Sentences with phrase «which peirce»

(1) The first objection, I think, is the one against which Peirce has the clearest defense.

Hartshorne has recently argued that Peirce's categories should be distinguished not according to the number of terms they involve but according to the types of dependence which Peirce rightly identified with each (CAP 77 - 84, 106f; (ICE 324).

6Hartshorne does not express which citation of Peirce he had in mind, but it might be 1.362 in which Peirce describes God as manifested by the completely evolved universe in the infinitely distant future.

It is the condition of blind change, which Peirce associated with Darwinian theory.

It will be helpful to look briefly at ways in which Peirce anticipated the need for agape as a condition in evolution.

It is important to emphasize that the creative love which Peirce identifies is different from eros.

Not exact matches

But... the infinite regress in question is an example of the «non-vicious» type of regress, since it concerns possibilities, and these not (on one view of potentiality) as a definite multitude, whose number is infinite, but as a continuum, which in the words of Peirce is «beyond all multitude,» as God was formerly described as being; and indeed, as we shall see, the continuum of possibilities is one aspect of God which may be truly so described.

The latter is a tangled problem at best, but it is clear that among the important founders of the process perspective — specifically I mean James, Peirce, Bergson, Whitehead, Dewey, and Hartshorne — it is Hartshorne's work which comes closest to being a kind of personalism.1 Whitehead explicitly sets aside the personalist perspective in Religion in the Making, considering its claims beyond the possibility of being established.2 On the other side, a number of personalists have been sympathetic to process thought, and Brightman is surely principal among them.3 Here I will not investigate the question of whether personalism in general, or even the idealistic type, is reconcilable with process thought.

Or, to use the similar language of Charles Peirce, an interpretation includes an object, a sign of the object, and an interpretation of the sign which the sign asserts to hold of the object.

I agree but add: God had no alternative to willing that there be some free creatures, first because (pace Alston) the idea of not creating at all could occur (if I may say so) only to a confused creature, second because, as Peirce, Bergson, and Whitehead have seen, by a «creature» we can consistently mean only a lesser form of the freedom or creativity which in eminent form is deity.

Again, in «The Law of Mind,» Peirce argues that personality, which is one of the manifestations of the law of mind, is a structure that evolves (6.102 - 63).

Charles Peirce said this in his twenties with superb clarity, except that finitude is in this usage an inadequate word; we are but fragments of the finite cosmos, which so far as we know is itself finite.

Peirce suggests a beginning for such an account when he indicates that once sporting within the initial state is acknowledged, we are drawn to a consideration of the respects in which sporting occurs.

It should be pointed out here that Peirce's view of the circularity of cosmic agape is consistent with the overarching thesis of synechism which embraces agapasticism.

Nor is it clear on Peirce's account that the initial state is to be identified under the category of firstness, for it is not, since it is prior to the universe, a condition in which chance functions or in which sheer qualitative suchness is manifest phenomenally.

In the final analysis, then, Peirce is committed to a fundamental continuity to which are subjected all departures from law, and all leaps from the established to what is novel.

Peirce points to the importance of viewing creativity in a developmental teleology — a teleology in which new intelligibility can develop.

Ah, but about the present Peirce became another mathematician legislating for actuality; he decided that the presents in which actions happen are infinitesimally brief, with an infinite number in any finite time however short.

This last point is suggested in a number of Peirce's discussions, particularly in his accounts of the function of the sciences (see, for instance, 1.191) as well as in his references to the goal of rational conduct which is the summum bonum (e.g., 5.4 - 5, 5.433).

However, in proposing that agape is the principle of creativity, Peirce attempted to show that specific instances of spontaneity can be the responsibility of an operative principle, agape, which specifically functions creatively.

This continuity is the heart of Peirce's general doctrine of synechism, under which, as I read him, agapastic evolution must be subsumed.

Bergson's tensions also underlie an opposition between life and matter, creative and conservative impulses, and an open society and a closed society For Peirce the first is mind, which is lively, and matter, which is sheer (although evolutionary) regularity, and is called «effete mind.»

This, I think, distinguishes them from Cartesian intuitions, which were rejected by both Bergson and Peirce.

Peirce's intuitions are not themselves cognitive but are subject to and contributory to triadic experience, which is interpretive, critical, and fully cognitive.

This expectation is comparable to Peirce's idea that intuitions — which, as suggested earlier, are thinner than Bergson's — would be subjected to critical interpretation.

In trying to answer, I shall turn exclusively to Peirce on the assumption that rhythmic durations have the function that infinitesimals have in part of Peirce's account of continuity3 I can only hope that a Bergsonian scholar will judge the extent to which my account of Peirce shows common ground with Bergson.

