Sentences with phrase «conscious experience»

The evidence indicates that in the growth of conscious experience mere awareness is prior and primordial.

More specifically, what kind of physiological event does an occasion of human conscious experience become?

Yet immediate conscious experience does testify, albeit vaguely, to its bodily origins.

Their results are even shedding light on the way our brains produce our rich and complex conscious experience.

It may be that the dramatic events attending birth, including drawing its first breath, are the triggers for its first conscious experience of life.

In addition to the vast complexity of unconscious experience, I suggested, we can analyze conscious experience into significantly organized and receptive levels.

Most of us would agree that conscious experience occurs also without such dearly focused interest, but just how far to extend the term is a matter of reasonable disagreement.

In the brain wave model conscious experience is the coming - into - being of a configuration of brain waves.

All of these circuits that are distributed throughout the brain allow for what we call conscious experience.

And if they could not interact, they could not form a single entity, and they could not have a single, unified conscious experience.

These are some of our favorite brands making beauty and self - care a more conscious experience.

We can examine the results of both in conscious experience.

But this much is clear: those factors found on the most basic level of conscious experience are precisely those that he attributes to the world at large.

Thus human conscious experience is our only reliable key to unlock the mysteries of reality.

Free recall is the ability to remember items from a list, while working memory is a type of short - term memory that involves immediate conscious experiences.

By this distinction of two modes of passivity — of receiving forms - Aristotle sets off the world of conscious experience from the world of nature, but in such a way that not only the objects but the very workings of nature are included as part of what is felt.

Then in the mid-forties Pollock, and increasingly Motherwell too, departed from the surrealist concept by using automatism as a device for objectifying an intense conscious experience as it was unfolding, rather than as a means of bringing forth unconscious material for association or of using unconscious thought processes to modify imagery.

(2) Can we reduce to biology or hope to reduce to biology those subjective conscious experiences which we may ascribe to animals, and, if question (1) is answered in the affirmative, can we reduce them further to physics and chemistry?

A posse of presenters argued that the lack of a complete theory by neuroscientists regarding how neural activity translates into conscious experiences (such as redness) means that a physicalist approach is inadequate or wrong.

He [Descartes] also laid down the principle that those substances which are the subjects enjoying conscious experiences provide the primary data for philosophy, namely, themselves as in the enjoyment of such experience.

As Max Velmans and Susan Schneider wrote in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness: «Anything that we are aware of at a given moment forms part of our consciousness, making conscious experience at once the most familiar and most mysterious aspect of our lives.»

And this precisely is the facet of the object that extends beyond conscious experience, for it is doubtless true of any arising entity that it must take, and perhaps even take in, the world as it finds it.

I had a feeling that if I understood this commonality I could make better sense of the relation between conscious experience and the body.

Descartes, Whitehead maintains, made a most important philosophical advance when he «laid down the principle, that those substances which are the subjects enjoying conscious experiences provide the primary data for philosophy, namely, themselves as in the enjoyment of such experience.

These occasions would contribute to conscious experience only when they were positively prehended by the presiding conscious occasion.

Researchers also tested the validity of conscious experiences using objective markers for the first time in a large study to determine whether claims of awareness compatible with out - of - body experiences correspond with real or hallucinatory events.

I assume that in my unconscious even now there is a relation to past experiences, also influencing my present conscious experience, that binds them to me «with some peculiar completeness.»

Our most fundamental conscious experience has generally been taken to be the perception of sensa, i.e., of relatively clear and distinct objects such as red, bitter, etc..

The most basic conscious experience is emotional rather than cognitive, an affective response (expansion or retreat) to some vague presence dimly felt (AI 225f, PR 246 - 48).

The object of conscious experience presupposes the agent and the transmission of forms.

Below conscious experience, therefore, there are agents but no objects; there are forms transmitted and received, acting and being acted upon, inheritance of a sort, reproduction and assimilation, but there are no forms received and entertained as objects and there is no immanent activity.

We are not imputing conscious experience to the proton or the cell but something analogous that can correctly be called subjectivity.

When we take conscious experience as our basis for understanding what experience is, we think of receiving and responding to stimuli from the body and the environment, of emotion, purpose, and thought, of the significant organization of data and the influencing of action.

Gilbert Harman's «Room 306» thought experiment can be revised to eliminate conscious experience from Harris's moral calculus: You have five patients in the hospital that are dying, each in need of a separate organ.

To a large extent my conscious decisions are made on the basis of memories of past conscious experiences and anticipations of future ones.

Neuroscience, he says, has shown the dependence of conscious experience upon the brain but it has not reduced consciousness to observable states of the brain.

In fact, Wolfgang Kohler and other researchers in the holistic tradition have formulated theories that link conscious experience to brain waves.»

«Specifically, the differences between emotional and non-emotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences.»

As a result, LeDoux and Brown observe, «the brain mechanisms that give rise to conscious emotional feelings are not fundamentally different from those that give rise to perceptual conscious experiences.»