Sentences with phrase «which subject and object»

On display during 2017 as part of Desert X in the Coachella Valley, Mirage presents a continually changing encounter in which subject and object, inside and outside, are in constant flux.

On display until 30 April 2017, Mirage presents a continually changing encounter in which subject and object, inside and outside are in constant flux.

In the tradition of land art as a reflection of the dreams and aspirations projected onto the American West, Mirage presents a continually changing encounter in which subject and object, inside and outside are in constant flux.

Or perhaps that really is the point: Stripped of intellectual backwash, Ding's canvases are simply cleverly interwoven threads of pure color, a sublime configuration of grids and crosses in which subject and object can lose themselves.

On display until 30 April 2017 as part of Desert X in the Coachella Valley, Mirage presents a continually changing encounter in which subject and object, inside and outside, are in constant flux.

Not exact matches

«Additive manufacturing technology permits production of extraordinarily accurate duplicates of objects that are the subject of IP protections,» said Teresa Rea, acting director of the Patent and Trademark Office, which is part of the Commerce Department.

In the electronic media, a radically altered relationship between subject and object emerges with which the old critical concepts can not deal.

And from There You Shall Seek by Joseph Soloveitchik Ktav, 230 pages, $ 29.50 Near the end of Courage to Be, Paul Tillich writes: «God as a subject makes me into an object which is nothing more than an object.

Here Lindblom quotes with strong approval Harold Knight, The Hebrew Prophetic Consciousness (London: Lutterworth Press, 1948), p. 96: «Here we have a state of the highest integration, for the attention is wholly focused upon a single object which gradually fills the consciousness until the connexion between the subject and the outside world is broken.»

Only the dualistic form of the modern Western consciousness, which is grounded in an absolute distinction between the subject and the object of consciousness, instills us with the seemingly irrevocable sense that the world or reality stands wholly outside of consciousness itself.

Such an aim is the feeling of a proposition of which the novel occasion is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal object is the predicate.

If so, the initial phase of the subjective aim is also the feeling of a proposition of which the occasion itself is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal object the predicate.

God does in fact treat us as subjects — that is as those having their own agency — but many preach a gospel in which we have been reduced to objects forced to live life in according to some divinely mapped - out and pre-ordained «plan», or to be the at the mercy of divine manipulation.

This comparison of an actual entity to the structure of a linguistic proposition can be misleading, however, since the concrete wholeness of a process is the creating subject (which is closer to the simple predicate linguistically) and the subject / whole's parts are objects (the subjects linguistically).

Let us call the two parties A and B. B's property or treasure, B's heritage, B's right, is adjacent, or appears to be adjacent or is declared to be adjacent — adjacency is a phenomenally flexible term, subject to interpretation according to what is deemed to he adjacent by the powerful covetor; B's thing which is B's by rights, by inheritance, becomes in its adjacency an object of passionate desire, an obsessive craving, on the part of a more powerful A.

Scandalously to oversimplify his argument, it is, says Heidegger, the history of this nihilistic impulse to reduce being to an object of the intellect, subject to the will, that has brought us at last to the age of technology, for which reality is just so many quanta of power, the world a representation of consciousness, and the earth a mere reserve awaiting exploitation; technological mastery has become our highest ideal, and our only real model of truth.

Looked at that way, the essential content of revelation, or perhaps the very nature of God (whatever is the ultimate «subject matter» or «object» of the inquiry) dictates certain methods and movements of thought which, if followed, denominate the inquiry as «theology.»

The relationship between subject and object is no longer that relationship of knowing postulated by classical idealism, wherein the object always seems the construction of the subject, but a relationship of being in which, paradoxically, the subject is his body, his world, his situation, by a sort of exchange.

To be actual must mean that all actual things are alike objects, enjoying objective immortality in fashioning creative actions; and that all actual things are subjects, each prehending the universe from which it arises.

Later the subject will select the «ideal of itself» from the «objective lure», which is the original fund of values and eternal objects it can draw upon.

I will note here that Catherine Keller's analysis of hetero - reality in terms of the separate self - hood of men and the soluble selfhood of women corroborates the stunted character of relations within the dominant patriarchal worldview, which diminishes both relationality and individuality with its dualistic patterning of subject - object in male - female relationships.

From the lived togetherness of I and It, philosophy abstracts the I into a subject which can do nothing but observe and reflect and the It into a passive object of thought.

These objections are likely to be reinforced in the minds of those who make them by the qualifications which Buber sets for the philosophical anthropologist: that he must be an individual to whom man's existence as man has become questionable, that he must have experienced the tension of solitude, and that he must discover the essence of man not as a scientific observer, removed in so far as possible from the object that he observes, but as a participant who only afterwards gains the distance from his subject matter which will enable him to formulate the insights he has attained.

A prehension is not so much a relation as a relating, or transition, which carries the object into the makeup of the subject.1 White - head's «feelings» are not states, but» «vectors»; for they feel what is there and transform it into what is here» (Process and Reality 133).2 He was writing a theoretical transcript of the fact that you feel this moment of experience to be your very own, yet derived from a world without.

Subject - object, or I - It, knowledge is ultimately nothing other than the socially objectivized and elaborated product of the real meeting which takes place between man and his Thou in the realms of nature, social relations, and art.

