Not exact matches
So if we look at a range of market
valuation measures, whether it's Shiller CAPE, whether its price - to - book, whether it's price - to - trailing earnings, price - to -
peak earnings, when we look at these measures, they look like they're
in the, what we would call, the 10th decile, meaning generally,
valuations are cheaper 90 % of the time.
The differences
in opinion arise primarily over
valuation and whether its rapid growth can continue to justify a price - to - earnings ratio that rarely falls below 40 and has
peaked as high as 138.
My partner Mary Meeker has a graph and it shows the
peak of
valuation creation
in each wave of technology is bigger than the last.
Back
in 2000 at the dot - com
peak, it was seven times, so you know, so I don't think it's necessarily a
valuation problem, but obviously it's been a big momentum play.
Less than two years ago, the company was riding high, experiencing explosive growth, but things
peaked in the summer of 2013, when it raised $ 150 million
in funding at a
valuation of $ 1 billion.
At Lululemon's stock
peak in the summer of 2011, the yoga - and running - gear maker commanded a market
valuation that was 350 % higher than rival Under Armour.
And while the S&P 500's price compared to earnings expectations is nearly 50 percent above the low levels exhibited
in the summer of 2011,
valuations have fallen significantly below the July
peak.
The market is super frothy IMO and it reminds me a lot of 2007/08... everything is way up
in value, company
valuations are at a
peak... take the money and run my man!
These Fed - induced speculative
valuations are now evident across the board, as the median price / revenue multiple on S&P 500 components (as well as S&P 1500 components) is now the highest
in history, easily exceeding the 2000
peak.
The problem is that record - high
valuations at the
peak usually create a mania
in the market, pushing asset prices even higher.
The graph shows that average
valuations are generally better globally than they are
in the US on a pure price - to -
peak earnings basis.
While a number of simple measures of
valuation have also been useful over the years, even metrics such as price - to -
peak earnings have been skewed by the unusual profit margins we observed at the 2007
peak, which were about 50 % above the historical norm - reflecting the combination of booming and highly leveraged financial sector profits as well as wide margins
in cyclical and commodity - oriented industries.
Even the 4 % annual total return of the S&P 500
in the 15 years since the 2000
peak has been made possible only by driving current
valuations to the second most extreme point
in U.S. history.
While it's true that the market established even deeper
valuation troughs
in 1974 and 1982 (near 7 times prior
peak earnings, compared with the current multiple of about 11), it is important to remember that long - term Treasury yields were 8 %
in 1974, and 14 %
in 1982, compared with about 4 % at present.
The favorable market performance associated with many historical economic expansions is fully accounted for by 1) favorable post-recession
valuations, with the S&P 500 averaging less than 9 times prior
peak earnings at the recession low, expanding to just over 11 times
peak earnings
in the first year of the bull market, and 2) favorable trend uniformity, which typically emerges almost immediately
in the form of a powerful breadth thrust off of a bear market low, and is confirmed within a few weeks by much broader trend uniformity.
In recent cycles, because of relatively higher
valuations at the market
peak, the completion of the market cycle has wiped out years of prior market gains.
You'll notice that the overvaluation at the 2000
peak was really dominated by extreme
valuation in the top decile of price / revenue ratios.
He said the following about Sun's
peak valuation in 2000 (it was one of the stocks trading at more than ten times sales at the time):
I've noted before that while the bubble
peak in 2000 was the most extreme level of
valuation in history on a capitalization - weighted basis, the recent speculative episode has actually exceeded that bubble from the standpoint of speculation
in individual stocks.
Higgins adds that
valuations were much more frothy: «Back [
in the 90s], the price / 12m trailing operating earnings ratio of the S&P 500 climbed to around 30 at its
peak, which was roughly double its level
in 1994.
The Importance of Measuring Returns
Peak - to -
Peak Stock returns equal income, plus growth
in fundamentals, plus changes
in valuation By John P. Hussman, Ph.D..
As usual, I don't place too much emphasis on this sort of forecast, but to the extent that I make any comments at all about the outlook for 2006, the bottom line is this: 1) we can't rule out modest potential for stock appreciation, which would require the maintenance or expansion of already high price /
peak earnings multiples; 2) we also should recognize an uncomfortably large potential for market losses, particularly given that the current bull market has now outlived the median and average bull, yet at higher
valuations than most bulls have achieved, a flat yield curve with rising interest rate pressures, an extended period of internal divergence as measured by breadth and other market action, and complacency at best and excessive bullishness at worst, as measured by various sentiment indicators; 3) there is a moderate but still not compelling risk of an oncoming recession, which would become more of a factor if we observe a substantial widening of credit spreads and weakness
in the ISM Purchasing Managers Index
in the months ahead, and; 4) there remains substantial potential for U.S. dollar weakness coupled with «unexpectedly» persistent inflation pressures, particularly if we do observe economic weakness.
But
valuations, even on a price /
peak - earnings basis, are now
in the same range as the 1929, 1972, and 1987
peaks.
As Graham and Dodd wrote
in Security Analysis (1934), referring to the final advance that led to the 1929 market
peak, the reason investors shifted their attention away from historically - reliable measures of
valuation was «first, that the records of the past were proving an undependable guide to investment; and, second, that the rewards offered by the future had become irresistibly alluring.»
