Sentences with phrase «valuation measures in»

We use an aggregate of four valuation measures in addition to the sole metric of P / B, and we investigate horizons of one month and one to five years.

Even within my dividend portfolio, I combine DCA (with automatic DRIP), and market timing strategies (by using PE as a valuation measure in deciding whether to add to existing positions or buy into new ones).

Even within my dividend portfolio, I combine DCA (with automatic DRIP), and market timing strategies (by using PE as a valuation measure in deciding whether to add to existing positions or buy into new ones).

Given the company's 11 - digit valuation measured in the tens - of - billions of dollars, the listing has become as much a curiosity to Wall Street as it is the to fans who want to buy a piece of the streaming music soon - to - be-ex-unicorn.

Not exact matches

So if we look at a range of market valuation measures, whether it's Shiller CAPE, whether its price - to - book, whether it's price - to - trailing earnings, price - to - peak earnings, when we look at these measures, they look like they're in the, what we would call, the 10th decile, meaning generally, valuations are cheaper 90 % of the time.

The media covers companies that reap billion - dollar valuations, and society measures success by the car you drive and the city in which you live.

Although the company just rasied $ 150 million at a stunning $ 1 billion valuation, Goldberg said both the Fab executive team and its investors thought some efficiency measures were in order.

The Hang Seng China AH Premium Index, which measures the valuation gap for companies listed on both mainland exchanges and in Hong Kong, is near its highest level since March 2009, indicating a widening disconnect.

The company's strengths can be seen in multiple areas, such as its reasonable valuation levels and largely solid financial position with reasonable debt levels by most measures.

The company's strengths can be seen in multiple areas, such as its revenue growth, reasonable valuation levels, largely solid financial position with reasonable debt levels by most measures and notable return on equity.

The company's strengths can be seen in multiple areas, such as its reasonable valuation levels, expanding profit margins, largely solid financial position with reasonable debt levels by most measures and notable return on equity.

The company's strengths can be seen in multiple areas, such as its largely solid financial position with reasonable debt levels by most measures and reasonable valuation levels.

When you look back on this moment in history, remember that spectacular extremes in reliable valuation measures already told you how the story would end.

Along with the steepest equity valuations in U.S. history outside of 1929 and 2000 (on measures that are actually reliably correlated with subsequent market returns), private and public debt burdens have reached the most extreme levels in history.

Measuring shareholder value requires deep fundamental research that (1) translates reported accounting results into true cash flows and (2) quantifies the expectations for future cash flows that is embedded in stock valuations.

As always, the strongest prospective market return / risk profile is associated with a material retreat in valuations followed by an early improvement in broad measures of market internals.

It turns out that he is still right, and the effect of being right is that equities are far more overvalued than may be evident even on measures like the Shiller CAPE (see An Open Letter to the FOMC: Recognizing the Valuation Bubble in Equities).

As we've demonstrated repeatedly, the valuation measures most strongly correlated with actual subsequent returns, particularly over a 7 - 15 year horizon, are those that normalize for profit margin variability in some way.

While a number of simple measures of valuation have also been useful over the years, even metrics such as price - to - peak earnings have been skewed by the unusual profit margins we observed at the 2007 peak, which were about 50 % above the historical norm - reflecting the combination of booming and highly leveraged financial sector profits as well as wide margins in cyclical and commodity - oriented industries.

In any event, our measures of trend uniformity are clearly unfavorable here, as are valuations.

In the face of constant cheerleading in 2000 based on theories and valuation measures that were historically unfounded, I wrote in February of that yeaIn the face of constant cheerleading in 2000 based on theories and valuation measures that were historically unfounded, I wrote in February of that yeain 2000 based on theories and valuation measures that were historically unfounded, I wrote in February of that yeain February of that year:

It's common to object to the dividend yield as a measure of valuation, given that companies have devoted more of their earnings to stock repurchases than dividend payments in recent years.

As an alternative to GDP, we might prefer a valuation measure that captures corporate final sales generated domestically, plus the estimated final sales that U.S. companies generate in their activities abroad.

As always, the best opportunities are likely to emerge when a material retreat in valuations is joined by an early improvement in our measures of market action (which, following our stress - testing earlier in this half - cycle, are robust to every market cycle we've observed across history).

For all the reasons listed above, the correlation between these two factors is actually very weak, as demonstrated by Tim Koller, Jack Murrin, and Thomas E. Copeland in Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies (p. 80).

Figure 2 compares Skechers to a number of other shoe / apparel companies in the «Athleisure» segment across measures of profitability, growth, and valuation.

At the surface, when we look at valuation measures and other fundamentals and compare them to historical precedents, there is a case to be made that stocks (in particular in the US) are above fair value, if not rich.

In any event, the problem for investors is that whatever increment we could possibly observe in GDP growth pales in comparison to the fact that the most historically reliable market valuation measures are far more than double their historical normIn any event, the problem for investors is that whatever increment we could possibly observe in GDP growth pales in comparison to the fact that the most historically reliable market valuation measures are far more than double their historical normin GDP growth pales in comparison to the fact that the most historically reliable market valuation measures are far more than double their historical normin comparison to the fact that the most historically reliable market valuation measures are far more than double their historical norms.

At this point, obscene equity valuations are already baked in the cake on valuation measures that are reliably correlated with actual subsequent stock market returns.

