Sentences with phrase «what peirce»

I don't believe he was referring to «authority» in the sense of expertise; in some sense the role of the IPCC in fixing belief around climate science is similar to Peirce's «authority», but it has no enforcement power and to me it seems far more like a step in the process of fixation and communication of scientific information, part of the publishing process, than anything like what Peirce was talking about in method 2.

About these societies I, with Whitehead and the Buddhists, would accept much of what Peirce says about individuals.

For his part, Hartshorne's interpretation of God so qualifies his meaning of creativity that the contrast between becoming and eternity within the cosmological process is softened, reduced in fact to what Peirce would call a «degenerate third.

CH: Well, I only discovered recently what Peirce says.

That's what Berkeley tried to remedy; it's what Peirce tried to remedy.

Action and law dominate in what Peirce calls anancastic evolution.

Much of what Peirce has to say throughout his published papers is pertinent to a philosophical perspective on the problems of creativity.

Not exact matches

For Bergson, like many process thinkers (Peirce, James and Dewey come particularly to mind), the entire concept of «necessity» only makes sense when applied internally to abstractions the intellect has already devised.11 Of course, one can tell an evolutionary story about how the human intellect came to be a separable function of consciousness that emphasizes abstraction (indeed, that is what Bergson does in Creative Evolution), but if one were to say that the course of development described in that story had to occur (i.e., necessarily) as it did, then one would be very far from Bergson's view (CE 218, 236, 270).

The pattern of development from the limited to a goal that is unbounded and envisaged in an infinite future also can be seen in Peirce's rejection, in «Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,» of Cartesian philosophy, particularly in his opposition to what he took to be the standard of subjectivity (5.263 - 317).

To say that there is spontaneity in the world, then, is to say that ordered generality, or what for Peirce is intelligibility, is founded on the unique, or what resists intelligibility.

First of all, we should observe that Peirce believed his thesis that there is spontaneity to be explanatory of «the general fact of irregularity, though not, of course, what each lawless event is to be.»

I should emphasize at the outset that although I begin with Peirce and shall refer to what I understand to be his view, the discussion will not be restricted to a straightforward exposition.

In the final analysis, then, Peirce is committed to a fundamental continuity to which are subjected all departures from law, and all leaps from the established to what is novel.

Now, what is important here is that the pattern of development from the finite to the infinite as Peirce defines it can be accounted for by the notion of agape.

In order to expand this point in another way, let me turn to the question of what counts as intelligibility and rationality — a question concerning the assumptions that underlie both Bergson's and Peirce's views of intuition.

I should add that if I am off the mark in suggesting such common ground, then I recommend that Peirce's account brings into focus more sharply what the central tension must be in any metaphysics of creative evolution.

In other words, I think what Bergson sees as intuitions belong properly to Peirce's level of thirds.

It is more important to consider what I think are crucial insights in both Bergson and Peirce about the interdependence that should be recognized between conceptual thought and intuitions.

Hartshorne's increasing willingness subsequently in his career to acknowledge his indebtedness to C.S. Peirce in particular, and to a host of other important historical antecedents (especially to Josiah Royce and to a number of personal idealists), helped broaden the discussion of what process thought metaphysically (as well as historically) entails.

These issues will be reviewed in terms of what I believe is a proper extrapolation of Charles Peirce's notion of cognition and his view of the conditions of cosmic evolution.

So was Peirce, who said so, and Whitehead, who did not say so but who did affirm what he called «reformed subjectivism.»

Well did Peirce say, «Plato knew what philosophy is.»

Cf. Peirce who describes an interpretant of a sign as «a feeling produced by it,» thus closely linking the interpretation of a sign qua possibility (or mere potentiality) to a peculiar quality of feeling that is, to what is simply felt.

Hartshorne sometimes explains this by reference to what Whitehead termed the fallacy of simple location (CAP 110, 187; CP 468; PS 10: 94; OP 301f), but he also illustrates the point through Charles Peirce's theory of categories (CAP 74 - 91, 103 - 113; CP 455 - 474; RNR 215 - 224).

What I take to be Hartshorne's conclusions about the illustration of Peirce's categories in experience are symbolized through our sample feeling «X» and the lower half of Figure One.

I do not know whether he would have done this or not, since I believe that with his pragmatism he might have accommodated relativity physics without altering his epistemology, though I can not go into the question here.16 What seems to me clear is that the philosophical issues underlying Hartshorne's criticisms of Peirce can not be settled by theories of physics or the mathematics of continuity.

In his later writings (1905 and afterwards) Peirce sometimes referred to his own position as «pragmaticism» to distinguish it from what James and others were calling «pragmatism.»

So, although for practical purposes our lack of intuitive certainties is much as Peirce says, theoretically we can say what we mean by definite relations and definite terms, and this seems an advantage.

When Peirce discusses individuals, he is writing about what for me are sequential societies of actualities, not single actualities.

I hold what Arthur Prior called the Peirce view of extralogical, non-metaphysical truths in relation to time.

What one needs is an all - inclusive logic — a «grand logic,» in Peirce's phrase — in which the positive achievements of these various alternative logics can be accommodated without having to pay the high, inflationary prices they usually demand: excessive ontic commitment and involvement, «fuzzy» semantics, excessive and perhaps unsound or at least dubious axioms and rules, and failure to achieve the kind of «maximum logical candor» that should be aimed at.

what to say erm... 8 mm strechers, lip peircing,....

What You Need To Know: Yes, it's a remake of Brian De Palma's 1976 psychological horror classic, this time directed by «Boys Don't Cry» filmmaker Kimberly Peirce.

Director Kimberley Peirce wants her remake of Carrie to mean something, but she can't seem to figure out what.

That was nine years ago and either the memories of what worked have faded or Peirce is finally experiencing the dreaded sophomore slump.

According to Peirce, this play is the first step to what the GEI hopes will be a string of events raising awareness and education about violence against women and the potential ways of stopping it.

The question regarding Peirce's classification is to what degree those beliefs were * fixed * by this method of simply clinging to them, despite contrary evidence.