Sentences with phrase «was nominal growth»

As you can see, there was nominal growth for both brick / mortar and online retailers.

In fact the growth differential must be among the most important factors in determining the relative «multiples», and it is nominal growth, not real, that matters.

Not exact matches

But decomposing real wage growth in nominal grown and inflation shows that the main driver has been virtually non-existent consumer price growth:

If the Fed were to adopt an operating policy of achieving a steady rate of growth in nominal thin - air credit, it could return to its prior anonymity.

«As a tax cut gets closer to passage (and assuming it is passed), the potential tailwind to earnings and nominal growth is likely to drive incremental fund flows into US equities,» Parker said.

If real GDP were to increase at 10.3 % instead of 2.5 % in 2015, then the government should receive, at a minimum, an extra $ 6.6 billion in tax revenue thanks to economic growth (this calculation assumes that nominal GDP grows at the same proportion as real GDP; it is more likely that nominal GDP would rise even higher as such quick economic growth would be inflationary, pushing that $ 6.6 billion figure even higher).

Gundlach, the chief executive of DoubleLine Capital, told Reuters on Saturday that it is «hard to love bonds at even 3 percent when GDPNow for Q1 2018 is suggesting annualized nominal GDP growth above 7 percent,» referring to a new indicator of economic growth from the Atlanta Fed.

By secular reflation, we mean at least a decade in which short - and long - term interest rates stay habitually below nominal GDP growth and high grade bonds are not really bonds any more: delivering trend returns that are close to zero or even negative.

After accounting for the impacts of measures and adjustments, the Sales Tax revenue base is projected to grow at an average annual rate of 4.3 per cent over the forecast period, roughly consistent with the average annual growth in nominal consumption of 4.0 per cent over this period.

Growth in several tax revenue sources, such as volume - based fuel and gasoline taxes, is more closely aligned to the real economy (that is, real GDP) than the nominal economy.

Finally, in a nominal GDP targeting regime, a decline in r - star caused by slower trend growth automatically leads to a higher rate of trend inflation, providing a larger buffer to respond to economic downturns.

But Japanese firms are highly capital - intensive, and «upward pressure on wages is also associated with a stronger demand environment and higher nominal GDP growth and, hence, revenue growth,» says Yamaguchi.

Of course, with debt in 2016 rising by roughly 40 — 45 percentage points of GDP while nominal GDP grew by less than 8 percent, it isn't easy to explain how the real value of assets in China grew by roughly 40 — 45 percentage points of GDP, nor why it is proving so difficult to rein in credit growth without a sharp slowdown in GDP growth.

While price level or nominal GDP targeting by monetary authorities are options, fiscal and other policies must also take on some of the burden to help sustain economic growth and stability.

This occurs when the nominal interest rate is equal to the growth rate of nominal wages.

There is, of course, a great deal of skepticism about the 7 % real GDP growth rate that China has reported, but we should remember that in the first quarter, nominal GDP growth was much lower, 5.8 %.

Because nominal wage growth for a large fraction of workers has been held to zero, a somewhat higher rate of inflation would grease the wheels of the labor market by allowing real wages to fall (Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry 1996).

This was based on real GDP growth of 2.0 % and nominal gross domestic product growth of 1.6 % in 2015.

A second issue is the unusually slow growth in nominal and real wages.

In contrast, direct program expenses are expected to decline assuming, that the government is successful in restraining the growth to less than the growth in nominal GDP.

On the wage side, though there's always variance, most wage and compensation series have been stuck at around 2 % year - over-year growth (nominal) with some, but not much, evidence of acceleration in response to the tightening labor market.

In this case the «cost» of financial repression to households was the gap between nominal GDP growth and nominal lending rates, plus an additional 1 - 1.5 % to account for the larger than normal gap between the lending rate and the deposit rate.

While stocks have a terminal value beyond a 10 - year period, the effects of interest rates and nominal growth on those projections largely cancel out because higher nominal GDP growth over a given 10 - year horizon is correlated with both higher interest rates and generally lower market valuations at the end of that period.

Most importantly, with nominal GDP growth rates having dropped from 20 % to 8 - 9 % the greatest of all the distortions, the interest rate distortion, has been the one most dramatically to adjust in the past three years.

First, it is now much harder for borrowers to justify investment in non-productive projects because they can no longer count on the huge gap between nominal GDP growth and the lending rate to bail them out of bad investments.

«The marginal cost of that debt is far above nominal GDP growth in respective nations.