With the S&P 500 within about 8 % of its highest level in history, with historically reliable valuation measures at obscene levels, implying near - zero 10 - 12 year S&P 500 nominal total returns; with an extended period of extreme overvalued, overbought, overbullish conditions replaced by deterioration in market internals that signal a clear shift toward risk - aversion among investors; with credit spreads on low - grade debt blowing out to multi-year highs; and with leading economic measures deteriorating rapidly, we continue to classify market conditions within the most hostile return / risk profile we identify — a classification that has been observed in only about 9 % of history.

If we are looking at these centres to play a role in our prosperity, then the success needs to be measured in revenue and company valuations from external financing or M&A.

Historically - reliable valuation measures are remarkably useful in projecting long - term and full - cycle market outcomes, but the behavior of the market over shorter segments of the market cycle is driven by the psychological inclination of investors toward speculation or risk - aversion.

Second, our own admitted difficulty in the advancing period since 2009 did not reflect a shortfall in either our measures of valuation or our measures of market internals.

Last week, the U.S. equity market climbed to the steepest valuation level in history, based on the valuation measures most highly correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 10 - 12 year total returns, across a century of market cycles.

At present, the valuation measures that we find best correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns are at the most offensive levels in history, matching or eclipsing the 1929 and 2000 extremes.

Although Wall Street continues to assert that valuations are «reasonable given the level of interest rates,» keep in mind that the most reliable measures of valuation imply negative 10 - 12 year total returns for the S&P 500.

By March 2000, on the basis of historically reliable valuation measures, I projected that a retreat to normal valuations would require an -83 % plunge in tech stocks.

Finally, Chinese stocks (measured by the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index) have trailed their Brazilian counterparts (measured by the Ibovespa Index) and moved in lock step with Russian equities (represented by the MICEX Index) since late January, based on Bloomberg data, and their low valuations are poised to potentially rise in a risk - on environment.

Recent cycles provide no evidence of deterioration in the relationship between reliable valuation measures (particularly those that aren't highly sensitive to fluctuations in profit margins) and actual subsequent market returns.

In conjunction with stock valuation ratios like the price - to - earnings ratio and the price - to - earnings - growth ratio, a stock's measure of volatility known as beta can help investors build a diversified...

As the USD is the largest component in the basket of global currencies against which other currencies» purchasing power are measured, and the ruble lost 58 % in valuation versus the USD just from June 2014 to January 2016, I would dare claim that a 58 % devaluation qualifies as a crash.

In an attempt to cast light on this issue, my colleagues at Plexus Asset Management have updated a previous multi-year comparison of the price - earnings (PE) ratios of the S&P 500 Index (as a measure of stock valuations) and the forward real returns (considering total returns, i.e. capital movements plus dividends).

Despite my admitted stumble in the half - cycle since 2009, it's perplexing that the equity market is at the second greatest valuation extreme in the history of the United States, on what are objectively the most durably reliable valuation measures available, but it has somehow become an affront to suggest that this will not end well.

The Importance of Measuring Returns Peak - to - Peak Stock returns equal income, plus growth in fundamentals, plus changes in valuation By John P. Hussman, Ph.D..

Our actual expectation is that the completion of the current market cycle is likely to wipe out the entire total return of the S&P 500 — in excess of Treasury bill returns — all the way back to roughly October 1997; an outcome that would require a market retreat no larger than it experienced in the past two cycles, and that would not even carry historically reliable valuation measures to materially undervalued levels (see When You Look Back On This Moment In Historyin excess of Treasury bill returns — all the way back to roughly October 1997; an outcome that would require a market retreat no larger than it experienced in the past two cycles, and that would not even carry historically reliable valuation measures to materially undervalued levels (see When You Look Back On This Moment In Historyin the past two cycles, and that would not even carry historically reliable valuation measures to materially undervalued levels (see When You Look Back On This Moment In HistoryIn History).

In our 1Q2015 letter, we noted that equity - market valuations were at dangerous levels by three different measures: the CAPE ratio, the Q - ratio, and the Buffett indicator, which are discussed at length in our last letteIn our 1Q2015 letter, we noted that equity - market valuations were at dangerous levels by three different measures: the CAPE ratio, the Q - ratio, and the Buffett indicator, which are discussed at length in our last lettein our last letter.

As usual, I don't place too much emphasis on this sort of forecast, but to the extent that I make any comments at all about the outlook for 2006, the bottom line is this: 1) we can't rule out modest potential for stock appreciation, which would require the maintenance or expansion of already high price / peak earnings multiples; 2) we also should recognize an uncomfortably large potential for market losses, particularly given that the current bull market has now outlived the median and average bull, yet at higher valuations than most bulls have achieved, a flat yield curve with rising interest rate pressures, an extended period of internal divergence as measured by breadth and other market action, and complacency at best and excessive bullishness at worst, as measured by various sentiment indicators; 3) there is a moderate but still not compelling risk of an oncoming recession, which would become more of a factor if we observe a substantial widening of credit spreads and weakness in the ISM Purchasing Managers Index in the months ahead, and; 4) there remains substantial potential for U.S. dollar weakness coupled with «unexpectedly» persistent inflation pressures, particularly if we do observe economic weakness.

Our measures of market action are still broadly unfavorable, and allowing even the mildest adjustment for profit margins and the position of earnings in the economic cycle, valuations remain rich.

As Graham and Dodd wrote in Security Analysis (1934), referring to the final advance that led to the 1929 market peak, the reason investors shifted their attention away from historically - reliable measures of valuation was «first, that the records of the past were proving an undependable guide to investment; and, second, that the rewards offered by the future had become irresistibly alluring.»

To quote valuations on any other measure in recent years would have led many readers to extremely bearish conclusions.