And with corporate profits still well below their previous
peaks and
valuations as of November 2017 looking fair given the more promising economic environment, European equities look to us to be potentially poised for another solid year
in 2018.
In fact, Flipkart had experienced several valuation markdowns by American mutual funds, including Vanguard Group, Fidelity, Valic Co. and T Rowe Price, throughout 2016, compared to its peak of $ 142.24 in June 201
In fact, Flipkart had experienced several
valuation markdowns by American mutual funds, including Vanguard Group, Fidelity, Valic Co. and T Rowe Price, throughout 2016, compared to its
peak of $ 142.24
in June 201
in June 2015.
The S&P 500 registered a record high after an advancing half - cycle since 2009 that is historically long -
in - the - tooth and already exceeds the
valuation peaks set at every cyclical extreme
in history but 2000 on the S&P 500 (across all stocks, current median price / earnings, price / revenue and enterprise value / EBITDA multiples already exceed the 2000 extreme).
U.S. dividend stock
valuations have come down since
peaking in late July amid investors» search for yield, and they are now more
in line with those of the broader market.
At the market's actual 2000
peak,
valuations were so high that even a future price /
peak earnings ratio of 20 could have been expected to result
in a nearly zero annualized returns over the following 10 years.
The «canonical» market
peak typically features rich
valuations, rising interest rates, often a reasonably extended and «flattish» period where, despite marginal new highs, momentum has gradually faded while internal divergences have widened, and finally, an abrupt reversal
in leadership, from a preponderance of new highs over new lows (both generally large
in number) to a preponderance of new lows over new highs, with the reversal often occurring over a period of just a week or two.
I emphasized issues like
valuations and
peak - to -
peak returns
in the semi-annual report, because the period of unusual overvaluation since 2000 might otherwise leave shareholders with an inaccurate understanding of «characteristic» performance for the Strategic Growth Fund.
To be sure, not surprisingly, market
peaks in the higher inflation, higher rate environment of the late 1960s to the mid-1980s tended to occur at a lower
valuation, not far from where we are today.
In Q2, the UK housebuilding sector * conjured up its own
Peak District and broke new high ground on no less than eight climbs — and on 31 May a new all - time pinnacle
valuation of # 38.3 billion was conquered.
On the subject of
valuations, I believe that the
peak level of earnings seen
in the past market cycle was somewhat high, so I'd agree with Bill Gross at PIMCO
in the sense that we're not likely to see that level of earnings as the «norm.»
In an interview last week after the Standard & Poor's 500 hit yet another peak, Yale professor Robert Shiller noted that stock valuations were near levels that preceded meltdowns in the past and thus were «a cause for concern.&raqu
In an interview last week after the Standard & Poor's 500 hit yet another
peak, Yale professor Robert Shiller noted that stock
valuations were near levels that preceded meltdowns
in the past and thus were «a cause for concern.&raqu
in the past and thus were «a cause for concern.»
The secular bull market that ended
in 2000 took
valuations dramatically above anything seen even at the 1929
peak.
U.S. stocks are not
in a bubble ----
valuations remain significantly below the
peak in 2000 ---- but that is not the same as being cheap, or even fairly priced.
To be sure, not surprisingly, market
peaks in the higher inflation, higher rate environment of the late 1960s to the mid-1980s tended to occur at a lower
valuation, not far from where we are today.
The sell - side
in these types of situations tends to value companies at
peak multiples of trough earnings, and only shifts to the more mid-cycle earnings and
valuation we use when there's clear evidence the cycle has turned.
Given what his price /
peak earnings tells him about the market's current
valuation (stomach - churningly high) and his perception that several of the supporting investment elements that have so far made
valuations irrelevant are starting to break down, what's he doing with the portfolios
in his care?
Since Run 6 starts from today's
valuations, this
peak would occur
in 2011.
Should we fear the lofty
valuation multiples, or should we fear the CAPE ratio itself, because of its notorious unreliability
in picking market
peaks and troughs?
Since Run 4 starts at today's
valuations, the
peak would occur
in 2031.
Equally worthy of note, the very same
valuation measures during the bullish
peaks in the 20 - year period never approached the mindless extremes that exist at present.
As I mentioned earlier, the median price - earnings ratios (P / E) and price - sales ratios (P / S) actually surmounted the
peaks at the end of the last two bull market cycles — the metrics went beyond the
valuation peaks hit
in 2000 and
in 2007.
The
peaks in momentum's performance — when we see the performance spikes and crashes — almost always coincide with
peaks in momentum's relative
valuation.
The maximum sustainable withdrawal rate (MWR) for retirees may continue declining even after the
peak in earnings
valuations in 2000.
Of course, none of this is to say a bear market can't occur, but overall, a healthy earnings environment has kept
valuations from approaching the levels that marked the
peak back
in 2000.
From Professor Robert Shiller's «Irrational Exuberance» Second Edition 2005, chapter 12, page 207: «The high
valuations that the stock market attained at its
peak in 2000, and the relatively high
valuations that it still shows today, came about for no good reasons..»
Particularly for the last 35 years, more than half of stocks» real return came from rising
valuations as dividend yields tumbled off their
peak of 6.4 %
in August 1982 to rest at a meager 2.1 % as of June 30, 2016.