In agreement with Peirce, James, Dewey, and even Whitehead, I hold that a belief which could not be expressed in action is only verbal.

There is an obvious external comparison which could be drawn here with the evolutionary cosmology of C. S. Pence, in which the laws of nature are described as having evolved, as subject to change, and as having more the characteristic of habit.13 However, there is no evidence whatever that Whitehead knew of Peirce's views or was in any way influenced by them.14

This is all the more remarkable in that it was the introduction of quanta which first caused physicists generally to take seriously the idea, so courageously defended by Peirce, of a tychistic or random aspect of the physical world.

There seems to be a succession of experiences, but (if the succession is a continuum) there are no single experiences» (M, 286); (2) that Peirce «fell into a subtle but complete mistake» when he held that since «continuity leaves open possibilities which discontinuity excludes... the burden of proof is upon discontinuity» (MR, 467 - 68); (3) that «he could not, in the continuum of becoming which he posited, give meaning to the idea of a definite single event» (M, 287).

Peirce seems to have had considerations like the above in mind when, after defining an individual as something which reacts, he went on to proclaim that «everything whose identity consists in a continuity of reactions will be a single logical individual» (3.613).

It is not enough with Peirce's epistemology to say merely that «an individual is something which reacts.»

Peirce ends the paragraph by remarking that this «common sense idea of continuity» is not that found in «the calculus and theory of functions,» according to which continuity «is only a collection of independent points.

What one needs is an all - inclusive logic — a «grand logic,» in Peirce's phrase — in which the positive achievements of these various alternative logics can be accommodated without having to pay the high, inflationary prices they usually demand: excessive ontic commitment and involvement, «fuzzy» semantics, excessive and perhaps unsound or at least dubious axioms and rules, and failure to achieve the kind of «maximum logical candor» that should be aimed at.

To establish his third point Peirce invokes the pragmatic shift of concern from origins to consequences and argues that knowledge is justified not because it has an absolute foundation but because it is a self - correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy though not all at once.

It seems to me that the Bergsonian position is radically vulnerable to several interrelated criticisms that have their origin in the work of C. S. Peirce and which have become almost contemporary commonplaces.

Now the obvious Bergsonian objection to this whole line of reasoning is that Peirce's arguments are telling only against the claim to have an intuitive knowledge which is at the same time conceptual.

Peirce hesitatingly and inconclusively gave hints in the right direction, as did some of my teachers at Harvard, so that when I came to know Whitehead and his metaphysical writings I was ready to utilize the advances he had made in this tradition, with some of which he was not himself familiar.

All feeling, for Whitehead, and, though less clearly, for Peirce and Bergson, is social, feeling of others» feeling; this is the kernel of love, which for Lanier also was the principle of principles.

With them I take seriously the apparent asymmetry of becoming, time's arrow, according to which the past is (in Peirce's words) «the sum of accomplished facts,» of definite particulars, whereas the future is exclusively constituted by real Thirds, that is, not fully particularized generals, which will be somehow particularized as the future becomes past but are not particularized in advance or eternally.

And Peirce says flatly, «It is the past which is actual.»

Nathaniel: This is a great question but difficult because then you have to really stop and think about who made which pictures when and you have to set aside people you've been rooting for forever that will seemingly be 70 before they birth a third feature (I'm talking to you Jonathan Glazer and Kimberly Peirce).

Now filming in Toronto, Canada is Sony Screen Gems» remake of Carrie, which has Kimberly Peirce...

Now filming in Toronto, Canada is Sony Screen Gems» remake of Carrie, which has Kimberly Peirce (Boys Don't Cry, Stop - Loss) in...

But while this is an efficiently made freak - out, Peirce packs the screen with nods to the earlier movie, which remains the iconic version of this story.

But I certainly don't bring the same expectations, let alone the same hopes, to the DC / Marvels — some of them anything but marvels — than I do to, say, a new Alfonso Cuaron or Kimberly Peirce of Brit Marling film... nor to anything in which Julianne Moore, whose taste in and savvy about projects match her talent, is involved in any way, shape or form.

Nearly a century and a half ago, philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce defined index as a sign that is caused by that which it refers to.

Peirce's last two methods of fixation are perhaps the most interesting for scientific discussion: that which is «agreeable to reason» vs that which «coincides with fact».

The agency, which has installed and will install rooftop PV systems on several of its facilities, said it is also considering the feasibility of floating solar panels deployment at Tengeh and Upper Peirce Reservoirs.

C. S. Peirce (1839 - 1914) observed [N, p. 1334] that: «This branch of mathematics [probability] is the only one, I believe, in which good writers frequently get results entirely erroneous.