Sentences with phrase «with peirce»

It is not enough with Peirce's epistemology to say merely that «an individual is something which reacts.»

With both Peirce and Whitehead I have been closely associated.

Along with Peirce and Weiss, Hartshorne holds that particulars are completely determinate, and therefore can only be past events, and that universals are somewhat indeterminate, and can therefore characterize only the future.

In agreement with Peirce, James, Dewey, and even Whitehead, I hold that a belief which could not be expressed in action is only verbal.

Hartshorne goes on to claim, with Peirce, that the one thing true of any entity is that it «is a potential contributor to the summum bonum.

As I shall mention below, this point indicates an interesting comparison with Peirce's idea of intelligibility as triadic and intuition as pre-intelligible.

I mention this not only as a point in relation to Gunter's statement that creation ex nihilo never occurs for Bergson but also with Peirce in mind.

I should emphasize at the outset that although I begin with Peirce and shall refer to what I understand to be his view, the discussion will not be restricted to a straightforward exposition.

But starting with Peirce and Frege in the nineteenth century and continuing with Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, and a host of others in the twentieth, the fundamental assumptions of this framework came under consistent and, I think, effective attack.

If there was something wrong with peircing your skin then why would tattoos be wrong and earrings be ok?

Not exact matches

In January, Commissioners Hester M. Peirce and Robert J. Jackson Jr., both nominees of President Donald J. Trump, joined SEC commissioners Kara Stein and Michael Piwowar, along with SEC Chairman Jay Clayton.

William James, Charles Peirce, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead have much in common with the process metaphysicians.

The latter is a tangled problem at best, but it is clear that among the important founders of the process perspective — specifically I mean James, Peirce, Bergson, Whitehead, Dewey, and Hartshorne — it is Hartshorne's work which comes closest to being a kind of personalism.1 Whitehead explicitly sets aside the personalist perspective in Religion in the Making, considering its claims beyond the possibility of being established.2 On the other side, a number of personalists have been sympathetic to process thought, and Brightman is surely principal among them.3 Here I will not investigate the question of whether personalism in general, or even the idealistic type, is reconcilable with process thought.

In any case, whatever the causes, Whitehead and Santayana form with James, Josiah Royce, C.A. Strong, C.S. Peirce, Charles Hartshorne and others a distinctive philosophical grouping with common concerns distinct from those of British and European philosophers.

As W. P. Montague saw so clearly (with no doubt some help from Peirce and Bergson), becoming as sheer growth, increase without loss, is the concrete reality and the secret of both being and becoming.

«44 This statement exhibits an mischaracterization of Bergson so extreme it defies words; if ever there was a more persistent opponent of Descartes» conception of natural science than Bergson, I do not know who it might be — with the possible exception of Bergson's process blood brothers — Peirce, Dewey, James, Whitehead and Hartshorne.45 In Lowe's defense it might be said that the eight or ten books that do the most to establish just how non-Cartesian, and indeed revolutionary Bergson's view of science was were all published after Understanding Whitehead.

-- Peirce, quoted by Hartshorne I have been preoccupied for a long time with the question, «How is our conscious experience related to our bodies?»

In this respect Peirce's agape is inseparable from eros with respect to the goal or final end to be reached by love.

Charles Peirce said this in his twenties with superb clarity, except that finitude is in this usage an inadequate word; we are but fragments of the finite cosmos, which so far as we know is itself finite.

* There is now a superb biography of Charles S. Peirce, with an excellent concluding essay on his thought by the historian, who is also a capable philosopher, Professor Joseph Brent, who has become a close friend, although I had not heard of him until a year or so ago.

It should be pointed out here that Peirce's view of the circularity of cosmic agape is consistent with the overarching thesis of synechism which embraces agapasticism.

Let me conclude with a brief suggestion about the conceptual utility of Peirce's view.

Peirce brought philosophy back to the real world or genuinely individual, fallible, localized choices, actions, with necessary antecedent conditions, and possible or probable subsequent outcomes, involving free choices in each momentary present.

Since my purpose is not to offer a study of Peirce's thesis, but rather to indicate the significance of his insight, I shall illustrate his recognition of radical creativity with only a few references.

It is the condition of blind change, which Peirce associated with Darwinian theory.

Ah, but about the present Peirce became another mathematician legislating for actuality; he decided that the presents in which actions happen are infinitesimally brief, with an infinite number in any finite time however short.

