Sentences with phrase «fiscal squeeze»

A recent conference on the politics of fiscal squeeze explored some these issues and looked at how it has played out in different times and places.

Even before science's current fiscal squeeze, many graduate students and postdocs were working 60 to 80 - hour weeks under heavy pressure to produce meaningful results.

Old political arguments are being tested with new battles emerging over whose expectations are to be disappointed and who should be blamed for fiscal squeeze.

Note: the authors were co-editors (with David Heald) of the book, When the Party's Over: The Politics of Fiscal Squeeze in Perspective (British Academy / Oxford University Press, 2014).

If austerity does indeed come back and the next fiscal squeeze episode turns out to be like the last, following the trend shown in Figure 2 and the apparently greater electoral survival chances for incumbents associated with soft squeezes, it will be soft, spending - focused and long.

States are caught in an extended fiscal squeeze caused by rising costs and lower tax receipts.

Over all, government expenditures plunged 12.6 percent in the fourth quarter because of the partial federal shutdown and a broader fiscal squeeze, lowering total growth by nearly a full percentage point.

With the Chancellor's 2016 Autumn Statement formally burying the previous «austerity» target of achieving a budget surplus by 2020 and instead adopting a new, more expansionary fiscal rule, how does the recent era of fiscal austerity compare with major fiscal squeezes of the past?

It then moved on to looking at fiscal squeezes in more recent times: New Zealand, Sweden, the Netherlands, Ireland, Canada, Argentina and Germany.

And again the most recent fiscal squeeze seems to fit a trend in which increases in tax revenue have played a smaller part in fiscal austerity packages in the UK over the last 30 years than in earlier periods.

Can governments that copy «good» examples of fiscal squeeze escape punishment at the polls?

In spite of how much impassioned talk there has been of austerity on both sides of the party - political divide, the table also suggests that the UK coalition government's overall cutbacks to date have been modest in comparison with the seven earlier episodes of fiscal squeeze shown.

If the future of fiscal squeeze follows the pattern of the past, we can expect future squeezes to continue to bite harder on the spending than on the revenue element, to be orchestrated and planned within the central administrative apparatus rather than by outside commissions, and for the pain to be spread over longer periods with lower annual falls, rather than in sudden steep cuts.

Might the explanation be more political, for example in the dominance of fiscal squeezes led by right - of - centre governments since the 1970s or of the use of electoral tactics such as those employed by the Conservatives in the 1990s (repeated in the 2010s) of challenging the Labour opposition to pledge to match its ambitious proposed spending cuts in the future (or face election - campaign accusations of secretly planning a «tax bombshell»)?

Over the whole century there has only been one emergency government set up specifically to apply fiscal squeeze (the Ramsay MacDonald «National Government» of September 1931).

Mr Osborne's combination of # 32 bn additional spending cuts by 2014 - 15 and an # 8 bn net tax hike amounts to an unprecedented fiscal squeeze, including an extremely severe clampdown on the welfare bill.

Even if all of George Osborne's proposals for further cutbacks between 2014 and 2017 were fully implemented, the total percentage point drop in expenditure would rank the current fiscal squeeze in fifth position out of the eight shown in the table.

In those more recent fiscal squeezes, year - to - year cuts in public spending have been notably less deep than those imposed after both world wars or the «Geddes Axe» cuts initiated by the Conservative - Liberal coalition of the early 1920s.

The same applies to spending cuts in other countries in more recent times, such as Ireland in the late 1980s, or Sweden, Canada, New Zealand and Germany in the 1990s, which we compare in a forthcoming book When the Party's Over: The Politics of Fiscal Squeeze in Perspective.

In our analysis of 100 years of fiscal squeezes in the UK, we found that hard revenue or spending squeezes were associated with a 77 to 86 per cent likelihood of the incumbent parties in government losing at the next general election, compared with the 38 to 42 per cent likelihood of losing the next election that was associated with soft revenue and spending squeezes.

«Hard» fiscal squeezes (coloured grey) are defined as increases in tax revenue or falls in public spending both in absolute (constant price) terms and relative to GDP (above a defined threshold); «soft» squeezes (light yellow) are revenue rises or spending falls in only one of those ways.

In our analysis, the rarest type of fiscal squeeze is «double hard» when governments reduce public spending and increase tax revenue both in real terms and as a proportion of GDP.

It was clear from that analysis that there is not a single set of economic and financial conditions that precede fiscal squeeze in all cases and that fiscal squeeze is by no means always a certain route to electoral defeat for incumbent parties in government.

It considered in depth nine cases of fiscal squeeze (defined as the political effort that goes into reining in expenditure or raising taxes) and explored what conclusions we can draw for current debates about fiscal squeeze from earlier cases in other democracies.

Could cases often presented as «poster children» of successful fiscal consolidation (and at those often portrayed as failures or «basket cases») inform us about the politics of those fiscal squeezes?

The nine international cases of fiscal squeeze were then systematically compared using published data and techniques of qualitative comparative analyses, in a session chaired by Lord Gus O'Donnell.

Based on his experience at the IMF, he commented on the remarkable depth of some of the fiscal squeeze cases discussed in the conference, given the political difficulty of cutting expenditure by more than 1 per cent of GDP per year.

Indeed, our comparative study of fiscal squeezes across nine democracies in different times and places (The Politics of Fiscal Squeeze, OUP / British Academy 2014), indicated that revenue - led squeezes seemed to be remarkably rare.

So the table demonstrates that, in historical perspective, Osborne's strategy implemented on top of the cutbacks already made by the current coalition government would be unusual but not unprecedented in the length of the fiscal squeeze it would imply (seven years).

For example, the fiscal squeeze that began with the «Geddes Axe» under the UK's last Liberal - Conservative coalition in 1921 - 2 (and implemented in the following three years under three different governments) was also based on spending cuts alone, and went far deeper even than the plans announced by George Osborne.

So what accounts for the apparent disappearance of the hard revenue squeeze from the recent set of fiscal squeezes, and is it a disappearance that is likely to continue or to be reversed in the future?

What can we learn about the future of fiscal squeeze in the UK (defined as substantial political effort to increase revenue or cut public spending or both) from looking at past cases?

Christopher Hood, and Rozana Himaz are co-editors (together with David Heald) of the forthcoming book When the Party's Over: The Politics of Fiscal Squeeze in Perspective, due to be published by Oxford University Press for the British Academy later this year.

Is that another approach to fiscal squeeze that is gone for good, or might it be expected to recur in some circumstances?

Nor (in contrast with recent Eurozone experience) has there been a fiscal squeeze in the UK since the 1970s that was part of a negotiated financial bailout by outside lenders.

The IFS» Paul Johnson concluded that the makeup of the coalition's «fiscal squeeze» has «not been especially growth enhancing».

Acquario says the 2 % property tax cap approved last year by Governor Cuomo and the legislature is contributing to counties» fiscal squeeze.