Sentences with phrase «majority judgment»

Third, the trial judge and majority judgment in the Court of Appeal applied the principle of good faith performance of contractual obligations.

Despite the five different majority judgments the question was answered clearly enough.

The Supreme Court had in its judgment in the appeal numbered SC / 133/2017 nullified the earlier majority judgment of the Port Harcourt Division of the Court of Appeal, of February 17, 2017 recognising Sheriff as the authentic chairman of the party.

Lord Justice Ward (giving the lead majority judgment) said that the wife's statement was about her present intention and carried no implication of her future intentions.

The Supreme Court majority judgment in J.A. was written by Chief Justice McLachlin (Deschamps, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Crowell JJ.

In Canada, the recent majority judgment in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., 2013 SCC 5, more commonly known as Eric v. Lola, is also an instance of Supreme Court justices deferring to the Quebec legislature's choice to draw a distinction between treatment of common law and married spouses.

On Friday, January 25, 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in a tight majority judgment (five: McLachlin, Deschamps, Abella, Cromwell and Karakatsanis, against four: LeBel, Fish, Rothstein and Moldaver) that the Quebec Civil Code discriminates against common - law spouses because it does not grant them the same rights as married couples in regard to spousal support and division of property.

As just one example, the Chief Justice authored the important majority judgments in R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15 and R. v. Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13.

Lady Justice Smith delivered the leading majority judgment.

Approval voting can be considered a form of range voting, with the range restricted to two values, 0 and 1 — or a form of majority judgment, with grades restricted to good and poor.

Saraki's appeal filed through his lead counsel, Mr. Joseph Daudu (SAN), is challenging the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal in Abuja delivered on October 30, 2015, which affirmed the jurisdiction of the CCT to try him and the competence of the charges of false assets declaration preferred against him by the Federal Government.

The majority judgment in the 4 - 3 ruling, written by Justice Thomas Cromwell, found that a warrant is not required as long as the search is truly incidental to arrest and police keep detailed notes.

«The majority judgment rests upon a precarious legal foundation and erroneous assertions and propositions which, in the result, fail to satisfy the test for a rationally designed starting point that provides meaningful guidance to sentencing judges.»

The CAT dismissed that appeal by a majority judgment (Sales LJ and Clare Potter) with Dermott Glynn, an economist member of the CAT, dissenting.

In addition, she authored the majority judgment in Marshall / Bernard in 2005.

A strong dissent to the majority judgment is worth pointing up at the outset.

The majority judgment in Dunsmuir, written by Justices Bastarache and Lebel JJ.

The majority judgment accorded no deference to the College of Teachers by constructing the College decision as one concerning human rights, an area firmly within the judiciary's traditional territory.

Meanwhile, the majority judgment as well as Binnie J. purport to be more deferential (reasonableness standard) as they see the question as concerning the arbitrator's interpretation of its governing legislation.

Tipping, McGrath and Gault JJ («the majority judgment») undertook a fairly lengthy review of the judgments in Challenge.

The court split with Chief Justice McLachlin writing the majority judgment for herself and Justices Binnie, Deschamps and Rothstein.

The majority judgment thought that there could be a combination of factors including the economic and commercial effect of the transaction and the financial consequences for the taxpayer.

The majority judgment clarified the relationship between specific provisions allowing a tax deduction or other benefit and the general anti-avoidance section by reference to the Court of Appeal's judgment in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments Ltd by concluding «it is only if a specific provision on its true construction and application was intended to give the particular transaction the tax benefit claimed that it will fall outside the areas of application of s 99».

In Tannadyce, the Supreme Court in the majority judgment of Blanchard, Tipping and Gault JJ (delivered by Tipping J) confined judicial review to cases where the taxpayer was unable to bring its grievance within the statutory process.

The majority judgment noted that the Privy Council did not differ from that statement of principle but only on the facts, taking the view that the economic reality was that it was a «pretence» for a profitable company to buy the shareholding of a loss company outside the group in order to offset the losses against the profits made within the group and that this was tax avoidance.

Justice Cory wrote the majority judgment.

Congratulations are also in order to Justice Marshall Rothstein who has written the majority judgment in Ministry of Correctional Services v. Goodis, a case on public access to information, and claims of solicitor - client privilege.

In Ferrara v. Lorenzetti, Wolfe6, the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal (Laskin and Sharpe, J.J.A.) held the plaintiff's claim against the defendant solicitor was NOT statute barred.

The majority judgment in Stapley v. Hejslet, 2006 BCCA 34, 263 D.L.R. (4th) 19, outlines a number of factors to consider, at para. 46:

According to the majority judgment, «Section 329, by virtue of its objective of ensuring informational equality among voters, is a reasonable limit on s. 2 (b) of the Charter.»

Neither does the majority judgment mention the history of violence between J.A. and K.D.. Although the majority's focus was properly on the law of consent in light of the issue it had to decide, it missed an important opportunity to situate this issue within the broader context of domestic violence and marital rape (for a recent study on marital rape, see my report for the Equality Effect here).

At the same time, while the majority judgment is focused on the law of consent, it does seem more pragmatic in its approach to consent than the dissenting judgment.

Although Justice Fish did not cite Ashlee until the end of his judgment (at para. 144), and then only to respond to the Crown's interpretation of the majority judgment in Ashlee, his reasons for decision made many of the same points raised by Justice Conrad in dissent in Ashlee.

The majority judgment in J.A. also responded to the arguments in favour of permitting advance consent, including those relied on by a majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal and the dissenting justices at the Supreme Court (Justices Fish, Binnie and LeBel).

The majority judgment in

The abstract nature of the majority judgment is also insufficiently attuned to the context of the case and the broader context of sexual violence.

The majority judgments in J.A. and Ashlee are also more compelling in terms of their interpretation of the consent provisions of the Criminal Code and their application of the case law on consent.

You might expand on what you say the tawdry aspect is of my point about the authors of today's majority judgment.

Writing for the majority judgment on this issue, Cory J. observed:

Their lordships unanimously upheld the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal to the effect that pleural plaques — and, arguably, pleural thickening — do not constitute actionable damage.

The defendant's appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed on a majority judgment on the basis that: l The question was whether or not a joint intention could properly be inferred from the parties» conduct since separation that, over time, the 50/50 split would be varied so that the property was currently held 90 % by the claimant and 10 % by the defendant.

The test, as the majority judgment and the dissent agree is that there must be enough evidence in the file to allow the appellate court to rule on the new issue, and the failure to raise it at first instance can not be the result of a strategic choice by the party that seeks to raise it on appeal.

As the majority judgment explains, one of the issues in Miller concerned the effect of the so - called Sewel Convention, which

She concludes that the majority judgment is at odds with the Court's s. 15 equality jurisprudence, and with its Charter jurisprudence generally.