TD is also now forecasting nominal GDP growth of only 1.1 % in 2015 considerably less than the almost 4 % growth forecast by the government last November.

The more appropriate measure of financial repression is not the deflator, whichever one we choose to use, but rather very roughly the gap between the nominal lending rate and the nominal GDP growth rate, the latter of which broadly represents the return on investment within the economy.

Should monetary policy drop its inflation target and instead do whatever it takes to maintain a stable growth path for nominal GDP, no matter what that requires it do, no matter what fiscal policy is?

To the extent that 6.3 % growth in nominal GDP seems too high (and there are certainly reasons to think so), just reduce those annual return projections accordingly.

As long as this government debt is rolled over continuously at non-repressed interest rates, which will be low as nominal GDP growth drops, China can rebalance the economy without a collapse in growth.

But regardless of the debate, the point to remember is that when the nominal lending rate is much below the nominal GDP growth rate, two very important things happen.

Before the financial crisis, nominal GDP growth of 5 % was considered normal in America.

Because low - risk investments return roughly 20 % on average in a country with 20 % nominal GDP growth, financial repression means that the benefits of growth are unfairly distributed between savers (who get just the deposit rate, say 3 %), banks, who get the spread between the lending and the deposit rate (say 3.5 %) and the borrower, who gets everything else (13.5 % in this case, assuming he takes little risk — even more if he takes risk).

Simply put, one might believe that short - term interest rates will still be zero a decade from now, but if that's true, it will be because nominal growth over the intervening period has also been dismal.

One of the ways Beijing seems to be reducing the pain of more expensive borrowing (relative to nominal GDP growth) is to loosen credit in a targeted way.

Their studies suggested that among developing countries nominal lending rates had on average been around two - thirds on nominal GDP growth rates (although China, at around one - third, was still well below anyone else's at the time).

For many years nominal GDP growth in China was 18 - 21 % and the official lending rate was around 7 %.

Because I think China's nominal GDP growth has been overstated by a substantial amount because of its systematic failure to write down bad loans, I usually have subtracted 2 - 4 percentage points from the nominal GDP growth rate before I did my very rough calculation.

It is only when credit growth begins to decelerate much more rapidly than nominal GDP growth that we can begin to talk hopefully about China's moving in the right direction, and it is only when credit growth falls permanently below the growth rate of the economy's debt - servicing capacity that China will have adjusted.

There are so many reasons why this is wrong (to list just the most obvious, poor countries have much lower debt thresholds than rich countries, Japanese debt can not possibly be dismissed as not being a problem, and because it is almost impossible to find an economist who understands the relationship between nominal interest rates and implicit amortization, Japanese government debt has probably only been manageable to date because GDP growth close to zero has permitted interest rates close to zero) and yet inane comparisons between China's debt burden and Japan's debt burden are made all the time.

Reflation is alive and well according to our definition: rising wages (albeit slowly this cycle) feeding stronger nominal growth, allowing lingering slack from the last recession to be gradually eliminated, stirring higher inflation over time.

While growth, both nominal and real, remains muted, central bank policy is evolving.

However, the slower - than - expected economic growth in 2013 and the accompanying lower level of nominal income in 2013 - 14 results in a «status quo» (before budget actions) deficit of $ 18.7 billion Subsequently, the status quo budgetary balance is actually lower that forecast in the November 2012 November Update.

But we believe a moderate rise in the dollar is more likely, and the support for profit margins from better wages, spending and nominal growth reinforces our broadly positive view on risk assets and equities in particular.

Reported nominal GDP growth is around 5 %, but the growth in debt servicing capacity is probably lower.

At a federal - provincial finance ministers» meeting in December 2012, the Finance Minister announced that, starting in 2017 - 18, the rate of growth in the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) would be reduced from 6 per cent per year to grow in line with a three - year moving average in nominal GDP, with a funding guarantee to grow by at least three per cent per year.

Chair Yellen has consistently maintained that as long as nominal wages grow no faster than the Fed's inflation target of 2 percent plus productivity growth, which is running at (a truly yucky) 1 percent these days, wages can grow 3 percent without generating inflationary pressures.

Different wage series show different trends, but if you mash them together, as is my wont, you find that the tightening job market has, in fact, given workers a bit more bargaining clout and nominal wage growth basically moved up from 2 to 2.5 percent.

To some extent, the framework in Australia is similar to an approach of targeting nominal income growth, without the attendant problems that may beset the latter.