Their sensitivity is assessed in several configurations under a high - end global
warming scenario over the time range 1976 — 2100.
In summer and autumn the CSIRO projections were for smaller decreases in rainfall than in winter and spring, but the observed change was a substantial decrease: in fact, as large a decrease between the successive 11 - year periods as CSIRO projected on the high global
warming scenario over the 40 - year period from 1990 to 2030.
Not exact matches
The long - term
warming over the 21st century, however, is strongly influenced by the future rate of emissions, and the projections cover a wide variety of
scenarios, ranging from very rapid to more modest economic growth and from more to less dependence on fossil fuels.
A team at British Antarctic Survey (BAS) examined the potential distribution of
over 900 species of shelf - dwelling marine invertebrates under a
warming scenario produced by computer models.
Over this 100 - year period, O'Gorman found that average snowfall decreased substantially in many Northern Hemisphere regions in
warm - climate
scenarios compared with the milder control climates, but that snowfall amounts in the largest snowstorms did not decrease to the same extent.
Thus as a practical matter, it doesn't really matter whether the inertia is climatic or societal or technological or economic because the globe will continue to
warm under all realistic
scenarios (what we do have a possible control
over is the magnitude of that
warming).
You have also brushed
over the fact that the
warming rate increases rapidly in the mid and upper
scenarios so using the centenial trend applied to the next 20 years is inappopriate.
To be consistent with recent observations, anthropogenic
warming is likely to lie in the range 0.1 to 0.2 °C / decade
over the next few decades under the IS92a
scenario.
In contrast, the
scenario in Fig. 5A, with global
warming peaking just
over 1 °C and then declining slowly, should allow summer sea ice to survive and then gradually increase to levels representative of recent decades.
Instead, Director Jonathan Levine (
Warm Bodies) cranks the silly dial to» 20» going for the most
over the top
scenarios.
That 0.1 to 0.2 degrees Celsius
over the next two decades represents the
warming ONLY for the IS92a
scenario (under different climate sensitivities).
«To be consistent with recent observations, anthropogenic
warming is likely to lie in the range 0.1 to 0.2 Â °C / decade
over the next few decades under the IS92a
scenario.»
To be consistent with recent observations, anthropogenic
warming is likely to lie in the range 0.1 to 0.2 °C / decade
over the next few decades under the IS92a
scenario.
You have also brushed
over the fact that the
warming rate increases rapidly in the mid and upper
scenarios so using the centenial trend applied to the next 20 years is inappopriate.
The current rate (
over the last 2 years) is about 1 m per century and we still have a lot more
warming to cause in a BAU
scenario.
[Response: You're wrong, as JA points out, since much of the
warming over the next few decades is contrained by commitment and current levels and doesn't much vary by
scenario.
Southern Greenland turns out to have one of the slowest rates of
warming of any land area in any of the
scenarios (the figure is the mean
over all models for the SRES A1B
scenario).
«In a
scenario of zeroed CO2 and sulfate aerosol emissions, whether the
warming induced by specified constant concentrations of non-CO2 greenhouse gases could slow the CO2 decline following zero emissions or even reverse this trend and cause CO2 to increase
over time is assessed.
The 2007 IPCC report highlights surface temperature projections for the period 2090 - 2099 under a business - as - ususal
scenario that reveals +5 °C to +7 °C
warming warming of annually average temperatures
over much of Eurasia under an aggressive A2
scenario.
This is a big departure from the work of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
over the last 20 years, in which scientists have periodically laid out «what if»
scenarios for emissions,
warming, impacts and responses, but avoided defining how much
warming is too much.
Building cities along coastlines as we have throughout our so - far short modern history, short though it has been from the standpoint of our climate history, should be recognized as the kind of short term planning that has gotten us into this trouble whether it happens now or a few decades or centuries down the road, and this concern
over atmoshperic
warming is just one of a multitude of possible planet - affecting
scenarios that could have devastating effects on our world's societies.
However even the moderate
scenarios which have eventual stabilisation give more
warming than 0.8 C. Even in the extremely unlikely event that there is no further growth in emissions, the current planetary energy imbalance (estimated to be almost 1W / m2)(due to the ocean thermal inertia) implies that there is around 0.5 C extra
warming already in the pipeline that will be realised
over the next 20 to 30 years.
Another riddle was that previous research indicated that under global
warming scenarios Pacific Equatorial Trade winds would slow down
over the coming century.
The results for change scaled by global mean
warming are rather similar across the four
scenarios, an exception being a relatively large increase
over the equatorial ocean for the commitment case.
«A rise of
over 1 m by 2100 for strong
warming scenarios can not be ruled out,» Rahmstorf (2007), extended by Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009), who project sea - level rise from 1990 to 2100 in the range 75 - 190 cm.
The report's «higher emissions»
scenario projects a devastating 8 °F to 10 °F
warming over the interior of this country — and, unimaginably, upwards of 18 °F
over in the Arctic — by 2071 to 2100.
On the other hand, Easterbrook's two temperature projections showed a 0.2 °C and 0.5 °C cooling
over this period, while the IPCC TAR
Scenario A2 projection showed a 0.2 °C
warming (Figure 6).
As Indur Goklany has shown, even assuming that the climate models on which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) accurately predict (rather than exaggerate by 2 to 3 times) the
warming effect of added CO2 in the atmosphere, people the world
over, and especially in developing countries, will be wealthier in
warmer than in cooler
scenarios, making them less vulnerable than today to all risks — including those related to climate.
«Using the IPCC
warming rate for our demonstration, we projected the rate successively
over a period analogous to that envisaged in their
scenario of exponential CO2 growth — the years 1851 to 1975.
