
mean reversion.
This trend matters to investors because rising
valuation levels inflate past performance, reduce potential future performance, and amplify the risk of
mean reversion to historical
valuations.
The
mean reversion component of the models needs to reflect
valuations, such that risky assets rarely get «stupid cheap» or stratospheric.
We ARE at insane
valuations, and I expect a «
mean reversion» in the next 2 years.
Relative
valuation levels for most factors exhibit strong
mean reversion.
Rather than rely on past averages to forecast future returns, we use a building - block approach that adds current yield, likely long - term growth in income, and some
mean reversion in
valuation multiples to create forward - looking returns.
Juicy Excerpt: It is the
Reversion to the
Means phenomenon that makes
Valuation - Informed Indexing so effective.
This gives some credit to the current good results, while also building a bit of
mean reversion into the
valuation.
Valuation - based tactical asset allocation has proven very hard to execute over time, for a simple reason: Asset - class
valuations do not exhibit much
mean reversion.
What we have seen over the past 2 + years is probably a
mean reversion, with Lowe's stock price slowly returning toward more normal
valuation levels.
With charts like this, looking at relative
valuation, you can expect some «
mean reversion» over time and you have to make a judgement about what you think is an appropriate level of premium / discount, and in turn, what you think is an attractive level.
For many,
mean reversion toward historical
valuation norms dashes their hopes of achieving the returns of the recent past.
The second implication is that any
mean reversion toward the smart beta strategy's historical normal relative
valuation could transform lofty historical alpha into negative future alpha.
The following two charts via Pension Capital and Star Capital, respectively, demonstrate the markets tendency towards this
mean -
reversion of
valuations.
The contrarian approach is to look for
mean reversion in both fundamentals and
valuation.
That said, the risk premium factor shows that the largest gains tend to come in the southwest quadrant: low equity
valuations and high Baa bond yields, which is a perfect set - up for
mean reversion.
Whether or not you take
valuations into account, the real, annualized, total return of the S&P 500 exhibits
MEAN REVERSION.
Using LINEST, you can calculate the effect of
MEAN REVERSION when you ignore the effect of
valuations, You take the ratio of the relevant sum of the squares totals: sstotal = ssreg + ssresid.
Kinnaras is a strong advocate of
mean reversion and has found that pessimistic
valuations, and thus attractive investment opportunities, often manifest when the broader investment community disregards
mean reversion and impounds overly pessimistic expectations into security prices.
Let's test our conjecture that the
mean reversion in fund performance is driven by cycles in factor
valuations, which presents a potential opportunity to use factor relative attractiveness to gauge fund relative attractiveness.
The research we present in this article provides evidence that
valuations are a key reason for this
mean reversion: underperforming managers tend to hold cheaper assets, with cheaper factor loadings, setting them up for good subsequent performance, whereas recently winning managers tend to hold more - expensive assets.
Smaller stocks, foreign stocks and higher - yielding assets have not held up particularly well; their
valuations may be on their way toward
mean reversion.
Historically it has been
mean reversion of
valuation ratios like price to book and price to earnings which have had the greatest effect on long term equity returns.