This discussion began with the observation that Peirce offered an insight into speculation about evolution when he introduced the notion of agape as an operative principle.

But I do want to insist that Peirce's conviction that evolution includes teleological direction is crucial to a view of evolution that does not stop with a restricted Darwinian view and recognizes that evolution does occur not simply as process as such, but as progress.

Bergson's approach calls attention to an unavoidable disunity in its stress on the three loci of tension and thus it is less unified initially than Peirce's, at least with respect to the continuity between the poles of the tension.

Peirce's synechism or insistence that continuity is of prime importance in philosophy and his effort to show that continuity fundamentally has no gaps (although continuity is nevertheless open to spontaneous, emergent developments) exhibit a fundamental affinity with Bergson.

In trying to answer, I shall turn exclusively to Peirce on the assumption that rhythmic durations have the function that infinitesimals have in part of Peirce's account of continuity3 I can only hope that a Bergsonian scholar will judge the extent to which my account of Peirce shows common ground with Bergson.

In his early writing, Peirce calls the respect the ground of the sign's function, and I think that as a ground it has the function of leading the interpretation to another interpretation with another sign as its subject, all in an on - going semeiotic process.

Compiling representative anthologies of process philosophical writing, Douglas Browning in 1965 (POP) and J. R. Sibley and P. A. Y. Gunter in 1978 (PPBW) include Bergson, selections from the later evolutionary cosmology of C. S. Peirce, Samuel Alexander, and C. Lloyd Morgan along with Whitehead and several American pragmatists as constituting the main «process philosophers.»

There is an obvious external comparison which could be drawn here with the evolutionary cosmology of C. S. Pence, in which the laws of nature are described as having evolved, as subject to change, and as having more the characteristic of habit.13 However, there is no evidence whatever that Whitehead knew of Peirce's views or was in any way influenced by them.14

In so far as minding is not a direct confrontation with actualities, but is rather a process dealing with floods of possibilities, the semiotic imagery is highly appropriate since signs, as Peirce insists, belong to the order of possibilities.

This book very clearly shows that Peirce was nearly an equal influence with Whitehead (cf. pp.

With this phrase Peirce crystallized the issue.

The present deliberations have two distinct phases or stages, the first dealing with processes as such and the second with process philosophy as it has evolved in the work of people like Peirce, Whitehead, and Hartshorne.

Dr. Kraus presents Peirce's thought with the humor and systematic rigor Peirce would have used had he been Whitehead.

Process As an Accumulating of Feelings or Creative Syntheses, Represented along with Charles Peirce's Three Metaphysical Categones As Modes of Time

Hartshorne has recently argued that Peirce's categories should be distinguished not according to the number of terms they involve but according to the types of dependence which Peirce rightly identified with each (CAP 77 - 84, 106f; (ICE 324).

Peirce was an immense genius, but he was a physicist perched in a world with a physics about to change to the foundations.

Peirce scholars are indebted to Charles Hartshorne not only for his work in coediting with Paul Weiss the first six volumes of the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 1 but also for three stimulating papers on Peirce's theory of categories.2 In the second of these papers (1964) Professor Hartshorne argues that «Peirce's greatest single mistake..

I do not know whether he would have done this or not, since I believe that with his pragmatism he might have accommodated relativity physics without altering his epistemology, though I can not go into the question here.16 What seems to me clear is that the philosophical issues underlying Hartshorne's criticisms of Peirce can not be settled by theories of physics or the mathematics of continuity.

The inconsistencies Murphey finds in Peirce's attempt to define individual identity are unavoidable if one begins with the assumption that the identity of an individual consists in a collection of independent reactions.

Thompson's discussion seems to limit «reaction» to transactions with simultaneous or contemporary entities; but Peirce as I read him allows memory (as in surprise) to instantiate secondness or reaction.

I agree with Thompson that Peirce is not a systematic writer.

It is hardly mere coincidence that Peirce not only had no encounter with quantum theory, with its emphasis on discontinuity, but that he did not want physics to develop any such theory.

About these societies I, with Whitehead and the Buddhists, would accept much of what Peirce says about individuals.

Murray Murphey finds Peirce's declaration that individual identity consists in a continuity of reactions to be inconsistent with «either the definition of reaction or of continuity — there can not be a continuum of instantaneous events.