So when I tell you that volcanoes are the major reason for the global
Warming / Climate Change
scenarios being touted by scientists (lobbyists) the world
over, I was hoping you might do some due diligence and find out why?
The beginning of the document includes this disclaimer: «We believe our portfolio is resilient under a wide range of outlooks, including the IEA's 450
scenario [compatible with avoiding 2C of
warming]... [However,] we have no immediate plans to move to a net - zero emissions portfolio
over our investment horizon of 10 — 20 years.»
«
warming in the pipeline» usually assumes constant concentrations, not zero emissions (though if CO2 emissions were dropped to zero tomorrow, and all other emissions were held constant, I'd probably expect a little bit of
warming before it turned
over and started dropping) 2) Don't forget aerosols: they are following the Level 1
scenario from Wigley et al. 2009, and may actually dominate short - term temperature trends.
The red line with yellow range represents the
warming to come
over the next 90 years in one of the more moderate IPCC business - as - usual emissions
scenarios (A1B - rapid global economic growth with a balanced emphasis on all energy sources).
... that a range of 2,050 — 2,100 Gt CO2 emissions from year 2000 onwards cause a most likely CO2 - induced
warming of 2 °C: in the idealized
scenarios they consider that meet this criterion, between 1,550 and 1,950 Gt CO2 are emitted
over the years 2000 to 2049.
While the planet has only
warmed about 0.8 °C
over the past century, the IPCC projects that in a business - as - usual
scenario, the planet will
warm 2.5 — 4 °C
over the next century.
report that ocean sediment cores containing an «undisturbed history of the past» have been analyzed for variations in PP
over timescales that include the Little Ice Age... they determined that during the LIA the ocean off Peru had «low PP, diatoms and fish,» but that «at the end of the LIA, this condition changed abruptly to the low subsurface oxygen, eutrophic upwelling ecosystem that today produces more fish than any region of the world's oceans... write that «in coastal environments, PP, diatoms and fish and their associated predators are predicted to decrease and the microbial food web to increase under global
warming scenarios,» citing Ito et al..
Using these
scenarios led the IPCC to report a range of global
warming over the next century from 1.4 — 5.8 °C, without being able to report any likelihood considerations.
In contrast, the
scenario in Fig. 5A, with global
warming peaking just
over 1 °C and then declining slowly, should allow summer sea ice to survive and then gradually increase to levels representative of recent decades.
Though observational data is limited on the links between climate change and dengue risk in Hawaii, future climate
scenarios predict
warmer temperatures and wetter summers in Hawaii
over the next 25 year, which will cause an expansion of mosquito habitat and potential dengue risk areas.
In this
scenario, there is approximately 2.4 °C global surface
warming over the 21st century.
It seems that every new climate
scenario making the media
over the past 20 years they always describe a
warm future on a multidecadal scale ignoring a cool future as if variability didn't exist, but isn't scientific climatology primarily concerned with longer millenia time scales of a thousand years or more?
The last time in Earth history when the global average surface temperature was as
warm as the IPCC projects for 2100 in its mid-range
scenarios, there was very little polar ice and sea level would have been roughly 70 meters (
over 200 feet) higher than at present.
Over that time, the globally averaged temperature difference between the depth of an ice age and a
warm interglacial period was 4 to 6 °C — comparable to that predicted for the coming century due to anthropogenic global
warming under the fossil - fuel - intensive, business - as - usual
scenario.
Based on these data, the 10 - year period, 1146 — 1155, was selected as a
scenario of worst - case
warm drought from the paleoclimate data for the past 12 centuries
over the Southwest.
My arithmetic for a 2x C02 would be: Present
Warming: 0.75 deg C Current warming Rate 0.15 deg C per decade Time to 2x C02 (BAU scenario) approx 100 years So 0.15 x 10 +0.75 = 2.25 deg C Further warming due to time lag at end of 100 year period ~ 0.75 deg, probably over several d
Warming: 0.75 deg C Current
warming Rate 0.15 deg C per decade Time to 2x C02 (BAU scenario) approx 100 years So 0.15 x 10 +0.75 = 2.25 deg C Further warming due to time lag at end of 100 year period ~ 0.75 deg, probably over several d
warming Rate 0.15 deg C per decade Time to 2x C02 (BAU
scenario) approx 100 years So 0.15 x 10 +0.75 = 2.25 deg C Further
warming due to time lag at end of 100 year period ~ 0.75 deg, probably over several d
warming due to time lag at end of 100 year period ~ 0.75 deg, probably
over several decades.
«A well - known feature of global
warming scenarios is the land — sea contrast, with stronger
warming over land than
over oceans.
In such a
scenario, the planet still has a radiative imbalance, and the
warming will continue until the oceans have
warmed sufficiently to equalise the situation — giving an additional 0.3 to 0.8 ºC
warming over the 21st Century.
I concluded that the projections of extreme sea level rise are not consistent with plausible physical mechanisms, not supported by the available data, and further, that the AR4 projected range (about 30 - 50 cm by 2100) agreed perfectly with my projections
over a wide range of
warming scenarios.
While the window for global decisive action is rapidly closing, climate scientists should not make careless promises about their ability to reduce uncertainties in climate
scenarios over the next few years, and thereby provide our governments with excuses to shun their responsabilities until they know more detail about how fast and adverse their regional impacts of global
warming will be (compared to those in other countries).
In looking at the rate of change in
warming I found what of which I was somewhat aware previously but still a little surprised to find the
warming slow down
over the periods just before and after the join year of 2005 where the Historical part of the RCP
scenarios meets the
scenario part of the series.