They speak, like Wolfgang Köhler, of the «objective requiredness» of values, and, like Eliseo Vivas, they describe the relation to these values as the relation of a subject to an independent object to which man simply responds.

Descartes drew the line between human minds which are subjects and the rest of the world made of objects.

Tillich suggests several criteria for evaluating religious symbols, in addition to this capacity for self - negation.30 A symbol of the ultimate must transcend the subject - object division, for the characteristics of being - itself are equally present in human life and beyond it; the symbol must express the basic unity of all things, of which man is aware in the depths of his own being.

He had long explored the complexities of human nature in history and society, but in this book he turned the problem around and looked at the subject which was involved, turning from the objective self which most analysts look at to the subjective self behind the object.

Mythical thinking is not to be thought of primarily as an attempt to explain the external world, for such a concept presupposes a consciousness of the duality of subject and object, internal and external, which is not characteristic of the mythical mentality.

The basic identity of thought and king, the unity of subject and object, and the possibility of immediate awareness by participation, which are assumptions of Western idealism from Plato to Hegel, are all fundamental to Tillich's viewpoint.

We are a religiously mad culture, furiously searching for the spirit, but each of us is subject and object of the one quest, which must be for the original self, a spark of breath in us that we are convinced preceded Creation.

It is thus the nature of every occasion of experience to be first a subject constituting itself through the prehension of past events and relevant possibilities and then an object which enters into the constitution of subsequent events.

Children become — and have already become — objects which others have the right to as opposed to subjects with rights themselves.

In fact, he still does — though it has already been transformed and resurrected and is therefore no longer subject to the ordinary laws of our physics, which govern only mortal bodies and material objects.

This dialectic provides categories, within our contemporary context, for discerning how communal expressions, when they are cut off from transformative communal experiences, become «objective» and «institutionalized» in ways which dichotomize subjects and objects, experiences and expressions.

Consequently as regards the fundamental contention we are examining, it is not appropriate, in view of the historical associations that burden the word «material» to subsume under the term «matter» the subjectivity which is also met with within the primordial unity we have described, because to do so would at least obscure the equally fundamental difference encountered in that unity between the knowing subject and the object which is merely met with.

Third, in our situation today, the specific requirements of these two criteria are such that no theology can be adequate unless it makes the assertion of the experience of God, by which I mean that it must assert, in some formulation or other, that the strictly ultimate reality termed «God» is the object as well as the subject of experience, and this in relation to others as well as to self.

It is the thinking - feeling subject, the cogito, and not just the object, the religious symbol, which must now undergo deeper exploration, in order that it can become open to the reality expressed in symbols.

The psychic processes, which were the content of conscious and unconscious experience, became for them also the objects of awareness, and these were, to an astonishing degree, thereby subjected to conscious control.

To argue by inference from effect to Cause, from the passive object to the active Subject of change, from transitory, contingent being to a Being who is necessary and eternal, from nature's striving after perfection to a Perfection which is ultimate, from the order observable in creation to a creative Mind - all that (I shall be told) is to approach the great Riddle from one side, and that the most difficult.

He continues: «Such an aim is the feeling of a proposition of which the novel occasion is the logical subject and the appropriate eternal object is the predicate.

In his exposition of Psalm 90 he even used the daring metaphor that the subject of faith was a mathematical point, so far was he from regarding faith as a subjective experience through which man's understanding of himself is illuminated, and so exclusively should faith be defined in reference to its object, the extra se of the historic Christ.

Furthermore, it may be that the essence of time is subject to conditions which can never be associated with it a priori but rather remain extrinsic and even contradictory to it, even though they lend themselves to conceptualization and reveal time (in one of its essential aspects) as an object of practical interest.

Here too it is true that I not only have my body in a subject - object - relationship, but much more, that as subject I am my body, a body that for me is something more and quite other than just a peculiarly intimate bit of the surrounding world (PR 81) with which I am not identified.

In a strand of really distinct actual entities, these would necessarily stand in a subject - object relationship to one another, so that the entity that perishes and is objectified is a different entity than that which is coming into being.

As Whitehead allowed cognition to be grounded in real prehensions, which occur between a subject and its object world, so also it was for Piaget: the «epistemic» subject, as an organism, previously an «open system» which simply lives in interaction with its environment, acts — and finally, thinks (BC 477).

He explains this otherness of the universe: Cosmology, in contradistinction to astronomy and astrophysics, is rather a «universology» that deals with a single, unique totality of all, which not only can not be treated as an object and hence subjected to experimentation, but also can not be made devoid of the delimiters of human insight (p. 182).

What hermeneutics just questions in Husserlian idealism is that it has inscribed its immense and unsurpassable discovery of intentionality in a conceptuality which weakens its import, especially for the subject - object relation....

When, through the «breaking - through,» i.e., through a «cutting off» of the ego from the world, and through an identification of the ego with the motivating dynamis of the unconscious, this severance is once more resolved, God disappears as object and becomes the subject which is no longer distinguished from the ego, i.e., the ego as a relatively late product of differentiation, becomes once more united with the mystic, dynamic, universal participation (participation mystique of the primitives).1