If there is no neutral matrix of
efficient cause in which to express responsible freedom, there is no responsible freedom.
In reality, they assumed, a deeper analysis of organisms shows that their behavior is also explained
by efficient causes operating among their parts or on them from without.
Modern science developed much further by
examining efficient causes, that is, what physical causes brought the phenomenon into being.
Although we differ on at least one point in the interpretation of Whitehead's philosophy (he holds the system to require that God acts efficiently by mediating to present events
finite efficient causes derived from the past), I do not see how his God acts coercively in any of the senses outlined in the previous chapter.
In either case the mind is faced with a conundrum: an endless regress without possibility of finding a
First Efficient Cause, or ultimate reason, on the one hand, or an absolutebeginning without necessity, on the other.
Although serious scientific work was done in terms of Aristotle's metaphysics, especially in biology, the ready appeal to final causes in explaining physical phenomena blocked needed inquiry
into efficient causes.
In that tradition, instead of thinking of God as a persuasive power who acts as a kind of lure toward which things move, which was Aristotle's conception, Aquinas and others adopted the understanding that God creates by being the ultimate
efficient cause for the world.
... Since reason can not truly know God, and since God is the only
true efficient cause, and God's will is the only true final cause, therefore reason can never go beyond material and instrumental causes.
Classically, God's power is seen in terms of omnipotence, and God is creator as the sole
primary efficient cause of the world.
To be sure, the existence of nontemporal actuality is different from that of temporal actuality, for temporal actualities influence us as
past efficient causes.
Some of the dualisms of the past almost identify the coercive power of
efficient cause with evil because it was seen to be so destructive.
There are several valuable constructive functions of
efficient cause in the cosmological scheme of Whitehead.
Both mechanism and finalism presuppose that «All is given,» the first
through efficient causes, the second through a kind of cosmic blueprint present at the beginning (CE 39 - 41,45,46) In rejecting both, Bergson insists that evolution operates within inherent limitations.
In either case the mind is faced with a conundrum: an endless regress withoutpossibility of finding a
First Efficient Cause, or ultimate reason, on the one hand, or an absolute beginning without necessity, on the other.
It does not belong to the «essence» of the
finite efficient cause and is not an intrinsic constitutive factor of its «nature», but, while transcending this nature, belongs to it precisely as its ground in relation to it as agent and cause.
God becomes the
ultimate efficient cause, the primary cause of things, separate from the world with all of its secondary causal processes.
At one time the Catholic natural law philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and his followers dominated European thinking, but its metaphysical foundations were undermined as science replaced Aristotelian teleology and Catholic theology with a materialist worldview that considers only
efficient causes.
For both systems God as
efficient cause must remain actual.
Brahman is said to be the material cause and God
the efficient cause in this creation.
It can be neither
an efficient cause nor the effect of a particular cause.
Creativity is the material cause of the universe while actual entities are
the efficient causes.
God is
the efficient cause of all other actual entities in that he determines their locus within the extensive continuum and then provides them with a suitable aim.
only actual entities can function as
efficient causes.
The material cause and
the efficient cause, substance and its accidents, are co-ultimate.
For Whitehead too, God is creator in the sense of
efficient cause.
Both continually operatC as
efficient causes.
If the Darwinist, taking up Descartes» and Bacon's project of understanding nature according only to material and
efficient causes, studies the history of living things and says that he can see no organizing, active principles of whole living substances (formal causes) and no real plan, purpose or design in living things (final causes), then I accept his report without surprise.
But series of
efficient causes in space or time are unintelligible; one never arrives at a final answer explaining the origin and goal of motion.
But once randomness is introduced into an explanatory science, «mechanism,» understood as a necessitating chain of
efficient causes, no longer suffices as an explanation.
He explained his belief in God by using the basic argument from contingency which postulates
an Efficient Cause.